Toomas Ilves on NATO’s Vilnius Summit

Welcome to Shield of the Republic, podcast sponsored by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Will Saletan during World War two, that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the necessary shield of our Democratic Republic. I’m Eric Edelman, Counsel at the Center for Strategic and budgetary Assessment, a Bulwark contributor and a nonresident fellow at the Miller Center, and I’m joined by my partner in All Things Strategic, Elliott Cohen, the Roberty Ozgood professor of Strategy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in the Arleigh Burke chair and Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Elliott, great to see you.

Great to see you, Eric. I mean, we always say that even though our listeners, of course, can’t see us, but we can see each other. It’s a great pleasure to introduce our guest today who has had a long and distinguished career. It’s Tumas Ilvas, who received his education actually in the United States, but, of course, is a very well known Estonia diplomat and politician, he was a among other things, was a journalist at radio for Europe, but then went into Estonia politics after the the Soviets left was minister of foreign affairs, and then president of Estonia from two thousand and six to twenty sixteen, known to I think people who follow him on Twitter as a wise and witty commentator on public affairs, and I have to say one other thing, a man with an extremely distinguished and elegant collection of bow ties, which Winsmith, particular place in my heart, Thomas, really, thank you so much for joining us. And I I believe you listen to shield of the republic.

Every week,

a a further market distinction. It’s great to have you here. It really is. And, you know, we both Eric and I, I think, admire your not only your forthrightness, but your insight on all matters European. I was wondering if maybe we could just start off if I could ask you about your take on the recent film in the summit.

What’s your your view of it?

Well, I give it a sort of a low b. If I’m gonna grade it, I mean, it wasn’t a C, but it was hardly an A. And in the B range, it wasn’t too high. I mean, I thought that that the language, I guess it was point eleven was fairly wimpy. I thought some of the sentences there, such as, well, if we all agree, we’ll take you, I mean, I don’t have the thing in front of me right now, but and we’ll follow your developments in democratization, which I thought coming from an organization that has Hungary and Turkey in it was a little bit too much.

I mean, I can imagine what the Ukrainians thought there. Being a fairly robust democracy, I would say. I mean, it’s messy, of course, But then again, I mean, it really it really struck me that you’d be raising that issue for a country that has a democratically elected president to without irregularities and follows rule of law and observes human rights that maybe that should have been should not have been there. What has promised, of course, no one really expected, and no one I don’t think I mean, no one really wanted anything as silly as proposed by some journalists maybe about immediate membership. I mean, that was never in the cards.

But a stronger statement on that, well, when the war is resolved, then you will become a member would have been much more welcome and I think left would have left the Ukrainians feeling much better. Separate from the final communique, I think, I mean, on purpose was the statement by the G7 was the was the place to then give the security assurances, which assurances are not guarantees, but they were, there was a shopping list of things that would be given to them and now we can only hope that those things will be forthcoming, so I guess that was meant to sweeten the pot a little bit or at least eliminate some of the bitter taste of the final communicate that really, as I said, was nuts anything really to write home about, and probably I bet there were probably people in the Kremlin going, thank God, it was so wouldn’t be.

Yeah, I think it’s fair to say, Eric and I would strenuously agree with you on all that. I suppose the only little qualifier I might put in is the thing that struck me about the g seven is that that there it was that forum, which of course includes Japan. Which, you know, one more indication that Ukraine is not just a European issue, you know, both the Japanese and in more forthright way the Australians have engaged in it, and I think that’s, actually, that’s significant. I have a different line I was gonna go into. But Eric, did you wanna say anything further about Villnius before we move on?

Well, I think there’s a lot to say about Villnius and I’d like to hear Thomas’s view on on a couple of the points. So first, I would say, to Thomas’s point about the sort of insulting nature in some sense of the language in the communique, which says that Ukraine has to When the allies agree that certain conditions, unspecified, by the way, have been met, u Ukraine will be admitted into NATO, which I think President Zelensky appropriately found insulting. This comes from an alliance that a few years ago admitted Montenegro, as a member, which I don’t have anything against Montenegro, essentially being a member. But It’s a country that brings virtually no military capability to the alliance and which is riddled with corruption. And although corruption has been a problem in Ukraine, as Thomas noted, there is basic rule of law.

