What Happens If the House Fails in Its Obligation

Hey, shield listeners. This is Eric Edelman. Before we start this week’s show, I wanna give you a heads up that while we were recording, shield of the republic this past week. We lost some of Elliot’s audio with about fifteen minutes left in the show. But because the content of our guest, Phillips O’Brien was so interesting, we wanted to make sure you got to hear all of his responses even though you may not be able to hear all of Elliott’s questions as we get towards the end of the show.

Thanks for bearing with us, and we’ll be back next week. Hopefully without any audio or video, issues. Thanks so much for listening to shield of the Republic.

Welcome

to Sheila the Republic, a podcast sponsored by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and dedicated to the proposition our articulated by Walter Lipman during World War two that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the shield of our Democratic Republic. I’m Eric Ettleman, Council at the Center for Strategic and budgetary Assessment, a Bulwark contributor and a non resident fellow at the Miller Center, and I’m joined by my colleague and partner Elliott Cohen, the Robert Eaz good professor of Strategy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in the early Burke chair and strategy at the center for strategic and international studies. Elliot, our last, episode was a upbeat positive, you know, episode, but here we are today, on the day that we’ve learned about Alexei Navalny’s death slash murder, by the Russian authorities, and it’s hard for me to be upbeat and positive about that.

Yeah. Well, I don’t blame you. And, I share your I share your feelings. I mean, one, I think, in fact, what we should be very clear. It’s one way or another.

This is murder. Right? Whether it was that they, you know, gave him an of something or poison them in some way, or I I don’t know what, but it it is it is murder. I I have to say I I actually lean to the interpretation that they that this was quite calculated. Doing it now, letting the world know pretty quickly that it had happened.

Not pretending that there was a prolonged illness or something of that kind. And I think it’s a, the implications of it are quite scary because I think what it and are intended to be. It’s, Putin very deliberately showing people, yeah, we can do this. And, I can do this, and I can get away with it. And I can do it to you too.

And then there’s a, just a, about what’s the word that I’m looking for? A kind of brazenness

Yeah.

About it that I think is very much in keeping with a, sort of, a thuggish jail, come secret police personality. Don’t you think?

Yeah. I mean, apparently, I don’t know that I’ve that scene has confirmed anywhere, I I saw somewhere. It might have been Kristo Grossoff, Bellingcat who said that, apparently, they press release announcing from the prison service announcing his death, came out literally two minutes after the, time of death listed on the death certificate.

Right.

So they they they were cocked. I mean, if that’s true, they were cocked and loaded, you know, and ready to to go, you know, So as you say, whether this was, you know, whether they, you know, actively did something to kill him today, or whether this was just the result of his being, his health being, badly deteriorated during the time that he’s been in a strict regime prison camp in the Arctic since December, it, you know, weakened his body. I mean, it, you know, it’s in the end, it’s like a distinction without a difference.

Yeah. Well, but I I I do think, it does make a maybe I disagree with you a little bit. I think it does make a difference If it was a a brazen murder committed while everybody watched you know, just kind of flipping the middle finger at the Americans, at the Europeans, at everybody else, seeing what I can get away with. It’s, you know, I I’m I’m frequently reminded of, one of George Orwellwell’s essays. Where he talks about the goose step.

And he says, you know, the goose step is it’s a really ugly step for a you know, for for a military unit. And he said it it deliberately kinda conjures up the image of a boot smashing into a face.

He

says, and that’s the whole point. Yeah. It’s ugly. Right. And it’s designed to say, you don’t dare laugh at me.

Do you?

Right.

And and I think that’s what we’re dealing with. It is a genuinely, fascistic kind of regime. Now it’s not completely fascist. Because I don’t think that they’re a actually able to pull that off. Although I think they’re trying, you know, if you look at the, kind of, martial patriotic indoctrination that that’s going on.

If you look at the real suppression of even the kind of phony, opposition that they’ve had in the past, you know, deciding that you’re not gonna let anybody run who might actually be construed as being anti war. And and I think it suggests that, you know, there’s also some deep insecurities, but I think this was this was intended to be a message to the west. And and I’m sure a message domestically as well. I mean, we should never assume that all the messages are simply addressed to us. I think his his primary concerns still have to be internal.

Oh, no. I don’t disagree with that. And I I don’t really disagree with what you were saying earlier. I the the point I was trying to make and probably didn’t do it very well is that whether they, you know, made a, you know, positive decision to kill them today, or whether he died because of the way they mistreated him, it’s political murder, you know, either way. I mean, that was really the point I was trying to make.

