Reporting from the Front

Alright. I don’t know what the hell happened. I can’t even read now.

H is a terrible thing.

Welcome to Shield of the Republic, a podcast sponsored by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and dedicated to the proposition our related by Walter Littman during World War II that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the essential shield of our Democratic Republic. I’m Eric Ettelman Counsel at the Center for Strategic and budgetary assessments, a Bulwark contributor, and a non resident fellow at the Miller Center. And I am joined by my partner, Elliott Cohen, the Robert e Osgood professor of strategy at the Johns Hopkins school, advanced international studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at the center for security and international studies. Elliott, welcome back.

Well, thank you. It’s good to be back. I I feel a little bit guilty, Eric, as you have privately pointed out to me. I’m flitting around the world a lot. And so I am abandoning you periodically to run shield with the Republic all in your I have to say you seem to be doing a fairly competent job of it though.

So

Well, it’s not the same without you. I will tell you that.

Well, that’s nice.

But I’m very glad to have you back especially from your travels recently because you’ve been in places near the frontline and with frontline states and So, you know, very interested to hear your impressions, particularly kind of your sense of the counter offensive and how it’s going and what the prospects are, we’re about to be celebrating the nation’s birthday, and it is a moment to reflect on democracy and its challengers, and we’re facing one of the biggest challenges to democracy and a very long time.

Yeah. So I think recently I reported back on a trip to Finland, Estonia and Pol after a brief interlude, which included travel elsewhere, I was back in Poland, for a couple days for a very small high level discussion about what are the best ways of securing Ukrainian security in the future, and I I came it was mainly Europeans I was very glad to see and really primarily under European auspices, which I think is a very good thing because although we will have a large role to play there still should be some limits to it. I can talk about that. But then the really most interesting part is I went on a from there, drove to Kiev and on the way back came back through LaViv in Ukraine. And while we were there, I was giving a lecture at one of the Ukrainian universities, the Mihola Academy, which is quite an old institution, and then met with some very senior people in the foreign ministry, defense ministry, and in the intelligence world in Ukraine.

And on the way back, you know, got a chance to see a bit of Keith and a bit of Loveve, which are two really beautiful old cities, you know, particularly the the urban core and, you know, before we get into some of the things you’ve addressed, I just wanna say, you know, there’s something terribly poignant about it, because you you go to these beautiful old cities, they’re a little bit you know, showing their age a little bit more than some of their central and West European counterparts, but they are recognizably part of your you know, there’s the Austro Hungarian Imperial vibe, but they’re just beautiful. The architecture is beautiful, and they’re filled with people. Outside going to cafes and restaurants, eating ice cream, trying to lead happy creative lives. And then, of course, you see, there aren’t that many young men, and the ones you see are frequently in uniform. And you see you know, the on the one hand, the mood felt a little bit more relaxed than the previous time I’d been there, but you see more posters, which are Some are sort of recruiting posters, some are just morale Bulwark.

And then you stay at the hotel, and this is you know, you check and say, okay, here’s where the bomb shelter is, and here’s what the announcements are like. When when we were in Kiev every night, there were there were alerts. And you have to decide, am I gonna run to the bomb shelter, just roll over and take my chances. The tragedy of that became clear. The other thing, really poignant moment, which I want to mention on the way back through LaViv, which has a very interesting history, particularly in Polish Ukrainian relations, about which I can say more.

We visited the Ukrainean military cemetery. And, you know, this may sound morbid, but it’s not. It I think it’s very important for people to see war cemeteries because they tell you a lot about the countries. And these Ukrainian war cemeteries of course immaculately tended. But decorated with, you know, for well, first, they’ve got the pictures of the people who fell.

And decorated with, you know, beautiful flowers. Usually, the grave itself covered with They’re very carefully designed layout of gravel that’s been painted bright blue and yellow the colors of Ukraine. Carefully and reverently treated and in a way that tells you, okay, this is a society which feels every loss and which celebrates the individual. And you compare that with the barbarians on the other side, you know, frequently leave their dead to rot I couldn’t care less, actually, about the human price of any of this. And, you know, it makes it clear what you’re fighting for.

It just it’s what a terrible thing you have to pay such a price for it. So that’s there was that. I’ll I’ll just say couple quick things, and then we can take it however you want to. While we’re in the middle of this, the whole progression puts came about. I was traveling with some very, very senior Polish, foreign policy experts, and practitioners.