The talking points that the Biden administration has used on corruption in Ukraine are, I think about four or five years out of date. They’re they’re not reflection of what Ukraine has become in in the last few years and even in wartime, I think they’ve made some progress against corruption So right now, you know, I’m curious about kinda Thomas’ view here of, you know, he was saying that the language is pretty wimpy. When President Biden came into office, he made a point of saying after the four years of Trump and continuing denunciation of allies by Trump and whatnot, that the US was back as the leader of the alliance. We were at the head of the table and yet here we have a summit where, as we were talking in the green room, before we started this podcast, European seem to be ahead of the Americans on a number of issues, I mean, on the provision of certain kinds of military capabilities, on the question of Ukraine’s path to membership, quite striking that the US was really pretty isolated at this summit. Along with Berlin, to be fair.

And the one thing I think you can say they did well, was, and Thomas, I’d be interested in your views of this because it’s, you know, close to your home here. I think they helped manage the Swedish succession issue reasonably well. That’s the one thing I would give them, you know, points for. I think you’re being generous giving them a sort of low B. To me, I got a gentleman C, you know, which is, you know, they didn’t fail but it wasn’t really a success either.

But that’s grating on a curve because I think as as you know, Thomas, you know, every NATO summit is fated to succeed, you know? So they’re built to succeed. So I just be, you know, those are sort of random observations. I’d be, you know, happy for you to comment on any or all.

Before you respond to us, I just have to tell you that Eric teaches a course called diplomatic disasters. And I know that the students in that class kinda quiver in terror at his grating. So, you know, the White House is not the only ones who are kind of feeling the lash of professor Edelman here.

That that’s because Elliott team taught the course with me, which he hasn’t told you.

Well, the b actually comes from the Swedish the resolution of the Swedish issue. That that was handled more smoothly than I feared, and also, it will see what happens is Erdogan said that, well, he’s gonna present it to the Turkish parliament in October, so we have three months to go. And who knows what propagation some Russian proxies will whether they’ll burn more Carans or do something else that I mean, we’ve seen it twice already and both times eliciting quite negative response in Turkey, and so we don’t know what’ll happen between now and then. But it was heartening also to see that Hungary never wanting to be last, but stalling on Sweden for all this time said that they would take up the vote in September, but handling handling Sweden without any real embarrassing moments, I think was sort of raised the grade, Could I ask you a

a different kind of question? So one phenomenon that again, we were talking about in the green room, seems to be that the I mean, the frontline states, including Estonia, of course, but, you know, also Poland and the other Baltic states and so on. Have always been, I think, extremely hard line on Russia, and they feel appropriately vindicated by what we’ve all seen. But one of the things that is striking going into vilnius, is that a number of the western European states like France, which now says it’s in favor of NATO membership, or like Netherlands, which has actually kind of took a bit of the lead in pushing for F-16s for Ukraine. Now seem to be leaning further forward than the United States.

Again, the the French now giving long range missiles to Ukraine, where the United States is still dithering about supplying atacam’s, which is really something that the Ukrainian urgently need. So I’m curious and even the Germans seem to have moved from in some important ways — certainly from where they

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before that also the Italians everyone

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And the Italians. So how do you how do you explain that as somebody who’s not observes all of Europe in the United States and not just your corner of it.

Well, I see that there’s a fundamental conflict here between the empiricists who are who have who have real experience with Russia and who unfortunately sort of go through sort of trauma every time they read about butcher because they know what it’s about having similar events in each of the countries that are most pro Ukrainian. And now you saw added the Nordic countries that had been kind of well, I guess were galvanized by by the invasion and of course the UK that formed kind of an arc from the UK to the Nordics and then down central and eastern Europe of people who didn’t share the kind of neo Hageleian view of of this perfect future that we’re all working on and that will arrive. France I think I don’t know about the Netherlands. In the case of France, I think that Macron realized that thirty years of French standoffishness regarding central and eastern Europe has I mean, would have to end if they would have any hope for anything anything approaching autonomy because you’re not gonna get that with by alienating and calling East Europeans hawks and warmongers. And I think that finally dawned on Macron that he had to switch something.

