What Happens When the Russians Come to Your Country
Episode Notes
Transcript
Eric and Eliot welcome Yaroslav Trofimov, Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent of the Wall Street Journal and author of the new book Our Enemies Will Vanish: The Russian Invasion and Ukraine’s War of Independence (N.Y.: Penguin Press, 2024) released on January 9, 2024. They discuss Putin’s rationale for the war, his long-standing views (shared by many Russians that are dismissive and disdainful of Ukrainian national identity), why some Russians (like Igor Girkin and Yevgeniy Prigozhin who had some actual knowledge of Ukraine) had more realistic views of Ukraine’s ability to inflict damage on the Russian army, the potential of a negotiated settlement in the spring of 2022 and why negotiations failed, the tensions between President Zelenskiy and Commander of the Armed Forces General Zaluzhny, the fate of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and the role of the high command in making decisions like the defense of Bakhmut, the views of the Ukrainian military about U.S. military advice and training, the Biden Administration’s self-limiting fears of potential nuclear escalation by Putin and the consequences of the hesitant provision of advanced military equipment to the Ukrainians as well as the likely consequences and dangers of failing to pass the Supplemental Aid legislation currently before Congress and resuming the flow of military aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
https://www.amazon.com/Our-Enemies-Will-Vanish-Independence/dp/0593655184
Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.
This transcript was generated automatically and may contain errors and omissions. Ironically, the transcription service has particular problems with the word “bulwark,” so you may see it mangled as “Bullard,” “Boulart,” or even “bull word.” Enjoy!
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Welcome to Shield of
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the Republic of Secret Podcast by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of public affairs at the University of Virginia and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Walter Lipman. During World War two that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the essential shield of our Democratic Republic. Eric Edelman Council at the Center for strategic and budgetary assessments, a full Bulwark contributor and a non resident fellow at the Miller Center. I’m joined by my continual partner in all things strategic. Elliott Cohen, the Robert E Ozgood professor of strategy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
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In Washington, DC, and also the Arleigh Burke chair and Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Elliott, welcome great to see you.
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Well, it’s great to see you. It’s a good, a, to be healthy and b, not to be on the road, both of which are kind of a change for where I’ve been over the last few months. And looking forward to our, our guest.
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Well, let me introduce our guest. Our guest is Janesluff Trofimuff, the chief foreign affairs correspondent of the Wall Street journal. And, more to the point, the, author of our enemies will vanish the Russian invasion and Ukraine’s war of independence its publication date was actually, I think, the ninth of January, which is, the day before we’re recording this. Yarslav is, a war correspondent with a lot of experience in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Holds an MA from New York University and is the author of, two previous books faith at war, and one of my favorite books, the siege of Mecca, about the nineteen seventy nine siege of the Grand mosque in Meccastaff welcome to shield of the Republic.
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Great to be on the show. Thank you for having me.
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Let me kick it off and then, I’m sure Elliot has plenty to ask you about. But let’s start at the beginning if you might for our listeners. What is your assessment of why we are facing this war, why Ukraine finds itself in this war. A lot of people in the United States have argued that this was really prompted by the United States, even, famously John Mearsheimer, professor of international relations University of Chicago, says it was NATO enlargement and very bad US policies that drove this. You are someone who comes from the region, native speaker, What’s your sense of, what drove Putin to declare war?
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Well, I think we have to go back to, what Putin has said. As the cornerstone of his worldview to him the collapse of the Soviet Union in nine ninety one, was the most tragic event of the twentieth century. And he has been seeking ever since to rebuild Moscow’s authority over this lands that were collected in by the Russian monarchs for generations and then lost almost overnight overnight in nineteen ninety one. And so Ukraine really in this frame had two options. You know, either you become a satellite that is normally independent like Belarus has become, or you have to be taken over by force.
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And sooner or later, that was good to happen. I mean, he already tried once. Sorry. He initially he initially tried this sort of the belarus model with president Yana Kovic. That didn’t work because the Ukrainian people rebelled when, you know, Kovic tried to steer away from ukrainians, European aspirations and and embark on the Belarus like path towards Moscow two thousand fourteen.
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He tried with, fostering a proxy war in Dunvas and then hoping for change inside Ukraine. That also didn’t happen. And, I think by by by the time of the invasion, he was seeing that Ukraine was slowly but inexorably changing and moving as a society towards Europe Union towards, you know, Western democratic ideas. And I was so, just sort of basic, facts of life. The Ukrainians could travel without a visa to the European Union, and the young people would routinely go, to the west instead of Moscow.
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So, sort of the vector of society have changed and it was changing with every year. And so I think in his calculations, time was working against him. But I think he had biscalculated the rate of change and Ukraine by the time of the invasion had already changed so much that there was very little nostalgia, a little support for this past, of sort of a common statement with Russia, and I think the other mistake he made is that the Russian speaking population of Ukraine was in its vast majority no longer for Russia because of what happened in twenty fourteen because in twenty fourteen, you know, Russia was still seen by many Russia speakers in Ukraine as land of, opportunity, land of prosperity, higher salaries, But then when Russia took over the bus and half the police had to flee and the economies appeared, there was this very good example of what happens when the Russians come to your country.