But I I agree with you. I, you know, as I might have said in an earlier, you know, part of my career, you know, it’s not by accident comrade, that this comes on the heels of Donald Trump’s, you know, statements about, you know, let Putin do whatever the hell he wants to NATO members and Tucker Charlie Sykes, you know, ongoing, you know, self abasement, at the feet of, you know, not just Putin, but, you know, of all these sort of slavicile, you know, Russians. I mean, his his little mini videos, you know, of going to the Moscow subway and, going to a grocery store, and and attacking the United States while he’s there, by the way. Saying that, you know, yeah. Russians are so much better off.

I mean, you know, I cannot tell you how much my wife was outraged by this having lived in in Moscow for, two years, with with me when we were serving in the US embassy there that, you know, it’s so ludicrous. You know, it it is the, you know, it, it gives useful idiots a bad name.

Well, I mean, I I think again, I I’ll take it darker. I think set aside what he’s saying about Russia because in a way that doesn’t matter. You know, he if if it would suit his purposes, he would say the same thing if he you know, we’re visiting, Mexico or, you know, Paraguay or Botswana or Bulgaria or, you know, any country on earth, or Cuba. I mean, what what did hungary? Hungry.

But I think the point is what it says about his view of the United States and what some of the currents are because, you know, people like Tucker Carlson are you know, they know what they’re pandering to. It’s not it’s I don’t think he would be saying these things if he knew that it didn’t gave a bit of a thrill to some part of his audience. And, it’s a very dark message. I mean, the thing that was in some ways more disturbing than all of that is that he, I guess, very shortly after the Navalny death. You know, he’s on the stage, somebody say, you know, well, this is, you know, he’s been murdered by Putin as well.

All leaders kill people. Some people kill more. Some people kill less. And and I think what that it, you know, it’s revealing is on what we used to call the conservative side not conservative. It’s something else in the United States.

There is a deep, dark, cynical, nihilistic angry, kind of hateful attitude towards the United States. Among other things to the values the country was founded on, to rule of law, to, you know, all the things that keep us going. So I I actually find this actually quite quite chilling. Not I mean, he’s it’s ludicrous. What are you saying about Russia?

Right.

And I don’t know whether or not he’s smart enough to know that No. This isn’t the real Russia. But that’s not the point. The point is what is it saying about his view of the US?

Yeah. I agree. And, but it’s also again, to talk about the inversion from Reaganite, Republicanism. You know, Reagan famously, you know, invade against moral equivalence, you know, that somehow, the United States was just another great power. The Soviet Union was another great power.

All great powers do you know, do bad things. And now we’ve got, you know, Tucker Carlson, essentially, engaged in precisely that kind of, moral not just moral equivalence, actually saying you know, our adversaries better than we are. It’s it’s it’s really awful.

Maybe I mean, you and I can remember a time when there were people who thought the communism in some way was attractive. We’re not old enough to remember a time, but there was a time when fascist ideologies were attractive too. And and we’re compelling in a certain way. Now different kinds of fascist ideologies, but they’re real. And they did have a certain kind of purchase in this country in the twenties and thirties.

We forget that now, but we shouldn’t forget that. And, you know, they were dangerous, and we’re living in a dangerous time. Now maybe we should talk about this later. I mean, I’ll if I could connect that to a another rant, which would be about the Republicans in Congress having decided to give themselves a two week recess while the Ukrainian defenders of Advica are being slaughtered because they don’t have enough shells. The Israelis are hanging out there.

The Taiwanese are hanging out there. But it’s the height of irresponsibility. And and and after what they think of as their major accomplishment, which is impeaching by one vote, a cabinet secretary who, you know, is implementing a policy they disagree with, but it’s not breaking the law. And and then the guy who master minds it announces that he’s quit in Congress because he’s accomplished his, the most important thing he could do, which is this ridiculous impeachment. I mean, it’s I I I am just disgust isn’t the word.

It it’s just there’s something outrageous about it.

Well, as depressing as all that is, we now get to turn to our, special guest to talk about the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. Elliot, would you like to introduce our special guest this week?

I would be delighted. Phil O’Brien, is a professor at Saint Andrews for his sins. He’s, the head of school as they say of the, they’re goes to the School of International Affairs, Phil.

International relations.