It was only three months ago that he was accusing the East Europeans in the European Union of being hawks that he disagreed with. So so I think there there’s a slow shift and never underestimate the French seeing an opening of where the US is behind the rest of leaping into the breach to take it here on bastille day with the tricolor going to the barricades of Eastern Europe. There was a shift and this is and to go to the United States side where, I mean, this is Let’s face it. The United States has been has led all enlargements, at least all the ones that I have been I mean, wow. I mean, I would say beginning with the ninety with the ninety seven summit, that was pushed by the US and then the twenty two thousand and two summit and then subsequent summits that led to enlargement it has been in the interest of the United States to bring liberal democracies into the fold.

And twenty years ago, I remember speaking to some people in the United States who said, well, the big nut to crack will be Finland and Sweden. Well, that was done now. I mean it was, but that was again, driven by the Swedes and the Finge themselves. They were the ones who pushed that.

Particularly the fans.

Yes. But so I am I’m and so I’m struck by how cautious and hesitant the US has been on Ukraine, which would be the greatest addition to to war fighting capabilities in NATO that NATO has had since its founding since you have you have hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people who’ve actually fought the Russians. No one else has. So why would we be so cautious?

You know you know, I think one part of the answer is and, you know, in the way you alluded to it early on, is that for some reason, the administration seems to think of admission to NATO as either a sort of an indulgence or a gift or an act of compassion or it’s like being admitted to a very snooty club where you have to show good pedigree and clean shirt crawlers and immaculate Lishein’ shoes. And as opposed to framing it the way you have, which is this powerful addition to the security instability of Europe, which is a major interest of ours. You know, one of the things that is striking, of course, is that Villnius was in Villnius, that it was in one of the Baltic states. And I wanted to ask you and particularly given your experience as President of Estonia than before that foreign sister. It it does seem to me the Baltic states, but actually, particularly, your country, Estonia, have been able to exercise leadership and a kinda moral pressure, which is not commensurate with their actual size.

I mean, the population of Estonia is what? One point three million. Oh, great. Yeah. One point three million.

Okay. It’s a very small country. So what explains that? Or first, do you agree with that? And then secondly, what what do you think lines it?

Well, I think the ability to articulate a position without appearing like an East European with his hair on fire is what has helped us. I mean tough but not going overboard as some even non baltic countries have gone, I mean I would say that sort of demanding reparations from Germany right now is not exactly a way to influence people. And so I think that’s part of it and the stony is do tend to be more taciturn and choose their words, and I think much of it actually has to do nowadays with Kayakalas, who is extremely articulate and smart and well read, combined with their own family history because if people don’t know among the listenership, I mean, In nineteen forty nine, so four years after the war, there was a mass deportation in in the Baltic countries March forty nine, nothing to do with anything except just to punish people, I guess. And so in that mass deportation, Kayakalas’s mother was the youngest child to be deported. So that kind of left a mark on the family, and moreover the family was throughout the Soviet period was not allowed ever to go back to where her mother was from, which is also five kilometers from where I live today, and way way south middle of the Southern Estonian woods.

So I think that the sort of personal experience and all so then the ability to articulate a position is something that has helped the stony and when I look back on successful diplomats and policy makers in the country. They’ve all generally fit into the mold of being tough but not overboard. And that’s I mean, I think we saw very clearly that being overly well, being hysterical did not help the your case. You had to really make it in a way that people understood. Now that’s it.

I would say that we have exhibited probably over the years better than others or articulated better than others’ position on, say, Russia, on the other hand, let’s face it we’re not big countries and we don’t have that kind of clout within either the EU or NATO. I think that role is being taken up today actually by Poland, though I mean, I think they could do better on the articulation side in terms of maybe, as I said, maybe not going for reparations. From Germany. So I think I mean, it’s a mixed bag. And he also depends on the government.

I mean, you know, the checks were in pretty bad shape when they had Zeem on there, and and when you Slovakia when they had Fizzo there who was also fairly russofiliq that also did not exactly endear them and then And then you have, well, you have Hungary for the past fifteen years, which is of unabashed, Rosophilia. Well, I don’t know, Rosophilia combined with sort of some kind of bonding with the far right in the United States, which also is beyond it’s bizarre to me. So that leaves not too many people to be able to express something. Now the other factor I would also bring in is that that explains some of this stuff is that and also some of the sort of hysterical responses in parts of Eastern Europe is a real difference between how Russia treated East Europeans after fall of the wall and after the breakup of the Soviet Union compared to the western Europeans. A real big difference.