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So the the, you know, the, yarrow, there’s, so much of a story of miscalculation in this book, which on both sides, which you really capture very well on side of the Russians, also on the side of the west. I think not understanding, what Ukrainian resistance would be like and how difficult the war would prove for the Russians You know, one figure who keeps on cropping up in your book, who is he’s a war criminal. Igor Gherkin, I guess, goes by the Nom de Gare Strelkoff, but he also seems to have understood pretty early on that this was going to be far more difficult than anybody in the Russian military and kind of national security establishment did. Could could just elaborate on that? Why why was that the case?
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We it wasn’t the case. And if so, why was it the case. I mean, I I believe Gerkin is now in prison, which may tell us something, but, you know, say a little bit more because he is a very interesting figure, I think.
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He’s a very interesting figure. And, you know, because of his firsthand experience in Ukraine, you know, he was the man who launched the you know, I mean, he sparked the violence in Dunbas in twenty fourteen by taking over the city of Slovakia and holding it, for, for a month. And then he was the defense minister of the Russian proxy state led, during its, so called during its people’s republic. So he had first hand experience of Ukraine. A new Ukraine.
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I think the problem with Russia is that there’s so much disdain, for the Ukrainians, for the little brothers, you know, with little Ron DeSantis, that they were not taken seriously, and it was a dirt of expertise, in things Ukrainian. People just felt that wouldn’t have to study Ukrainian politics. It’s all, you know, Ukrainian culture and society. It’s all jokes. It’s a fake country that will collapse as the house of cards.
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Which was the prevailing belief in Moscow ahead of the war. You know, people were saying it. The the Ukrainian army will switch sides And all we have to do is remove this, you know, corrupt western elite imposed by the CIA. And everyone else will bring us with flowers and and unity in the normal state of things will resume. And and putting himself was, to a large extent, how much of this thinking, you know, he spent the entire COVID periods, you know, in his bunker reading books about, you know, Ukrainian history and how Ukrainian don’t really exist.
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The traditional Russian view. And, you know, if you read the books by Russian historians, you know, it would tell you that the Ukrainian language was invented by the Austro Hungarian General’s staff to undermine the Empire in, you know, nineteen fourteen. And people believe that. I mean, the the series people believe that in Russia. And, you know, Will Saletan this a say that was read to every member of the Russian forces in two thousand and twenty one on the historical unity of the Ukrainians and Russians I think he really believed that and he really believed that he’s just restoring the normal state of affairs.
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Instead of trying to eliminate a nation that does exist.
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Just a a quick follow on that. Do you think the Russians have substantially revised that initial view. And if so, what are the consequences of it? Because, I mean, you know, clearly they anticipated the Ukrainian collapse because of that understanding of what Ukraine is and they absolutely failed to achieve that and it’s turned into something infinitely bigger and bloodier than they ever could have expected. Do you think that deep down, there’s now a a different understanding of Ukraine and what consequences do you think that might have?
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I think on some level, yes. So if you read the and I’ve spent far too much time reading, you know, Russian military bloggers on Telegram in the last two years, There is an appreciation that yes, oh, wow. These guys, you know, know how to fight and they want to fight and, you know, they’re actually kind of real. So one parallel of this is I think there is a lot more desire for vengeance and indiscriminate punishment. And so I think the it it made the Russians more brutal in their behavior.
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Because if in the beginning, the thoughts, the the generally thought, you know, many soldiers thought that we’re coming to liberate our brothers from the Nazis. Who just took over power in the, you know, in a pooch sponsored by the Americans in twenty fourteen. And once they realize they’re actually facing a aid people that is hostile to them. I think that was that was the trigger for many of the atrocities that we have seen after that.
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You know, this is not a new view that Putin came to. I mean, as you noted, there’s a lot of discussion about during COVID, he kind of took a deep dive into this history and background, but he had famously told, president Bush forty three, you know, some fifteen years ago that, you know, George, you have to understand Ukraine is not really even a nation. I mean, This is a deep seated, long held view with deep roots as you, you know, suggest. It’s not
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just not just reporting, I think. I think I think it was a majority view in the general public in Russia. I mean, it didn’t it didn’t intellectuals that Joseph Brodsky kind of thought like that. You know, keep famously penned this verse on the increasing independence full of profanities and wishing that the deeper river would flow Bulwark. You know, and so all the ungrateful opinions would dare to break up with Russia.