He’s a very good friend, collaborator on a project. We may have an opportunity to talk about a little bit. His just to give you by way of background, a, he’s he’s had good taste to be from the Boston area. So that’s already a, a good indication of character. A, terrific scholar in in the podcast thus far, we’ve, a number of times, invoked the name of Sarah Steiner.

One of the truly great international historians of the twentieth century, and Phil was a student of ours. He’s written a number of books, but I think they’re the two that really stand out, which I warmly commend to everybody, are ones called how the war was won, which is a somewhat revisionist account of World War two, which I think has colored his observations about the Ukraine war, and another one, which, I liked as much in some respects, even better, called the second most important man in the world. It’s a biography of William Lehi, who admiral William Lehi, who was, Franklin Roosevelt’s chief of staff and who fill argues, I think, extremely convincingly was was indeed the second most important man in the world. A lot of our listeners will know Phil, though, not less because of those things, though they’re probably aware of them. But, because he’s been a prolific and accurate, and passionate commentator on the war in Ukraine.

He writes regularly for the Atlantic. I’m glad to say. But he also has a wonderful sub stack, which again, I I commend to everybody, which is very, very widely read, and he has a, he has a podcast too. So, Phil, welcome from Saint Andrews. It’s great to have you with us.

And a forthcoming book.

Oh, it’s great to be.

And a forthcoming book. Actually, do you wanna say something about the book?

I mean, you the book, is gonna be out this summer. It’s called the strategist. And it it looks at the first World War era experiences of Churchill was about Hitler Stalin and Mussolini. All of which had sort of very interesting exposures to war in very different ways. And then how they take that experience and they use it And you might say they’re informed by it in how they behave in the second World War.

So it’s a sort of strategic biography looking at the five of them.

Great.

But looking at their first World War experiences and then saying, okay, this is how they view war. And they’re very consistent in many ways. You can see what Churchill, what Roosevelt, what Hitler do in the Second World War is very much comes from their experiences. Hitler being a a infantry soldier, on on the western front, Roosevelt, being a political person on the rise, Churchill being both at the front and then very certainly minister of munitions. And all of these things play a role in in how they they do things, and mussolini being a bullshit artist.

So all all of this, in a way sets up my the first question that I wanted to ask you which is, I mean, here you are a distinguished historian of the, particularly of World War two, you know, stretching back a little bit earlier in the twentieth century as well. And yet somehow you’ve gotten deeply engaged in writing about Ukraine you’ve been there. You really have been, you know, prolific and have decided views about it. How how did that come about, Phil?

It came about because I was really confused by how people were speaking about a Russian invasion of Ukraine before February twenty fourth twenty twenty two. Anyone Elliott like yourself, who is a historian, no war goes off the rails. They’re confusing. They’re chaotic. They’re not usually decisive.

I mean, that that war is usually a disaster in many ways and goes very much wrong. And for a country like Russia, that’s not economically powerful. That is not a technological leader. The chance of, being a catastrophe are far larger. And yet everyone was talking about Russia being super strong.

And as if the worst this war would be over in a few days, and Ukraine would be steamrolled. None of that seemed to be borne up by any historical experience we’ve seen. And so I think I was just troubled by the way people were talking about war. And so I just started saying that that this makes no sense. Ukraine, it’s not going to be steamrolored in three days that the Ukrainians don’t want to be Russians.

They’re going to fight, and we need to understand that this is almost certainly going to be a catastrophe if it’s unleashed. And that’s, that’s how it happened. And there was this chorus of every not lots of other people. Unlike yourself, thankfully, Elliott actually reached out to me very much at the beginning of the war, and we started corresponding because we were of the same mindset. But there was this whole group of people who were talking about this war as if it would be decisive and quick and easy and it just seemed to me barking mad if you don’t mind me using a phrase, and that’s how I got into it.

I I should add one other thing. This is, This is a teaser, not a spoiler alert, for listeners. Phil and I have been working for the past year on a a quite extensive project looking at what at those analyses of the Russian Ukrainian military. We are in the final stages of preparing a a report. The names are all named in the footnotes.

There’ll be some very prominent people who are quoted all the time in the New York Times and the Washington Postless and the Wall Street Journal, I have to say. Who will be very, very unhappy at being reminded of the things that they said, but it’s it’s I think going to be an important piece of work because it it is important for people to remember what what war is actually like. And, to be wary of some of the analyses that get spread widely around. But maybe what we can do is kind of move to the next step and then, Eric, I know you’re a bit under the weather. So I’ll I’ll I’ll shoulder most of the the burden here, but, you should definitely chime in.