And I know Eric you were in Finland, so you probably could observe that everything was sweet and light when the Russians talked fins, but when they talk to us then it was sort of banging the fist on the table and best example of this was when we when we had our border negotiations with Finland, rather, excuse me, when we had our border negotiations with Russia. I propose that we give we give to the Russians that who wanted a simplified border agreement, that we simply take the Finnish Russian border treaty and just use the replace function so that everything that applied to Finland and Russia would apply to us in Russia. To which ambassador Sverin who led the negotiations said, You are not Finland. You never were Finland. You never will be Finland.

No. So, I mean, that’s so I mean, so while they were being very, you know, lover of was being all cosmopolitan and and sophisticated in speaking with his counterparts in Western Europe and in the United States when he talked to us, then it was really pretty stalinist.

I wonder, Tom, if we could talk a little bit about what you think the impact will be inside the alliance of having Finland and Sweden in. You know, I of course, I’m biased because I’m as you pointed out, a former US ambassador to Finland, but I think in Washington and in the US generally, there has been an underestimation of the strategic importance of having Finland and Sweden in Not least, because, of course, it helps enormously with potential defense of the Bulwark by creating a kind of strategic, hinterland, from which to reinforce, all these new defense plans that NATO adopted at the Villeneus Summit for instance, to be able to move forces forward more quickly, the fact that Finland and Sweden being in is gonna be enormously helpful. In in that regard, the ability to close the Baltic and bottle up the, you know, Russian Baltic fleet this serious defense industry that Finland and Sweden bring, the fact that there’s, you know, serious countries with serious governments, I mean, I’ve been struck throughout the war in Ukraine by the tone of the statements, not just by kayakoles, as you pointed out, but by Sona Modern when she was prime minister of Finland, but also now Foreign minister Walton, just in the last twenty four hours, made a point very similar to Elliott’s, that, you know, Ukrainian membership in NATO is not a gift in assistance to Ukraine from NATO is not a gift that the Ukrainians are fighting to defend NATO.

This is from a country that’s been in NATO for all of three months. Right? So I I’m just curious what you think the impact inside the alliance will be of having Finland and Sweden in. Will it shift the debate a a bit? Have you see that playing out?

I think a lot of things Will Saletan is that in fact the Fins have, as you know, have had for ever since? Well, throughout the cold war, had a really good military which they have kept up with universal conscription, which I think also adds a lot to the cohesion of society so sons of fishermen served next to the sons of professors which makes which adds to the cohesion in that society and Finland and Sweden rather has now come out of a long period of basking in the peace dividend I mean, they got rid of all troops on the most strategic place in the Baltic Sea, which is the island of gut blood, from which and SS three hundred can cover every capital in Northern Europe. Which would make so with no troops guarding it, it would have been like an ideal Spetsnott’s place to attack. So that is, okay, that we get rid of those problems. Sweden was a little slow in recognizing things in because on there was the good Friday attack in twenty thirteen when Russian sent bombers escorted by fighter planes to attack Stockholm, veering off right before they reach reached the territorial waters, which no one, which the Swedes did not pick up because it was good Friday, and they have sent their the radar people home.

So it’s a big jump, whereas that would not have happened in Finland. So you have their capabilities which are great and the Swedes, of course, produce their own fighter planes and artillery and the Swed and the Fins have their their armored cars or armored personnel carriers, rather, which are sort of used throughout Europe. So that side of things. From a strategic point of view, of course, right. I mean, Scotland has now been taken off the table.

The I mean you could think really strategically that the three Baltic countries were a spit, a peninsula, but it may be more like a spit with basically sort of defense depth of two fifty kilometers which the Russians in Ukraine covered in a matter of hours really or days. And so that has always been a weakness on the part of our of the three Baltic countries in NATO, especially being potentially cut off at the Suawake corridor between Belarus and Kaliningrad, which is only sixty kilometers or forty miles wide. So, I mean, if you think about what could have happened. Now that that that is completely obviated now. There is no problem with Finnish and Swedish membership for for supplying troops for supplying for defense, and so it really is becoming a NATO lake and this is I think a huge step forward strategically.