Very interested to get their take, which is quite different I think from the take that we had with our friend Steve Sistanovich. About what this means. You detected a lot of I I I my view is Ukrainerainians had some idea this was coming because one of our intelligence meetings, the we asked about, you know, what they thought about promotion. This was I think on Friday. And, you know, we noticed kind of a sly wink being exchanged, But I think they are, you know, as as I think they’ve been in the past, confident without being cocky.

But they are beginning to think about their future, and then I really will stop and let you speak. I apologize for going through.

No, no, no, no, not at all.

They it it is clear to them, and frankly, it is clear to me that NATO membership is absolutely essential. Absolutely essential. It is not, you know, one of the things I would one of the many things I would criticize our government for is treating, admission to NATO as the equivalent of it, you know, admissions to a very rigorous club, you know, where you have to show that your shoes are always shined and know, your shirt collars are always clean. And, you know, I mean, when president Biden said, you know, we’re not gonna make it easy for them. I thought that was truly one of the more idiotic things that he said, because, you know, honestly, the alternative I I This is something I believe and not just because of things I’ve picked up.

The alternative to NATO membership for them, is nuclear weapons.

Right.

And we should think about what that means. And they can do it. They’ve got the scientists, they’ve got the expertise. Lord knows they’ve got the justification and the motivation. Sure.

And that would not be a good world.

So let’s start there. Let’s talk about maybe break the conversation into two which is one is the future security arrangements, and then the second prospects for the counter offensive. You know, I was struck when reading Putin’s discussion with the military bloggers that he had, I think it was on June fourth. In which he said, talks about the allies and he basically tells the military prescribers, you know, that allies are losing confidence in this And, of course, he says the Americans don’t really have allies. They just have vassals, which is probably, you know, one of the best examples of projection that I’ve ever.

I was gonna say, this is the case for the psychologists.

But, you know, my my the thing that hit me, as I read that, was if ever there was a case that shows that the Americans don’t just have vassals, it’s this. It’s been the allies who have forced the Biden Administration’s hand, constantly on provision of long range artillery, on the provision of tanks, with the leopards becoming forcing function for the Americans to provide some Abrams tanks, f sixteen. —

f sixteen’s.

Yeah. It’s sort of the best. Long range strike with the storm shadow by

the — Yep.

— by the British. And you see that same dynamic beginning to play out here on the question of Ukrainian’s future relationship. With NATO. It’s NATO allies who, I mean, in the past, it would have been the US, I mean, having been a participant, in the early phases of NATO enlargement back in nineteen ninety six and ninety seven, and even earlier. It was the US that drove the pace of all this.

Working closely with other allies, particularly the French and the British and the Germans, but definitely American, you know, conception and lead. Here, the Biden administration is being kind of you know pushed forward by the Baltz, the Nordics, the British, even the French,

Well, I I what I was gonna say, Eric, is the the big news is the French. I mean, the Baltz have always been there. The East Europeans have already been there. The Brits, I think, have always been there. The Nordics are not particularly surprising, that the French now say that.

This is a big deal because I think they were the ones who were a, the most skeptical about NATO in general. Or at least president Macron was, and definitely some of the most skeptical about Ukraine joining it. And I think they’ve changed their tune Because at the end of the day, with all of their faults, you know, they’re an analytical bunch. And Macron is an analytical guy. And I think they’ve sort of thought this one through and come to the same conclusion that I have, which is you you’re not gonna get stability in Europe and until the Ukrainians are in NATO.

And I think, you know, part of the problem is I think the the Biden administration in addition to timidity and telegraphic its fears and so on. They have somehow you know, conceptualized NATO membership as as I said, first, joining an exclusive club, but as as an act of charity, and and, you know, a favor that you’re doing the poor Ukrainians. And that’s completely the wrong way to think about right way to think about it is we need to preserve the security and stability of Europe because that’s where really big wars start. The really big ones.

It’s our leading trading leading trading partner and

And and plus all that. And the best way to ensure security and stability is to have Ukraine in NATO because at the end of the day, the Russians have not been willing to attack NATO members. Right. They’ve made it very clear they don’t think Estonia really deserves to be a state. They could overrun that place in twenty four hours, although they would get a fight.

And why don’t they? And the answer is NATO? And the French should figure that one out. And hopefully at some point, the Biden administration will figure it out as well. I I will say one other thing to that is, you know, the PREGosian thing broke.