Phil, let’s just, begin with what seems to me to be obvious, which is this is obviously a very, very fraught time. We don’t know what the house of representatives is going to do. They it’s terrifying that there’s a majority in the house that’s in favor of aid to Ukraine. But because of the politics of the Republican Party, it’s, entirely conceivable, may even be likely that they won’t get it. The first question would be, what happens in your view if the House of Representatives fails in its obligation to look after the national security interests of the United States.

And does not vote in favor of aid to Ukraine.

Well, it sets off a domino kind of reaction that could go a number of different ways. I think it will depend a lot on what the bid administration does at that point. If the Biden administration is, as it has not been so far in this war, decisive, and says, okay, we’re gonna unfreeze Russian assets we’re gonna let you buy material in the US from that. We’ll ship it for you. We’ll find a way to get, get you some aid.

Then, you know, that will probably energize, Europeans. And I think that would actually allow Ukraine to to hold the line where it is now if they can get I mean, they’re gonna lose of deep gun places like that because they simply don’t have ammunition. But if the Biden administration in some sense finds a way around the block of the house and still can get aid to Ukraine, Ukraineian should be able to hold the line relatively well without too many major sort of retreats. And that would be the, probably, the optimistic scenario. The pessimistic scenario and, so there should maybe be three.

The pessimistic scenario is by the administration, which has been showing a little bit of frustration, actually. And I think lack of commitment to Ukraine action over the last few months, maybe just says, okay. It’s not been passed. It’s up to Ukraine to see what will happen. And then European states in the bad scenario really run around like chickens where their heads cut off because there is no there’s no consensus yet in Europe about what to do.

There you might say is a very hardcore in Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and the Nordics in Bulwark, that really want to fight for Ukraine. We’re not quite sure about how Western Europe would be and that Europe would go into chaos. The middle is that the United States sort of trundles along getting a little bit of aid out of the Biden administration. And Europe actually begins to shoulder more and more of the burden. That will be very tricky for a while for Ukraine because they will not be able to get kind of weight of fire that the US has been giving them.

But if Europe at least does come together or ninety europe without Hungary, we wanna say or Slovakia, then and they decide this is an existential thing as states like Finland, Sweden, the Bulwark, Poland all believe, they should be able to get enough to Ukraine to limit the retreats. I mean, they’re still probably gonna lose some territory. In the short term. But then they have to take the American abrogation of American duty as the sign that Europe has to now take over. And that will be this will be the moment for Europe.

Now, Europe has not met its moments terribly well over the past fifty years. It’s tended not to meet those moments. But maybe this time because it is actually existential for some European States. And there’s far more serious discussions going on behind the scenes now in Europe than there were even months ago. The Europeans are scared.

They are not scared. They are maybe facing reality that the United States is not to be trusted as a partner, and they need to look after themselves, and So those are the scenarios. Either Biden administration finds a way to deal with it. Europe gets I acted together both good Biden administration gives up Europe splits really bad. Biden administration doesn’t do much, but Europe gets its act together in the middle that’s probably where I think it’s gonna go is towards that if the Biden administration doesn’t aid.

Phil, I wonder if you could talk a bit about, of Deepka. You were saying it, you know, looks like, looks like the Ukrainians are positioning themselves to to retrograde out of of Deepka. You wrote a lot last year about Bakhmoot and about, the during the siege of Bakmoot, how the Ukrainians were able to really attrit a lot of, Russian forces. A lot of that seems to have gone on in Avdifka as well as some of the losses starting in October, you know, a thousand people a day. They just had a press, conference yesterday or press background, or I guess it was at the Pentagon where a senior unnamed senior official said three hundred fifteen thousand kill or wounded, you know, total number of Russian casualties, which I think is actually low balling it.

I I suspect it’s higher, probably closer on the order of four hundred thousand. Which is I think the number that, that the Ukrainians are carrying, and they their numbers have been pretty good on this. How much damage do you think the Ukrainians, we’re able to to do. I mean, it does seem like the Russians have a force of about fifty thousand that they’ve gotten kind of around Avivka and a lot more equipment. They’re using both, artillery and air strikes.