Attitudes, of course, you both in in both Finland and Sweden you have right of center governments now that are not overly burdened with with the pacifist sixties and seventies, leaderships that were most Sweden was decidedly non aligned. Finland had some some fairly anti American leadership for many years in the form of Tariya Hollandan and ERCitomiya, the foreign minister. So it was it was

I’m sadly aware.

Yes. I’m sure you are. So, I mean, you see that there’s been a shift there and I’m sure that actually the I’m sure that actually the the election results last year and or this year in Finland and Sweden were also affected by the invasion of Ukraine where suddenly two countries realize that they are in fact vulnerable in their assumptions about sort of being smarter than everyone else in being neutral was quickly disabused by Russian behavior.

Yeah. Can I shift us a little bit and see if we can get you talking about two other countries, one of which you’ve lived in for quite a while, you know the language fluently? That’s Germany. And what what do you make of how much of a change there’s been in Germany? I mean, if there’s one country that You know, I think there is some responsibility for how we got to where we are.

It is it is Germany, and then actually we should talk about Russia in your view of the Russian future and what do you think is going on there? Maybe we could start with Germany.

Well, I think the two most notable things about Germany, first of all, is the is the strong transatlantic position advanced by the Green Party, which I mean that’s been a long term transformation I mean, even Yoshka Fisher, despite his kind of nineteen sixties street fight and man kind of Row already was twenty years ago was decidedly transatlanticist in his positions and the party has long ago abandoned the kind of knee jerk pacifism that I knew in the eighties when I was there. So that’s one change. The other change, which is not at all so pleasant is the astounding rise of the IFD, which is the the hardcore right wing party that now is Well, I mean they’re almost at the level of the social democrats and in popularity, and the, well, the most popular party right now is the right of centered, which is I mean, it’s it’s also kind of a split party between the one the the right that wants to that is traditionally for NATO and for defense and then the others who are very mercantilist in that party So, I mean, it’s a mixed bag. You can’t really ascribe to any party that, you know, the kind of view that you would you would in the US context.

So you have you have greens that are very pro American. You have conservatives who are or very pro Russia, I mean, it’s just the bizarre mix there. Though, again, US also now has conservatives that are pro Russia. So it’s hard to say. I mean, I think that I think that the chancellor Schultz is that he was not ready for this, for this invasion, and I think he’s had to go through through a lot of learning in terms of what Germany is and what Germany needs to do.

I mean, it’s basically been a laggard since the ball fell on anything relating to defense, and during sure this time, as chancellor they really went sort of downhill on defense and on Also, I mean, sort of looking in domestic security, I mean, sort of there was a lot of there are a lot of Russians in in Germany today with the who still seem to have strong ties to to the to the Russian regime, which you see in these mass demonstrations of people in Germany supporting supporting the invasion of Ukraine, which nothing else gives a lie to the notion that while Russians are only, don’t have all the facts. So you have people, you have three million Russians. And in Germany, you have all the facts. Because they’re living in a free media environment. On Russia, I don’t know.

This is I mean, my secret hope is that, as I said the other day, that Forest returns as history because it seems like nineteen sixteen with the with the generals going into revolt and but in any case, from the Prig regime incident on, it’s they seem to be headless. I don’t know can’t tell what’s going on.

Yeah, just back to Germany for one second before we go to Russia. I mean, do you it it seems to me that there was a kind of deep consensus in Germany about a more or less accommodationist postured towards Russia, you know, you cannot blame at all the SPD, Angela Merkel, certainly pursued it.

Right.

You know, and then you have Schultz, who, as you say, you know, was not prepared for this in the slightest, says we have a site and vendor. There’s a kind of a major turning point. And I I wonder if you think at a kind of a deeper level whether it’s policy elites or or in fact the entire population, there’s just a a fundamental shift of attitude or not. And Of course, part of what falls from that is, you know, will Germany be able to play a different role in European security than it has for the last twenty, thirty years?

Well, the opinion polls show actually Germans to be more pro Ukrainian than the government.

Yeah.

Which is well, I mean, usually, when you get those kind of results, then the government kind of shifts to to go with the to go with the people. And I think that is driving things somewhat. I mean, pistorious is far, far, far more serious minister defense than his predecessor Lumbrecht. To really I don’t think ever got the message on the excitement then. So I think it’s moving I don’t know how much is moving.