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Yeah. And you you see it. You you still see it even now in, you know, the writings and discussions of so called Russian liberals like, Gregory who, you know, you know, shares this sort of Russian imperial view, what, however, wherever they are on the political spectrum, it it it doesn’t really change the I mean, I mean, I mean,
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you have seen some of the people in the Russian position of who twenty fourteen, very ambiguous, and now have come out very clearly. You know, it’s what it would bring to be fair. That also happened.
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Right. Very small number, though.
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I mean, even Navalny, you know, in twenty fourteen, he was ambiguous. He said, creamy is not a sandwich. Can I give you back? But the statements he made from prison after the invasion to to turn twenty two. Yeah.
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Were much more clear cut in defending the principles of Ukraine independence and integrity.
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Fair enough. You know, I but this actually Precipitates another question I had for you, which is, and I think the book is really terrific on this point. And I and I if I’m not mistaken, I think there’ve been some excerpts in some, newspapers that have captured this, but there’s been a a narrative that there was an opportunity for a negotiated settlement early in the war You had these talks in, Istanbul minister, Midyensky, the, I guess, former culture minister, as he may be still term minister. I can’t remember. But, was was there, you know, acting at Putin’s behest and there were Ukrainians and there were, you know, sort of somehow wandering around, as a gray spectral presence.
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So for all of this, but you do a pretty good job of making it clear that, unless the Ukrainian were prepared to totally capitulate, there really wasn’t the makings of a of a deal here. Could you talk about that a little bit?
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Yeah. So the talks, you know, there were several phases to these talks, and the first meeting happened four days after the invasion where the situation was touch and go. The Russian troops almost around in Kiev and, you know, attacking it and trying to take it over. The Ukrainian forces were struggling to put up defenses in other areas. Harkiv was, torturing on the brink of being overrun.
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And, when the Ukrainians came to the stocks in Belarus, which was by no means neutral territory, the Russians, essentially, what is capitulation. I mean, the list of Russian demands, right now, Benadinsky, included panning over all the heavy weapons of the Ukrainian armed forces. Obviously, you know, changing the government, creating a puppet regime in Ukraine, Russian language as a state language, and even changing the street names, to remove everyone who’s in Russian history is deemed to me. Four of Russia. And by the time they met again after two more rounds in Istanbul at the end of March, twenty ninth of March, twenty twenty two.
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The situation, the situation on the battlefield that changed dramatically. So, the Ukrainian no longer had a gun to their head. And, you know, things that they could have considered in the beginning of the war where, you know, the very existence, the survival of the government was very much in doubt. Were no longer palatable, to discuss. And the Russian demands were also less harsh because the Russians realized that they lost the battle of Kiev by then.
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Then the Russians started to withdraw the troops from around Kiev. So they’re no longer demanded the Ukraine hand over all the heavy weapons, but they still demanded pretty significant in the Korean military. And there was no agreement how big they are. You know, the porting, put in famously displayed the documents of the draft agreement. But there was still a major divergence within Russian and Ukrainian positions.
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And after that point, the Ukrainians were willing to discuss things like mutual status and abandoning made it made to membership in exchange for binding international guarantees that you know, the US was not going to keep anyway at the time. So it was a bit of a pipe dream. And the negotiations were not going to lead to a binding agreement at the time because a lot of these things would have required the create to have a referendum, you know, need a membership as part of the constitution, and that was made very clear. So this is still preliminary discussions. So the word the word talks, there was no agreement.
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And then, one of the delegations returned to Kiev, the Korean troops had just entered Wucha and found more than four hundred bodies of local civilians who were tortured killed, you know, executed, by the Russian forces there. And it was really a shock to the entire colonial society. And also, opened open the eyes of the world to what Russia was doing in in the territories that had occupied and to what was happening elsewhere because We’ve seen Bucha and we know what happened in Bucha because the Russians were forced out of Bucha and didn’t have the time to cover the tracks. But in other places like Marlupo, they just bulldozed, you know, housing blocks full of, full of corpses. Nobody know exactly, you know, how many people died there, you know, twenty thousand, thirty, seventy, you know, nobody nobody was counting.
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And so I think that really, that really was the psychological break break for it. Yens. On one hand, they finally realized that they don’t have to capitulate because they could beat the Russians. On the other hand, they also for the costs of capitulating because, you know, if they had syringer, there’ll be butchers all over Ukraine.
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And there were some others, like, is you and other places where Yeah. Similar things happened.
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Exactly. Exactly.
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You know, you you describe, very vividly the the kind of social cohesion that was shown all over Ukraine, Although the there’s one exception, which is the south, the area around Qerson, where, actually, the Russians were able to achieve quite a bit. So my first question is really what accounts for the difference between, say, Harkiv, where with a largely Russian speaking population. I think people included the Russians anticipated that they would be able to to take the city pretty easily. And then what seems to have been the case, in the area of the south, where they, you know, did not initially meet, as much resistance as they did around Kiev or around Farkev. And then the second question I’d like to ask you, which is related to to this is how how do you assess the, the cohesion of Ukraine today after two years of, you know, really intense brutal conflict and what looks to be something of a stalemate, although we can argue about that.