I mean, it presumably, once the Ukrainians have sort of straightened their lines and withdrawn, you know, they’ll be in a more defensible position, but it doesn’t seem like they have done a lot of the entrenching that the Russians did for instance after the car chief liberation that made it so tough for the Ukrainians to, you know, to make any headway during the counter offensive. How do you how do you parse all that out.

Well, there’s a lot there. I mean, in terms of entrenchment until September, they really were hoping the counter offensive might end up splitting the Russian line. So they they weren’t thinking in an entrenchment kind of way. They were thinking in a combined arms maneuver warfare, hopeful kind of way, which didn’t work out. So they have started entrenching since then.

From what I’ve heard, it’s very much dependent on the local commander. So certain places have entrenched very well, certain places and not as entrenched as well. Avivka, the the issue really seems to be now that they don’t have the ammunition. I mean, I believe it is the kind of place where the Ukrainians, like in Bakmoot, could treat the Russian. They haven’t treated the Russians enormously because Putin wants to take it for the election.

It’s a political token for Putin. And like Bakmoot, he wanted to take Bakmoot that was very important. So he threw everything he could to take Bakmoot. They destroyed Vogner. I mean, Vogner was eradicated as an organization by the attempt to take Bhaput.

And now when it comes to Avivka, the Russians are willing to suffer almost any loss to take this town. So the Ukrainians would like to to fight there in a trip, but they can’t protect their own troops with defensive fire at point. What they hear, as much as they want to attract the Russians, they also have to protect their own troops now. But this is a real moment for the Ukrainians there’s there’s a lot that has to go on about saving Ukrainian troop numbers, retraining, resting. A lot of these troops have been on the front line for a long time.

And because they don’t have the firepower to really continue to attract the Russians in Avivka, the Russians have been able to make advances again very slow. These are the advances that you make that a human being makes on foot. That’s what we’re seeing around Avdivka. It’s a human being on foot advance, maybe a kilometer a day in certain places. But that now has made the position untenable.

And so the that unless there is a massive infusion of ammunition, which I can’t see happening, the ukrainians are probably gonna pull out about Deepka simply to save their own troop numbers.

Let me just shift the perspective a little bit. I mean, there’s so many different things I’d like to talk about, but let’s start with this one. What what does Ukrainian victory look like? Or is it even even something that is conceivable at this stage?

Absolutely. It’s I mean, Ukrainian victory is conceivable if Ukraine is armed in the way that our Ukraine Ukraine should have been armed. That ukrainian victories is in my own mind. And actually, I would say this is shared by a number of ukrainians that I’ve talked to who who know their geopolitics and all of that, Ukraine victory is the liberation of the legal entry, legally recognized territory of Ukraine. That is victory.

Anything but that means that Putin’s wars of expansion have been vindicated. That that that you’ve torn up the post nineteen ninety one world, and you have permanent instability. So victory, not only for Ukraine, but I would say for Europe, is basically Ukraine liberating all of its territory as recognized in nineteen ninety one. That could be done if Ukraine was armed properly. We’ve we’ve armed Ukraine in this in my own mind, very bizarre way to fight close range land battles.

So we’ve given Ukraine weapon to fight from the front line to maybe twenty or thirty miles behind the front line, which isn’t that far. And that’s most of the weaponry that we’ve given. Right now, the Ukrainians are showing the most vulnerable part of the Russian occupation is like Crimea. But they don’t have the weapons to regularly hit Crimea. They’ve been able to knock out the Black Sea fleet through a lot of Crimea.

So the Black Sea fleet is having a huge problem operating around Crimea. If we gave them something to take out the courage bridge, then Crimea is in very big trouble because it’s hard to see how the Russians supply it. So, yes, Ukraine can win if we arm Ukraine properly. However, if we’re not gonna arm Ukraine, we’d still accept for the the storm shadows and the scalps. Not give them long range weapons, then they’re gonna have a hard time liberating their charge.

Well, let’s put let’s put a little bit differently. Could you describe for us how Russia loses?

I mean, this is where I’m an old fashioned. Russia loses when its army can’t function in Ukraine. And I actually physically, you need to get the Russian army out of Ukraine. And you do that by cut by basically making it unsupplyable in Crimea on the West to begin with. That, you know, if you can cut Crimea, then you end up with Russian forces and kerosene Oblast in real big trouble.

Because they have quite a tenuous supply line, and you would begin an area of sort of pushing the Russian army out because it can’t be supplied. I don’t believe this idea of Russia’s limitless resources, and this is not true. The Russian economy is not that productive.