There’s this whole battle going on and what should be the relationship with China, policy discussions, on top of everything else, including I mean on top of the war in Ukraine, you also have this issue like between the the mercantalists and the the other people. How what is our approach to China? And that has not been resolved yet. I mean, that’s a problem that actually faces much of Europe. What should be the European position on China?

And it’s becoming clear to many countries in Europe, UK, France, Germany, that that it’s all not it’s I mean, the kind of it’s it’s not all based on trade. There’s some serious rights there.

On on Russia, do you I mean, is it your basic expectation that that I don’t really ask you as an Estonian I suppose former Estonia policymaker, but you’re quite influential. I mean, is should the basic assumption on which Estonia operates is you know, no matter what happens in Russia, we will be permanently stuck with this big predatory imperialist, ruthless, aggressive state forever. And we just have to figure out how we’re gonna deal with that. Would that be or do you think that Russia will ever transform itself into something that’s a bit more reasonable?

It’s the former. I

mean — Yeah.

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Frank. I think that I think the general attitude was the kind of Clinton approach to Russia was naive and overlooked a lot of things and that hope that trade would I mean, well, I’ll put it this way. I think the big problem is that people thought it was communism, that it was means of production. It’s not means of production. I mean there is a fundamental nationalism there which we should have seen already on the part of Milosevic, who was also a person who got rid of communism.

You became a capitalist, and then he started committing genocide. I mean, this is this is the the problem that that, you know, sort of economics does not determine the sort of everything. I mean, there may be a state ideology but but in terms of the behavior of Russia as the Soviet Union or as Russia today in Ukraine, is not very different. And I would even argue that communism or sort of internationalism as they called it had kind of a ameliorative effect on the non Russian republics of the Soviet Union and that once that went away, once there was no more communism then sort of you got full bore Russian chauvinism with kind of statements that would, I mean, just with attitudes about genocidal positions that we will liquidate these people. They all have to die.

You couldn’t have said that as a communist.

Right. I I wonder if we could talk maybe just I mean, you and Elliott have just been talking about kind of Russia in the long term. I wonder maybe just focus for a minute a little bit more in the short term. You talked about, you know, Pragotians’ rebellion. Putin’s been out you know, on television and to some degree traveling a bit around Russia to try and project the notion post prego vision that Everything is fine.

I’m in charge. He just leaked. They he just leaked. He he said to Commerissant last night in an interview that He met with all the Wagner guys, and he offered them all these things to go back to, you know, fight for Russia, blah blah blah. In the meantime, though, we we see in the Wall Street Journal today that more Russian officers have been detained for questioning Some have been released, but some not.

Sort of Beacon hasn’t been seen in three weeks. Their reports, I don’t know how much stock to put in them, that he’s been tortured, that he’s been beaten, and they can’t show him on TV because there’s visible evidence of that. General Popov gave an interview in which he, you know, ripped up, gerasimov and Shoyegu for mismanaging the war, His wife now says he hasn’t been been in contact with her for, you know, some period of time, couple of days. All of which seems to suggest that the progression, rebellion, whatever it represented, isn’t over yet. I mean, the phenomenon isn’t over It reaches deeper into the military than might appear on the surface, which does open the prospect, I think, potentially, of splits inside the Russian elite that might lead at some point to, you know, Putin finally, you know, cutting his losses and thinking he’s got to at least temporarily stop this thing.

What do you make of all that, Thomas?

Well, that’s why I mentioned nineteen sixteen before. Because it’s as far as repeating its history, which is that, I mean, when you nineteen sixteen, the dismal state of affairs on the on Russia’s western front led to generals beginning to well not quite revolt, but I mean, lose faith in there in the in the government or the regime. And right now, I mean, there’s there’s a fair bit of dissension. It seems among the military area and also the military bloggers or mill bloggers who kind of are the mouthpieces of the of the military. That’s not necessarily great because they they make Putin seem like a sort of a tame person.

I mean, they’re not very they’re fairly bloodthirsty. So you have this I mean, it’s hard to say what could happen. Clearly, by by making well, by being muddy, buddy with the Progojan people is so out of character and with what Russians are used to. Where, I mean, if you uttered a peep before, you’d be flying out a window, and now this is I mean, this certainly shows Putin as being fairly weak because everyone knows what is what used to happen. And so here, first you call it treason, and then and then you’re sitting around and having meetings with not only Progyny, but with twenty four of his top guys.