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Yeah. So I in some ways, Harkev and Hassan are similar, and the outcome was different because of leadership. What I’ve seen throughout Krain is whenever wherever local leadership, the mayors, you know, the governors, you know, the village heads. Decided to resist show initiative, it didn’t, you know, put a couple of bulldozers across the street, you know, dump trucks move up a bridge. That would stop the Russians because they were not prepared for resistance.
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And it would stop the Russians often long enough. For the Ukrainian military to a group to to to take positions to stop them permanently. In her son, What happened in Arizona is what the Russians had expected to happen everywhere in Ukraine. The local leadership you know, a large part of it was infiltrated by the Russian, you know, especially the local intelligence service. So they, collaborated with the Russians of their depositions and no one really resisted.
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It’s really remarkable because as soon as the Russians arrived at the borders of the isolation to the next one, suddenly they were stopped. You know, in Nepropriotropscription, for example. The other differences that Harkiv is a particular city because Harkiv had a history of this, you know, conflict in two thousand fourteen. Let’s remember that when the Russian people’s republics were proclaimed in Dunjensk They also tried in Harkiv. They lasted one night, but they took over, you know, the Perussian militias took over the government building there, and then they were kicked out.
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And Harkiv as a result had a sense of what could happen and he also had historically a very strong and militant a pro pro Ukrainian movement, the event took part in the in the conflict in the bus, and will inform the kernel of the resistance afterwards. As for the creation of society now, of course, when Ukraine’s very existence was in danger, society was extremely nice in the beginning. You know, everybody wanted to join the territorial defense, kept a gun in flight. I think what we see now for two years of war is a lot of fatigue and a lot of exhaustion. You know, casualties have been high.
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And also it’s a little bit the same pattern as we have seen in two thousand fourteen. You know, Kiev is living more or less except for, you know, recent time when there was a lot of barrage more like, mistyled Barrajekt’s more or less normal life. There is war far in the east. And, you know, if you are, if you’re a young man in Kiev, you don’t really necessarily want to go and die for Abdi if going to the bus because you’ve never been there and or back out for that matter. It doesn’t really matter to you who controls it.
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I think should the product last be breached? And, you know, that is not, that is not unlikely. The cohesion will return because Once once the war becomes existential again, the psychology will change. And, you know, many Koreans Hope that they will not come to that. And, obviously, every time Russia a tax key, as we have seen, in over the near, will miss Alvarages and kill civilians.
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That also reinforces the unity, I think. And, There’s still a very large number of people who are, ready to fight. I’m just gonna say that, you know, the designer of of the website for my book is leading to join the army this week.
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Alright. Let me go back to, Kopo, go back to the Russians for a moment. Do you think the Russians understand? And when I say the Russians, again, you can kind of slice that however you wish, that What they have done is to reinforce the Ukrainian sense of nationality in a very powerful way. And, you know, that in some respects, no matter how the war actually turns out they’ve, in some sense, lost it.
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I mean, I don’t know if you would agree with that assessment, that that certainly seems plausible to me. But I’m I’m more curious about getting inside their heads. I mean, I understand they’re vengeful and angry and, you know, all that. But do you think that at at some deeper level that they understand that, you know, this has been a a failure? I mean, again, to go back to another bizarre character, progression, the head of the Wagner Group.
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You you had a sense that he sort of understood that. Or believe that.
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Yeah. Again, I mean, because pre government had spent a lot of time in Ukraine. Yeah. So he had a, you know, a realistic assessment of what Ukraine is. I think the reason I’m understanding that the Ukrainians are not Russians.
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But I think a lot of these characters, especially Gierkin, you know, they correctly understand the facts. But the conclusions of the draw are not necessarily rational. So the conclusion drawn by many of the rational, and the analysts from this, analysts are in a very sort of loose sense of the word, you know, people in sort of the Jonathan Last military media is that they just have to be much more harsh. And if you look at the recipes for the future of Ukraine, that are circulated, including on state news agencies, you know, like RIA is that, you know, there was this famous op ed, unreal published. I think in in April or or May twenty twenty two, that’s it.
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Okay. Well, you know, what do we do with Ukraine? If we take over Ukraine, we have to physically eliminate, you know, the entire elite that has polluted the minds of our brothers. And in the ordinary, people have to suffer to pay for their sins. And maybe, you know, in two generations, we’ll make them into Russians.
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So the problem, I think the the the the the lesson learned from Ukraine resistance is that you have to mention genocide. I think that is That is what a lot of people in Moscow concluded.