Well, that that’s actually I think that these thing I want to draw you out on, and then I I really would like Eric to comment on this. You know, potentially the Ukrainians and and in, you know, in reality too, in in many ways, the Ukrainians have had the the arsenals of the west and even to some extent of, parts of Asia at their disposal. Increasingly, what Russia has at its disposal are the arms in the trees of North Korea, that may not be such a big deal. Iran, which, unfortunately, is more significant than anybody would have anticipated. And I think it’s pretty fair to say that the Chinese are are probably not going to let them lose in a very visible way.

That is you know, they’ve been increasing the supply of, not of weapons, but of the things you need to make weapons, of the things you need to dig trenches, of basically a lot of the supporting technologies, which are critical in war. Let’s, you know, as long as we’ve referenced world war two, remember Dwight Eisenhower and his memoirs when when he says, you know, what were the critical pieces of, equipment He lists five. None of which went bang. I think it was the landing ship tank, the duck, the Jeep, the C forty seven transport and the combat bulldozer. None none of which, you know, had a gun on them.

Alright. Maybe the electric ship tank did, but that’s not what they were they weren’t used for that. They were delivering things ashore. So, given that that’s the geopolitical reality, is that set a limit in your view on the extent to which Russia will be allowed to lose or, Is it the case, which and this, I guess, this is more my my view, that the way Russia will lose will be, at some point, it’ll just so futile, so costly, so utterly not worth it that Putin is removed from power, that than other words, you can’t really have a rush to lose until Putin goes down.

Well, certainly, I I don’t disagree with that that you need to basically maul the army so badly that the destruction of the Russian army would lead to some kind of political settlement. It has to be Russian losses and Russian battlefield performance. And I don’t know what the two of you think, but when I look at this Russian army and I don’t see a perfect military organization. I still see a deeply flawed organization, and one which the Ukrainians, if if armed properly could take advantage of. So I think we’re on the same line.

I I tend to think you’re gonna need some major military defeats. Unless it’s gonna go on for a few more years. I mean, Putin seems at this point having seen off promotion and, you know, having these elections to at least be strong enough to fight for another year or two, and I mean, though I’m not a Russian expert, and I don’t want to pretend that I am. I would like to think he’d be overthrown. I can’t see that happening.

But maybe I’m wrong on that I would go for a military defeat of the Russians in the field in probably the second half of twenty twenty four. Spending the first half of twenty twenty four at treating Russian forces down, letting the Russians attack, and try and create the battlefield conditions where the Russians have to, in a sense, make some significant withdrawals. And maybe then we end up with the political situation, which leads to, Russians accepting the fact that this war has no good ending for them. And it really doesn’t have a good ending for them if we support Ukraine.

Eric, do you want to comment on this?

Yeah. I guess what I, you know, what what worries me right now is that, Russ have, essentially reconstituted their defense industrial production much more quickly than had anticipated. I mean, they they’ve now got, you know, the budget, Russian state budget is basically forty percent devoted essentially to to defense production, and and they’re cranking stuff out. I mean, as you said, Ellie, if they’re, you know, have been dependent on North Korea and on Iran for artillery and and drones. They’ve been dependent on the PRC for dual use goods and financing that allows it to come in but I guess what I’m worried about, you know, is, like, how do we, you know, get to the long run as it were?

Because you know, I’m not sure it’s sustainable for the Russians to be able to produce at that level. But right now, if if the Ukrainians are cut off by the United States and by the total irresponsibility of the US Congress or at least the House of Representatives. I wanna I wanna, you know, I wanna doff my hat to Chuck Schumer and and Mitch McConnell for getting the senate to do the right thing. But, you know, I I I worry that there’s gonna be a period here you know, Phil was talking about the ammunition shortages that they’ve had at Avdifka, you know, if the Russians are able to you know, take advantage of this at least, you know, period of time where they’re gonna be out producing what the Ukrainians are armed with, I I just worry that, you know, it it will not not go well.

The way I mean, I think we do have to be careful about talking about mass of Russian production, there’s still far below losses in almost every category.

Right.

That, usage. So in, in twenty twenty two, the Russians fired I think from generally ten to eleven million shells were fired by the Russians. They would have lost millions more when all their depots went up in June, July, when the High Mars year. This year, or sorry, last year, twenty twenty three, they fired seven million shells. So they had probably access to fifty percent of the shells in twenty twenty three that they had in twenty twenty two.