We don’t know. I mean, there could be kind of like I mean, there could be retribution could come later. But right now, I think it’s a very confusing picture for everybody. But from what I have heard from my various contexts is that this dissatisfaction with Putin is mainly with Gaurasimov and Shoygu, but that extends to Putin is much more widespread than the than the the people who have been detained right now.

You know, one of the things that I think one occasionally hears out of the American administration is, well, we don’t want, you know, you don’t want chaos in Russia. You you know, you wouldn’t like there to be real internal fighting and stuff like that that we should be worried about Russian instability. Do you share that view?

No. I mean

I was hoping you would say that.

I mean, since the justification for doing nothing with Russia for so long has been well, that, well, it could get worse. I mean, there was a cable from I think ambassador bullet than, like, nineteen forty five, about, well, you know, we have to support Stalin. Otherwise, the hardliners will take over. I mean, I I mean, It’s not really I mean, we’ve tried this one approach. And I think I mean, I think the real fear in in in too many places within NATO is that we don’t want the Ukrainians to lose, but we don’t want Russia.

To lose either. And so that’s I mean, we were kind of Lisa Rice said like twenty years ago that she fears a weak Russia more than she fears a strong Russia. I disagreed with that then and I disagree with it today. I think that well Russia has to deal with its own problems. And that doesn’t mean a civil war all across across the Eurasian land mass, but certainly, they have to be forced to deal with their own problems, and I think that they should we should give them a time out and, like, figure it out guys.

Yeah. Well, for for the record, Eric and I both want Russia to lose. We prefer her weak. Could we touch on maybe another topic? You know, we in the green room, we had had a conversation about about the nature of Europe and how some West European states felt, and I, you know, I certainly think this is right, that, you know, they somehow had an assumption that Europe now ended at the Elb.

It’s been over three decades since the since the wall came down. I wonder if you could just reflect a little bit on the way in which what we used to think of is eastern Europe is now just become Europe.

It’s a very slow process. I mean, it’s it’s a third of a it’s more than a third of a century and they still referred to the former Soviet Block. I mean, I had already graduated college which is the same amount of time since I graduated college, I mean, in World War II, and when I graduated college, when the Will Saletan now. And when I graduated college, I did not read articles talking about the former Nazi Reich. You know?

I mean, so and I don’t think that people quite understand the degree of transformation in much of Europe since that period. And so you still I mean, not only read about former Soviet Republics, but, I mean, in certain things such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, rule of law rankings, my country is ahead of almost all EU countries. I mean, but they still persist this image of gray people leading gray lives and gray apartment blocks. It’s just not true. And then people show up and say, oh my god.

I mean, this is your trains are so good and you have everything is digitized, but their old perceptions persist. It has not changed enough and I despair of it changing for another couple of decades because I think it’s almost sort of hardwired into thinking and has been for so long. Well, I mean and now, of course, in some sense, a new the division between sort of western complacent West European complacency regarding Russia and the much tougher position taken by East Europeans I think may have even strengthen this feeling that, okay, they’re different from us. We are different because we actually know what we’re talking about. Right?

Yeah, because you live in reality unlike the sort of lotus eating fantasy that a lot of West Europeans I think have lived in for the last thirty years. I we’re we’re running a little low on on time. By the way, I I wanna just say that having visited Talin not too long ago just before COVID, I I can testify to what you say about, you know, the vibrancy and you know, the modernity of of contemporary, you know, the contemporary Baltic states compared to the European kind of, you know, so Chiaroscuro, view of everything being kind of, you know, rather dull. I wonder if you could comment on kind of another big set of issues that came up at the summit, which is You know, the the massive effort by the US and allies to supply Ukraine has really thrown into very sharp relief. In the US, the frailty of our own defense industrial base, shortage of munitions that we face, the difficulty we have, and replenishing the stockpiles that we’ve drawn down in order to support the Ukrainians.