It seems to me that it’s apparent that that puts attempt is actually going to reinforce the drive for NATO membership, and it will silence some of the critics of that for a while, and it will encourage those who are in favor of it.

So I think, you know, it’s worth talking about some of the mechanics here, first, there’s, I think, the backstory, which is that, you know, there’s a whole series of of things that happened in Ukraine’s past, that I think give them some special moral as well as strategic consideration. So, and this is something we’ve talked about in the past on the podcast, which is the Ukrainians in nineteen eight nineteen ninety four giving up their claim on the nuclear weapons that were left on Ukrainian territory after the Soviet Union broke up. Now, there were a lot of reasons why it made sense for them to do that, and I was partially involved, involved for part of the discussion before it before it eventually ended in the Utapest memorandum, my successor and my job actually was Steve Piper, who we’ve had on the podcast talking about this, But the Ukrainians never really had physical control over the nuclear weapons. They still remained under the control of the, you know, the Russian strategic rocket forces, the Soviet strategic rocket forces of now resident in the Russian Federation, it would have been extremely expensive for them to actually maintain those weapons.

They also were not particularly well suited actually to function as a deterrent. Against Russia because of the ballistic trajectories. So there were a lot of reasons why it was a card worth playing from their point of view for the economic and political benefits, but not really a claim that was worth vindicating And I only say that because John Mearsheimer, at the time, advocated nuclear weapons for Ukraine, and has argued subsequently that if only we’d followed his advice. You know, none of this, you know, current unpleasantness would have happened. But the point though is that the political benefit that they got was assurances from the Russians, the Americans, the Brits, and later the French, that they, you know, would not be threatened with the use of force or nuclear weapons and that they would their territorial integrity, including Crimea, would be recognized by the the states and that these were not guarantees that was a big part of the negotiation which in US terms has a legally binding quality to it like the article five guarantee that you get as a member of NATO or that we have in our mutual security treaties with the Republic of Korea and Japan.

And the Philippines and Australia, but that they would be assured that the US would do some of course in twenty fourteen obama administration did nothing when this happened, and president Obama has recently been doing interviews with Christian Amanpour you know, trying to vindicate that position of his, which it seems to me is ludicrous. I mean it set the stage for Putin to do what he’s done not only in Crimea, but in the Don Bosset now in Ukraine as a as a whole, so the Ukrainians come at this with some understandable concerns that anything less than NATO membership is in the end of the day not gonna cut it. Now, that does raise a question of, you know, sort of the timing of all this. I mean, they then also had the, the two thousand eight episode in which the NATO alliance did not cover itself in a lot of glory at Bucharest when it refused to give membership action plan to Ukraine but said that it would become a member of NATO which had the it was the kind of worst of both worlds. It was the unintended consequence of which was to inflame Russian opinion, but without providing Ukraine with anything substantive in the way of, you know, greater security.

So they’re gonna come at this understandably, you know, looking for something more serious. Now the question in my mind is, you don’t wanna divide the alliance, so you have to find something that can unify the alliance on this point. It seems to me that the NATO Secret Podcast general you know, has made a, you know, pretty good proposal, which is the summit of vilnius out of state unequivocally, that there’s no need for a membership action plan for Ukraine. Because Ukraine is now demonstrated, it can operate NATO equipment, it can work together with the alliance, it has the will to fight, all the things that you would want, certainly has met the bar that Montenegro met when it became a member of NATO some years back. So that seems to me to be sort of a no no brainer, and I think the administration is okay with that.

It seems I I think it’s not completely clear. But then there’s a further question of, like, what is the time frame in, you know, which this is decided? And how do you set that? And it seems to me that there’s gonna be a summit in Washington next year which will mark an anniversary of the alliance.

I think that’s exactly right. It’s the seventy fifth anniversary that’s the time to do it. I, you know, in the interim, I think one of the things that’s necessary, well, two things. At first, very important to address the arguments of people who will oppose it. So one argument will be, well, you don’t wanna admit anybody to NATO whose borders are not recognized.

Important to remember that Germany was admitted when it’s eastern border had not been recognized — Right. — and agreed upon and that which was true, by the way, really, until the end of communism. And that was part of the part part of the deal. There well, there’s a war underway. Well, you you know, we have not only security guarantees to South Korea, but, you know, very large troop presence there even though technically that war is still ongoing.