Maybe Russian production is two and a half million shells this year. Maybe. That’s sort of the upper estimates. Two to two and a half million shells. They’re going into the year with, I think, four million in stocks according to the to the Estonians.

They can’t fire everything they have in stock or literally they run out of shells and the war is over. Right. So even under very optimistic scenario, Russian fire in twenty twenty four will be down on twenty twenty three and massively down on twenty twenty two. So I in Russian production, normally, you think of an award by the third year, you’re drastically out building and providing more than what you had at the beginning of the war, the Russians are still only able to provide a fraction of what they

had when they started. Fair fair enough, but on the other hand, you know, if they’re out firing the Ukrainians five to one, it’s still, the the That’s why we have to I

mean, yes, the European, Ukrainian supporters have to get in and give Ukraine the kinds of things that they can use to take advantage of the fact that Russian fire will be down. I mean, it’s not all I’m saying is Russia’s not getting stronger.

Right.

And I think we need to fight against and the same with Tang. You know, they’re, they’re only can make a small number compared to what they have lost in massive numbers on the battlefield and tanks and and armored vehicles. I mean, I have to say I, you know, I I didn’t see if you had asked me in two thousand fifteen. Would we be here? I would have said absolutely not that I can’t read.

Yes, there would be trouble in the alliances, but the way NATO actually stepped up to help the United States and Afghanistan made it seem that the alliance certainly had, significant, legs to it and that it did act together and that there was an understanding on both sides of atlantic, that the Alliance had value. Yes, Europeans have not always paid their their two percent with the United states has benefited enormously from from being the leader of NATO and in a global sphere. So, I mean, in some sense, I look on what has happened as a tragedy. I mean, it is a I can’t believe it. I can’t believe that the language has become so mercenary and so zero sum.

When this alliance serves both interests, it serves Europe, and it serves the United States, and it has served them incredibly well for with over seventy five years at this point. On the other hand, I believe this is the most serious crisis in in European terms, because they now have to deal with the fact that Trump might get elected in twenty twenty four. And they can’t pretend that won’t happen. And this is the most serious war in Europe since nineteen forty five. And for certain states and, as I said, and who are very militarily inclined now.

This is an existential war. And if they see the United States saying, well, you know, we’re not gonna go fight for you. And by the way, that rhetoric even started before Trump there was some people, oh, or maybe we’d never fight for Poland or Lithuania. I remember talking to Carlson saying that on Fox. Oh, you know, who do we care about this?

Well, they hear that now. And they see it. We are in an existential war. The United States clearly can’t trusted to defend, its role under Article five. At least this is the European way.

And so they are taking it more seriously in parts of Europe than they ever have before. And I don’t know if you can get that genie back in the bottle. Particularly if Trump wins. I do think if trump wins the alliances over. That it’s hard to see how it survives.

Just why Europe would ever actually trust the United States again to respect Article five unless Trump comes into offices at everything I said and they can’t pay wrong. I love NATO and I love Article Five, and I will, you know, go and do these things, but I find that hard to believe it. And then Europe in some ways has to wake up and smell the coffee and and start looking after itself. But once it starts doing that, it’s hard to see that it will go back.

I’m with Phil. I, you know, if Trump is elected, I think it’s more or less the, you know, end of the alliance. I don’t, you know, that might not be the case formally. Know, there there is legislation that was attached to the last national defense authorization act that says he can’t take the US out of the alliance, without the approval of Congress, which I don’t think he could get. But that’s also probably an unconstitutional provision because it’s a legislative veto, and I doubt that if he took it court that the Supreme Court would uphold it.

So but but even without that, you know, there are a lot of things you can do to to, you know, make the alliance non functioning even without actually withdrawing. And, and, you know, John Bolton, Mark Esper, people who you know, whatever you think about them were serious people who tried to do serious things while they were in the Trump administration have both testified to the fact that they think he would take us out of the alliance and and it would in in effect destroy the alliance. So I’m I’m afraid I’m with Phil. I think even creative flattery, will not be enough to, you know, to save the save the alliance.

That’s what I mean. It it it’s it’s potentially so destabilizing this world we’re going into that I don’t think it could become destabilizing very soon. I mean, say A doesn’t get through the house and the Biden administration, washes its hands. Sorry. Nothing we can do.

We’re done. You know, we’ve helped Ukraine we will root you on from the sidelines, but it’s up to you now to we’re out of the game. And that’s a possibility. But what happens then? What do states like Poland and the Bulwark do if they see the Ukrainian army rocking back on its heels.