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I’d like to turn back to Ukraine for a minute. When Zelensky was elected president, had a overwhelming vote. I think it was over seventy percent, when he was elected. Popularity had declined before the war began, but of course became, you know, stratospheric, afterwards. But, your book already, makes clear that, during the course of the first year of the war, which is what you, you’ve focus on that there were some kind of, I would say, incipient differences emerging between, his view of how to fight the war and, the view of the, armed forces commander, general’s illusiony, Those differences have now begun to, sort of break the surface a little bit, so loose gave, an interview and posted a, a long paper on the the economist website.
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So it looks like the adjournment of politics that had taken place for the first two years of the war is beginning to change. Ukraine is still operating under a state of emergency. So there won’t be elections anytime soon. I I suppose. What’s your sense of kind of the state of you know, politics inside Ukraine.
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And how might that affect, you know, the the war effort going forward? I mean, there’s a whole issue about mobilization, you know, both Zaluzhanie and Zelensky have talked about the need for five hundred thousand kind of fresh troops to be able to fight this war over the long haul. That’s very controversial. I gather it’s a pretty vigorous debate around Ukraine, even as we speak. Tell us a little bit about your sense of that.
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Well, I think when we say that, you know, Zelensky was popular than he was unpopular before the war, and then his popularity is stored again. I think it wasn’t Zelensky necessarily as the person, but in his role as the president and the symbol of Ukrainian statehood. You know, I have never seen any portrait of Zelensky amongst soldiers on the front line, you know, I’ve seen one soldier wearing a patch saying, I killed for Zelensky, and that was a joke. So, I think I think abroad, he was a very effective spokesman for the Ukrainian case going over the heads of politicians and and and and governments to the Western public opinion and making the moral case for Ukraine, which worked really well in the first year of the world. I don’t think it’s working anymore.
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As we can see by, you know, the funding, my shortfall and the, you know, the US politics around it. But, The tension resolution was always there and, you know, sometimes it’s inherent in their dual roles because because, Zelensky is the, overall commander in chief and Zaloesnay is the commander of the armed forces. And so when I gather in this stuff, which is the Supreme headquarters that was set up, a few months into the war, you know, you also have their, you know, the foreign minister, the finance minister. You have heads of the intelligence agencies, and sometimes what makes sense in the purely military terms. Mainly necessarily makes sense, in the political and You know, for example, he had two way priorities such as, you know, securing Western weapons And, sometimes there was a clash.
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But I think so far, they’ve, you know, they they they have managed to keep these tensions from, tipping over. You know, Zalva just always says that he’s not interested in politics and he’s interested in running the military. And I think cranions have a really better history, in the past, you know, many centuries where the Ukrainian state in the seventeenth century or the Ukrainian state in the early twentieth century all collapsed because of internal strife. And I think that’s a lesson that was learned the hard way. And, you know, even even in the recent past, you know, the the the pro russian government union coverage could only come to power because of, squabbles in the pro western company, Ukraine, in in the UK you should come to Mashenko.
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And so I think as long as this existential threat persists, there will be great effort by Zelanski and solution in others to keep things civil and and workable.
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Are there substantive differences between them about how the war should be fought.
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I think it’s more of an issue of tactics. You know, as I lose the beginning of the war, adopted a dynamic defense. So so he traded land, for force preservation, And as I heard it worked, you know, if Ukraine were fighting for every village when the Russians invaded, it would have no army by the end of the, you know, first couple of days. But now that Ukraine was in the phase of trying to regain land, Any surrender of territory was seen as a big political setback, which is why Zalensky really insisted on fighting to the nail, not to let Russia take the city of Bakhmunt. And, you know, the Russians to Bakhmunt as a tremendous cost to themselves, you know, Wagner was destroyed as a military force as a result of it, but obviously also, it’s looking heavy damage to some of Ukraine’s best units, and we’ve seen that and I decree not having these brigades really affected its ability to, launch a counter offensive, last year, which did not achieve significant results.
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Do you have a sense of how the high command, I mean, think really of on the military side, how they assess the future of the war. I mean, do do you think they see the next year is one where which is basically one of positional warfare and then Eventually, they build up and go on the offense. I mean, how how are they thinking about the future of the war?
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I think the main priority in the next year is not to lose significant ground for Ukraine because we’re now in a situation with Russia once again. Has a very low salary advantage in emission, and we’re back to the base when it’s a five to one ratio, the number of shells. The Russia can fire, all along the front line. And Russia has been on the offensive, in the last three months. You know, with limited results, but still it’s getting ground, random deep cuts, getting ground slowly in other areas.
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And so the priority for Ukraine, especially if, this supplemental doesn’t come through anytime soon and especially if it is a flow of Western military age slows to trickle is not to allow us to have a major breakthrough into preventing catastrophic collapse of the front lines, which is not impossible.
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Although, the co I mean, the Russians in Avtivka have taken enormous losses both in men and materiel. Over the last three months. I mean, pretty astounding losses, actually, which in in, I mean, in many cases would would break in our hasn’t broken the Russian army yet, but, it certainly has come at an enormous cost and you have to assume that morale can’t be that great on the Russian side of the line given given that, I would think.