And if anything, I think the situation is you know, worse in Europe with the defense industrial base. And, you know, one of the big headlines out of the summit was we’ve approved all these new defense plans and we’ll be able to move such a number of troops forward, you know, to defend the frontline states against potential Russian aggression in very short amount of time, blah blah blah, you know, that that’s all fine and well, although I think is gonna take a little bit of time even to reach those goals — Yes. — typically has been in the past. But if they’re not armed with anything, it won’t really solve the problem, and I I wonder if you have any thoughts. I mean, you mentioned, you know, bringing in Finland and Sweden, they both have pretty serious defense industries.

You got Patria and Finland, you got Bophers and Sweden. What do you think, you know, the future of all this is, Thomas. How how is this gonna develop in Europe?

I was glad to see the one I mean, one of the things that estonia or Kayakalas proposed was actually adopted by the EU was to devote a billion to producing ammunition. Which was not even on the table until she proposed it, and then people said, no, that’s not a bad idea, and they proved it. So, I mean, a billion on one hundred and fifty five millimeter shells would be not bad. But I think that there is broad recognition that they need to do more. The question is who’s going to do it.

And so we’re not gonna I mean, here, I’m hoping sort of even the French, but they’re money where their mouth is regarding strategic autonomy. I mean, if you’re going to have any kind of serious defense in your all of the EU or NATO countries must, you know, do their part and actually increase defense expenditure and spend it on buying stuff. I mean, that’s it’s I mean, that’s one of The problems if you have a all voluntary army is that the bulk of your defense expenditure goes to paying pensions. I mean, that’s not the way to go. I think that there needs to be a rethink on how we do defense in Europe and the fact that we better get our act together, I guess in part there is sort of driving some of it behind I mean behind this concern is not only Ukraine but also the prospect of a Trump presidency, which is not I mean, it’s not I mean, it’s possible, and that would be that would basically mean the end of NATO.

And And of course, congress as well. I mean, there’s not I mean, fortunately, there are enough Republicans in the house to be pro Ukrainian to keep things from going completely out of whack, but thinking back on my youth and how it was the Republicans who you could always count on to be strong on defense and now it’s the Democrats, which is kinda weird.

Yeah. Not well, they’re not strong enough. So Well, let me use that actually to ask my last question. You know, you’re a, as I think our listeners Will Saletan figured out for themselves are an an illusioned observer of international affairs. We’re in the middle of this terrible war.

It’s almost a year and a half. You know, there’s a lot of questions. We’ll Ukraineian, the offensive succeed. There’s, you know, troubling things in American politics. There’s troubling things in other countries’ politics.

And are you fundamentally, as you look out an optimist, a pessimist, or just kind of in the middle somewhere?

Well, I’m colored by my experiences, which is growing up thinking that if Estonia ever became independent, it would be a hugely successful three and but then well, I’ll get this. I the late George Urban. Who was editor of The Economist, and he was had a radio for Europe, like thirty five, thirty four thirty eight years ago, called me to his office when I was an analyst at radio for a year. He said, Thomas, you know, somebody’s never gonna be independent, but I like what you write I think you should retool yourself as an expert on terrorism because that’s got a future. George was very smart, but I said, now I think I’m gonna stick around and deal with Estonia.

So I’m I’m optimistic and looking at the success of my country, I’m optimistic, and I’m just hoping that other people would also be willing to put as much time and effort into making their country successful, not only the ones in eastern Europe, which are becoming successful but also countries in Western Europe to be able to make changes in the way they do things so that they would actually be able to meet the future challenges that will be, I mean, Russia is not gonna stop being challenge and China’s going to be an ever bigger challenge, and this kind of tunnel vision combined with myopia means you can’t see very far ahead either either ahead or to the side, and that’s what I find is a very disturbing in Europe, much of you are today and I would say countries like mine and basically the central and East Europeans have to look further ahead and have to look more at what’s going on around them than countries that are concerned strictly with their immediate issues.

Yeah. Well, that’s a great note to end on. Thank you very very much, Thomas.

This has been tremendous fun talking to the two people. I I listen to every every week And now here I am speaking to them. It’s great.

Well, Thomas, it’s been great having you. And this issue is not going away, so I hope we can have you back periodically to check-in and see how how things are going in Europe. Our our guest today has been Thomas Ilvast, the former president of Estonia, former an Minister of Estonia, former ambassador of Estonia to the United States. If you enjoyed this episode of Shield of the Republic, please leave us Review on Spotify or Secret Podcast wherever you get your podcasts from.