Do the polls say, okay. We’re gonna have a Russian victory. Give Russia time to rebuild and then come at us in five years time? Or do they say Russian army’s been terribly damaged. Let’s help Ukraine even more.

I mean, what does the fin say? The the the Bulwark. This could get very pear shaped very quickly.

Both the Fins and the Poles have, you know, drastically increased their own defense budgets and defense production. So, they are actually taking it very seriously. Elliott, I wonder if I could impose on both you and Phil since you’ve both written about this. To talk about the command changes that president Zelensky has made because that’s I think, many of our listeners are probably you know, perplexed about all this, you know, there was a lot of catastrophizing about this at when it was first, you know, announced that solutiony was gonna be, you know, relieved of command. I mean, Elliot, you’ve pointed out that, you know, that this happens in wartime all the time that, you know, it’s not not particularly, you know, remarkable from that point of view.

But it was not just the change of, you know, the overall command. It was also the land forces command. Other commands were changed. I think five commanders in in toto. Could you guys talk a little bit about that?

What do you see coming out of this in terms of how the Ukrainians are gonna approach the next phase of fighting, you know, putting aside the other imponderables we’ve been talking about with regard to US assistance?

I mean, clearly, the Zelensky’s delusiony relationship had deteriorated in the last few months, six months or so, that there was a lot of tension between the two from everything that we we have heard, that they both whenever they were both trying to protect themselves, both trying to blame the other for the the failure of the counter offensive. So the relationship was not working between the two of them. The real issue is probably Well, one, Zuluzani was loved. When anyone you went to Ukraine, you went to Zuluzani was one of the few people, who had universal positive remarks. I’ve never heard anyone say anything critical about Solution.

He was really a beloved character. And a change had to be made because Zelensky, I think, couldn’t work with him. And ultimately, the civilian authority needs to dominate on this. Very controversial thing was picking serious as the replacement, because in the way that Zuluzny was loved, Syrsky divided opinion. He both had some very strong backers, and also some very strong detractors.

I don’t think there was any Ukrainian officer who divided opinion as much as Syrsky did. Between those who saw him as an old Soviet style officer or those who saw him as sort of a hard fighter. What seems to have happened is on the one hand, though, I mean, I talked about it with Nicole Labiela Schvast today in Secret Podcast. Things have settled down. So the initial has worn off.

Zuluzny is definitely still missed, but people now have accepted this as war and the transition has occurred. I think the junior well, not junior is the long way because they’re a very senior officer, but the new senior command under Sears that has been brought in has on the whole been greeted very positively, that there are a lot of successful younger officers who sort of risen up and right. The kinds of one who often do well in war, who are younger than normal, but perform well and and get get raised up. They they seem to have been brought into positions of strength. So the immediate crisis has to a certain degree past their new team is in place, the the crisis has been weathered, but now we have to see whether that command change makes any difference.

So the first part has happened, and we’ll see what happens in the second. Oh, I mean, it’s interesting. What do you right? And what do you get wrong? And I’ve gotten a lot of things wrong and certain things right.

I mean, that’s because I think from the training and and the way you look at it. I mean, what historians bring is the sense of things not working out. That you have to understand that plans go awry. War is a chaotic dynamic. Event, it’s never gonna work out the way all wars are thought they’ll be over by Christmas and are never over, over for years.

And that we keep failing to lose this lesson so that historians can bring in things about looking over the last few hundred years of warfare and say, well, we need to have a certain balance on how we talk about it. And certain political processes repeat themselves in wars. Not identically, but they, they, they go over and over. Where I sort of, I think maybe where if things got wrong, is the assumption. I’ve written a few things wrong and it’s generally because I assume people would be rational by my mindset.

So I can’t believe the United States has an armed Ukraine in the way that I would have armed Ukraine because I wanna beat Russia. This to me is an army that could be beaten. If you look at, you know, military history, it’s an imperfect body. And yet, for different colo policy reasons, the administration and now Congress seem to be doing the stupidest things possible. And I just couldn’t have imagined they would be in my mind so stupid as to, to make the choices that they have made.

So I think, you know, the one, if I don’t know what, you know, what, what, what we take from it in that way, because certain things we can give a very good perspective on, and then certain is I’ve gotten completely wrong.

Phil is great to have you. Thank you for joining us.