I think You know, there will obviously be some sort of lag between the end of hostilities, if indeed hostilities end. And full NATO membership. And my view on that one is that the there should be an indication that the concrete planning will be to have American, probably British, French, German, maybe German, we’ll see. Polish, forces stationed in Ukraine. And to do that, you know, before NATO membership.

The the difficulty I think the biggest difficulty is if you say, well, the war you know, we’ll we’ll do this when the shooting stops,

gives him an incentive to keep shooting forever.

You you you incentivize exactly. Now in this respect, I think the progression thing may actually work to our benefit. As as I said, I I think this is much much worse for Putin than some of our friends think. For what it’s worth, that’s also the Polish view. And I think it’s the Ukrainian view as well.

And although I don’t doubt Putin’s sincerity, so to speak, in his belief that, you know, Ukraine is part of Russia. It’s a phony statement that There’s no question in my mind that the preservation of his personal power trumps every other consideration of you know, ideology or personal gain. And if he gets to the point where he feels the regime is in serious danger again, he is perfectly capable of making up some reason to stop the shooting saying, you know, we’ve completed denosification of of Ukraine. I mean, in fact, his speaker Piskov already said that was, well, you know, we have disarmed Ukraine because now they’re using western weapons.

Right. We’ve destroyed their defense industry, which by the way is not true. Yeah.

Yeah. Which isn’t true. They just put a very, very smart guy in in charge of it. The guy who had been in charge of the rail system. So, you know, there are ways to deal with it.

But, you know, once again, there will be no substitute for American leadership. The key, as I kept on telling, I’ve told various allies, is not so much to push the United States as to pull the United States. You know, the our basic instincts as a country, I think, are to help Ukraine. The administration will go along with things eventually as they went along with, you know, tanks and we’ll go along with f sixteens, but you gotta just keep on tugging at them to get them get them over the line.

Enter Alio, you’re saying that Progyny episode should help us. I should say that, you know, I have a very simple minded view of what happened there. It and it’s guided by the higher naivete. Which is bearing in mind that both Pregosian and Putin are liars. You know, I I think, in this instance, sort of, we probably should take prego vision more or less at his word.

I mean I think what was happening here was, and this is the point you’ve made in your piece in the Atlantic. You know, if you really want to understand this, you got to understand the Godfather. These are you know, mafia families. This is all in the spirit of our mentor, the late Alvin Bernstein. These are mafia clans.

Shoigu and Garasimov had had about enough of Prigoshan’s criticisms of them and his glory, you know, seeking for being the, you know, deliverer of the great victory, the great Puric victory at Bakhmoot, And so they wanted to subordinate, as Steve Sanevich said, when we talked with him about this, the Wagner Group to ministry of defense. I think Progyny wasn’t sure because of his connections to Putin, where Putin really stood on this, And so this was really an effort to sort of flush him out. And he probably was encouraged by some people perhaps you know, in the in the system that, you know, hey, we’ll back you if you make a play. And I think as our friend Phillips O’Brien says, you know, it then got away from him. It was sort of catastrophic success.

He probably expected to be opposed at some point and that there would be there be a point where he’d stop, and there would be a negotiation he’d extract some concessions, But instead, he found himself approaching the gates of Moscow with five thousand guys and realized he couldn’t take the city. And I think he he kind of, you know, shocked himself when he realized that he had actually maybe exposed the frailty of the whole regime, and of course when Putin came out on Saturday mornings, and accused him of being a traitor, I think that probably brought him up short too. I mean, the fact is that Putin said nothing and was silent, all day Friday and over Friday night into Saturday morning. That’s my take on this. This is, like, just, you know, to the into the comic aspect of this was it’s sort of like springtime for Hitler, right, in the Nathan Lane Matt Brondrick movie.

You know, I think that may be true, but I guess I and again, I I may have been affected by hanging around with East Europeans. Who tend I think to believe much more in the kind of serious mafia quality of all this where there are always conspiracies and stuff going on. And and I guess my feeling on this one is I cannot imagine progression being able to do this or to accomplish what he did without at least the tacit cooperation of some very senior people.

Oh, yeah.

Let’s just take let’s just take the fact I mean, you you don’t just get up one day and drive with, you know, a five thousand man military formation, seven hundred and eighty kilometers by the way, shooting down half a dozen helicopters

— Right. —

and to command and control aircraft along the way. And that had to take planning. I cannot believe that, you know, the Russians would not have penetrated Wagner at least nominally with FSP agents. I mean, there are spies within spies all over the security establishment in Russia. So then you’re gonna say, well, why wasn’t Putin told that, hey, there’s something fishy going on.