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I mean, what do we’ve seen really the lesson sort of in purely military terms? In the past year is that neither Russian or Ukraine have been able to carry out, you know, combat arms warfare and carry out any successful offensive operations. Ukraine also took the large casualties and and and a lot of losses in the separation front and amatious he’s, you know, what’s five, ten, a little villages. Right.
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What do you think is the, I can use a a bit of jargon. The the the theory of victory for, the Ukrainian high command y you know, what what is the story that that gets them to success?
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Well, I think the one thing that they, really focus on these long range fires, being able to disrupt the Russian rear, and and that has proven very effective, with the, you know, the cruise missiles that, works from France and the UK. In small numbers, but still. So, they hope that once they have sixteen center in disguise, and that could also change the balance, of power, on the front line. But I think the war has settled into this pattern where it’s done the resilience of each of the two societies. So, basically, the question is will the Russian society crumble first or will the Ukrainian society crumble first?
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And we may not know this answer. And in through a logic study, it depends on how much external help will Ukraine receive both in military terms but also in just pure sustaining the economy terms, to prevent soft unrest.
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I wonder if we could talk a little bit about something you address, in the book, and I think it’s appeared in some of the excerpts. Which is the whole question of the West’s assessment of the risks of escalation. In in, response to support for Ukraine. It’s been a a steady theme of of this podcast with, Elliot and me beating the, drum that the Biden administration has over estimated, the the risks of of escalation, particularly given, the losses that have, that that Russian conventional forces have suffered. You know, not a lot of appetite on Putin’s part to actually be in a conflict, a real conflict with Ukraine.
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I mean, with NATO. Whatever the rhetoric is about how it’s already going on in Ukraine, but the result has been a pattern, a consistent pattern which you talk about in the book too of delivery of assistance that’s sort of always late, you know, and always a bit behind the curve. You know, it’s always coming after the point at which it might have had, you know, maximal impact and maybe a decisive impact on the on the battlefield. Could you talk about that a little bit? Sure.
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I mean, I think the profits in the pudding, you know, the Ukrainians were asking for, you know, I have sixteens for the patriots, for Abraham’s tanks, labor tanks for, you know, timers for everything, since the war began, And, every category of gear, they were told that no, no, we cannot give it to you because it’s going to provoke a clear reaction from Moscow. And then it didn’t. Yeah. But by the time this, you know, what the Pentagon described with the mountain of steel, which was really the mountain, but still, you know, all this armor arrived in Ukraine in the summer of twenty twenty three and was truly because the Russians had the entire winter in the spring to begin to build this, you know, massive fortification and to recruit, you know, hundreds of thousands of, soldiers. Ukraine really had the best chance of breaking through in, in sort of September, October twenty twenty two.
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Before Putin declared the mobilization. And, Russia had about a hundred thousand combat troops in all of Ukraine at the time. And, but they didn’t have the resources. So that that offensive, well, successful, eventually ran out of steam. And, let’s remember that at the time, Putin had announced the annexation of four, Ukrainian regions to Russia.
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And again, put the nuclear card on the table and said that, you know, this is now Russian land and different rules apply. This is not a bluff, quote unquote, and the Ukraine is called his bluff. I kept going and in Cabo City of Liman after that speech. And again, Putin didn’t do anything. So I think it’s in hindsight, it’s very clear that portions nuclear threats, worked to a great extent, they did throttle Western support when it was most needed.
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And You know, he he was because of that, and he was also able to, break out the West, a big advantage of the internal political rifts in in western societies. As we can see now, with the, you know, with the delays and possible, you know, general. Collapse of the consensus about, military aid and aid to creating the US Congress.
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To ask a related question, the impression that I have, and, just ask you to tell me what you think I’m it’s right or wrong, is that, You know, throughout this war, we’ve been giving the Ukrainians military advice as well as weapons and some sorts of training. But that the advice is actually, often not really appropriate for what their circumstances are, and that it, you know, there’s a I I sometimes get the sense that Ukraine don’t actually particularly trust our operational level military judgment about what they can do and what they they should do that they, you know, I’m sure very grateful for the weapons and they’re grateful for the intelligence, particularly the very fine grained intelligence and maybe they, I’m, you know, I suspect they probably learn a lot from, you know, the technique and tactics of, say, air defense. But when it comes to operational level judgment about how to conduct the war, I sort of have the sense that the Ukrainians don’t have a particularly high opinion of what it is that the United States and Britain little loans in other countries have to offer them. Is that too harsh or a reading of things?
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I think it’s correct. I think it’s correct. And also, you know, And there was an example to that as well in how the offensive failed. If you look at the US military, and at last time, the US military faced a near peer, adversary was in Korea. You know, the US military has gone through the last several decades fighting countriesurgency wars, which is a completely different scenario to what the Ukrainians had experienced.
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And the crayons, you know, are fighting. And a near peer, but a much stronger near peer, obviously. And, they have adapted the way they’re doing it. They they had there’s a lot of innovation. They’re doing a lot of things that the US military is not doing, you know, the the the drone technology there’s nine employed down to squad level at all levels of the Ukrainian military.
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It’s one example. The sort of the integration of the but for management platforms, you know, every every one at every level, you know, has these tablets, through which they can see you know, the drones out there, their artillery connects with the eyes in the sky. So you have this on Uber like system, and that is quite advanced. And and, you know, organic. And so, when the offensive was being prepared, several brigades were trained in Germany and other countries in Europe by the US military.
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But they were trained in in the US doctrine that and methods that presumes the existence of air support. And they were not trained in some of the real things that Ukrainians use. Such as, you know, the drones, you know, maybe from this. And and it’s other other other hard learned ways of fighting war. And then these brigades because of this fetish, if you will, of American training, were giving the best weapons and sent to fights and, you know, they they did not show very good results because they were not experienced in fighting war in Ukraine.
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And they lacked air superiority. I mean, they were being asked, but, or encouraged by American advice to do something that we ourselves would never do.
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Of course. Yeah. Yeah. That was that. But also, you know, because there was this whole idea that the US military so superior can teach us so many things, It it really was a fetish.
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And it, you know, as it turned out, you know, always had to be reinforced with battalions from other existing brigades that did not get American training to maintain some kind of cohesion and and try to continue fighting.
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So I I don’t know if your reporting has has taken you in this direction, but, when you talk to American military people who are involved in these efforts, do do detect any increased sense of humility about this?
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No. I don’t think so. I think, you know, what I sense is there’s a lot of kind of blame game going around. It’s clearly retrofits have failed and whose fault is this. And Ukraine has also made a lot of mistakes, obviously.
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And, but in the US, you know, there’s also independence into, aside all the mistakes of the Ukrainians. And I think that’s just unfair.
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Yeah. I I share your sense on that.
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Eric earlier had said that there’s a question about the supplemental, and whether it may be too late because of American internal domestic politics to restore aid to Ukraine at something like the level that we had before. You know, one one can always hope that actually there will be some sort of deal that is cut, and the spigot will be opened again. I’m I’m curious, can you talk us through each of those two scenarios What what does the war look like? What does the war look like if, you know, the republican party and the thrall of Trump just simply won’t let military aid to Ukraine go forward or on an alternative world in which some sort of deal is cut before presidential politics, take over for the rest of the year?
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I think the situation on the ground will be the same. The question is the cost. How many more Ukrainians will die? I think the, you know, some of the Ukrainians have a choice in what to do. The Russians don’t want to settle.
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Without conquering, you know, much of most of Ukraine. Certainly, they’re not interested in a deal before the US presidential elections because they hope they can get a much better deal. Should trump win the election. And, so the Ukrainians will just keep fighting. And the question is, how many more lives will be lost because they are gunned.
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And obviously it’s gonna be much more brutal and bloody, five of which many more thousands of Ukraine will die either Aravano.
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So let let me, then just put up one more hypothetical to you. Obviously, if Trump gets elected, we’re in a different universe in many ways. Let’s say Biden gets reelected. So that the that Putin’s theory of victory takes a major blow. Namely, he’s gonna be up against the United States that is committed to opposing him rather than having a president who’s, quite willing to pull the plug on Ukraine.
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Does that how how does that affect Russian strategy do you think?
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I guess, I mean, putin is all you’re working on alternative strategy. So he’s already created an alliance, military alliance that is functioning with Iran and North Korea ruined on their resources. And I think, What he’s trying to do has failed so far is to draw China closing closer to that. You know, China’s still, militarily, not involved. But I think if you look at it from, from Beijing, you know, preventing a collapse, military collapse of Russia remains in China’s national interest.
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And so so should Russia really be reeling, we’ll probably expect much more active Chinese enrollment to this.
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We’re running, you know, short on time, yarrow, and I I wanted to, ask you what know what the consequences will be of sort of these scenarios that you and Elliot have been talking about if they come come to pass. I mean, you at the end of your book, you describe Zelensky’s visit to Washington, which is very successful. And you say that in in a sense, the war had become not just Ukraine’s war, but the West’s war, even though, you know, western there aren’t western boots on the ground per se fighting. It’s it’s the West War and the consequence of, you know, allowing, Putin to be successful would be in in your words, to, you know, something that would completely undermine the credibility and deterrent power of of the United States and the and the West. Is that where we’re headed?
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You know, if there’s no supplemental in your view, or will will we end up in some, you know, other kind of day new model?
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Well, I think we are heading in that direction. And it’s clearly even though many people in the US say this is not our war, but nothing do with Ukraine, if you choose from Russia, It is a war against America and youth from China. It’s also the West’s credibility that’s at stake and deterrence power. You know, so, especially after throwing all those huge resources into this world. You know, Ukrainian defeat and early twenty twenty two would not have been the defeat of the West.
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Ukrainian defeat now would definitely be seen around the world. As with heat of America. And the Ukrainians will obviously keep fighting. You know, because they have no choice. And so it’s quite possible that even when that is supplemental, the bill prevent a rush of victory just by sacrificing entire generation of people.
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Could you see the war expanding? That is to say with entry by Poland, perhaps with some of the other states in Europe that are most concerned about Ukraine’s fate?
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I mean, the only scenario under which the world expand is if the Russian troops were nearing the board. So if key effort to collapse, you know, things could become more probable. But I think the the more likely scenario, and we’re talking now about catastrophic scenarios, is that Russia absorbed Ukraine, and then uses the Ukrainian manpower to bulk up its armed forces and then tries again in the Bulwark in Finland, you know, somewhere else in five, ten years. Which was historically, you know, they were the way the Russians were doing things, you know, they were fighting all those words of expansion using the And although
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it might be on the list as well.
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Yeah. Well, moldova could be easy if, you know, if Russia is kept to address. So then, you know, why stop.
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Do you I mean, and I know you’ve been mainly covering the Ukraine war from Ukraine, not not from Russia. Is there, is there any way in which the Russian political and social order itself is fragile, do you think?
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Well, I mean, we have seen that with Pregosin, right? Who would have thought that? You know? He would mount is cool. So Russia is hard and brittle, and so you never know when when when tensions come to a boiling point.
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And that’s that good takes us back to, you know, the fact that the victory in this war will be determined by the resilience. Of each of the warring parties internally. And so at some point, all this all this tensions will take it all with Russian stability, which is they don’t know when it would be in six months or six years.
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Well, Elliot, I’m I’m happy to leave the the last question to you, but I will say that the been a sobering conversation and, appropriately downbeat for shield of the Republic where we always, you know, value our ability to bring a little gloom into everybody’s life. Do you wanna try and, end us on a more uplifting note?
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Well, I mean, I think, you know, I I would say, I think our book is uplifting because it’s, the story of the people who were sort of written off by a lot of their friends, and certainly by their enemies. Who achieve really astonishing things, but before the western arms begin to flow in. And I think And one of the great strengths of the book is the way in which, arrow you move from, you know, the high level kind of strategic political thing down to specific engagements that you were, that you saw directly. I mean, I remember we first corresponded over your, the story you read about Ron DeSantis, this little town where because of one of these mayors who you described, showing some initiative. The population kinda comes together and they slow down and eventually stop a Russian column and actually has some that has some, larger significance.
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I guess I I do think we have to remind ourselves. And again, I’ll I’ll ask you already give you the last word to ask you to comment on this that there are a lot of other aspects of the war in which the Ukrainians have actually done pretty well. The Russians have not really been able to collapse the economy. That’s a sort of a defensive success. The offensive success is, I mean, who’d have thought that they would have the success against the Russian Navy that they’ve had and against, and against the Russian military and, naval infrastructure and crimea.
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And that seems to that seems to me to be kind of a big deal that they’ve been able to that they’ve been able to to do that. And then I guess finally, I mean, you don’t wanna get too caught up in body counts. I mean, the Russians have taken an enormous number of casualties, and I I guess I just find it difficult to believe that that society is infinitely resilient And, you know, I, you know, I’m mindful of what yahoo you were saying about the the question of this being a a content, contest about the fragility or the brittleness of the two societies Of course, we, you know, the Russians have been very aggressive in trying to deny us and their own people. Information about their own brittleness, but that just means that there’s stuff under the surface, which something pops out with something like precautions bizarre mosque March on Moscow. So I suppose, despite everything and everything, I remain cautiously optimistic, you already wanna bring me back down, or you wanna
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No. No. I I do agree with you. I mean, let’s just take a step back. I don’t look.
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You know, we’re now two years into the war. That Russia launched against a country that nobody expected to resist or survive long. And started pregained half the equivalent, you know, Russia still controls only about eighteen percent of Ukraine. And the entire NATO military force was designed, you know, to stop the Russian offensive and Ukraine Bay itself managed to do that. And so it’s nothing short of a miracle that we’re talking about Ukrainian counter offensive in the first place.
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That’s a great point, on, on which we can end. My, I mean, I agree with everything Elliot said. So we’ll end on an uncharacteristically upbeat note for for shield of the republic, but, I’d like to thank our guest. Yaurastava Tropheimov, the author of our enemies will vanish the Russian invasion in Ukraine’s war of independence, terrific book. Thank you.
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On the first year of the war, and, you know, sadly, this conflict is gonna go on for a while, I think. So I hope we can have you back on, Shilda Republic in the in the future.
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Absolutely. Well, thank you so much. It was great to be on the show.