I I the fact I I think it’s established as a fact, although I’m not a hundred percent sure. That Putin fled. He ran away.

Yes. I mean, that does seem to be because

That’s a tell. I mean,

it raises the question though of what made Progyny lose his nerve.

Well, so, I mean, I can give you some of the theories I’ve heard, which is first that he may have gotten out over his skis, it may have gone further than people thought, but that he was offered a very attractive deal, probably including a large payout of money, and assurances by people who could actually protect them. I mean, one version that I have heard, which go so far as to say, Putin is already sort of a figurehead, that that he has lost most of his real power. Now I I don’t see the evidence of that, although it does seem to me that he’s been fatally weakened by this. I mean, just the the fact of this happening, you know, and I I understand the the other arguments, but the idea that this has somehow made him tougher and more resilient I don’t think so. And and I think what it is gonna do is I mean, he is clearly kinda paranoid at the moment.

And he probably does he’s probably asking himself exactly the same questions that you and I are, but, you know, where you and I giggle about it, you know, for him, this is quite literally life and death. Sure. And so he has to be any and, you know, the fact that it’s very striking that Lukashenko’s portrayal of this makes Putin look very bad. And Lukashenko is not a careless guy. And, you know, for him to say that, that it tells you something.

Last thing I’d say on this by the way, I You know, we’re used to treating progression as a buffoon. I’m not so sure that he’s buffoon. I mean, of course, he’s brutal, he’s terrible, terrible human beings.

He’s a criminal. He he’s a career criminal.

He’s a criminal. But he’s a talented criminal. And, you know, Vogner, the professional part of Vogner, set aside the convicts who were, you know, just there to kind of draw Ukrainian fire — Yeah. — till they were killed.

Canon fighter.

But the the core of Viator is actually a very effect, you know, by Russian standards very effective.

Among the most professional and, you know, yeah, effective forces. Yeah. So, you

know, He I think he somebody who built that operation is probably not entirely full. What what other angle on all this just as long as we’re talking promotion, is I Here’s the thing that I wonder. This guy has spent a lot of time on the front line. He has ordered lots of atrocities. He has undoubtedly seen lots of atrocities.

He’s seen piles of bodies.

He’s perpetrated some of them.

Oh, men. Yep. And I bet you he’s not entirely right in the head as a result. Could be. Could well No.

I mean, post post traumatic stress is a real thing.

Mhmm.

I think once somebody gets deeply, deeply into the world of slaughtering other human beings and being slaughtered in return, you know, particularly if I mean, it’s not like he had such a great life before that, nine years in a Russian jail as kind of being low on the criminal hierarchy that was probably not a great experience. So you’re probably dealing with somebody who has a few screws loose even if he’s pretty capable.

Let’s turn to the I mean, that’s a good segue into turning to the counter offensive. I mean, the but the Wagner forces sort of accomplish their purpose as the perhaps most effective offensive fighting force that you know, Russians have. I mean, I’m not sure how and they they were he pulled out of Bakmoot. But I’m not sure how much the the Russians needed him for this phase which is largely on the strategic defense. But how do you see this all playing out?

And what did you hear in in Ukraine that would give you some insight into where this is all headed?

So so the Ukrainians don’t share much and I don’t really expect them to I sort of sense that, you know, would they like to take Crimea and Dunn Bas in this in this offensive, yes, but I think they’re real they will consider the success if they break the land bridge. In other words, the, you know, the, as our sure listeners know, the supply lines that the Russians have run essentially east west, relatively close to the coast. They had pulled them back once we began giving High Mars. To the to the Ukraine. If they can cut those rail and road lengths, then the Russians are basically unable to resupply their forces around Curasan, their forces north of Crimea.

They’ll probably be able to get in range of the Curch Bridge and take that down, so all of a sudden you can’t supply crimi at all, that would be a major success, and I think they think they’re gonna get that. Now, the one reason why they probably you know, I think one of the questions is, do the Russians have any operational level reserves left? That is to say, when you know, when you’re fighting these kind of massive breakthrough operations, the sound defensive doctrine is you have lots of counter attack forces ready at both the tactical levels or close in fight but then you have operational level reserves, thousands of troops with tanks and all that, ready to launch a counterattack once your enemy is kind of broken through, but has taken losses and is sort of disorganized by the act of breaking through, when you counter attack with your well organized forces that have been held in reserve, and the indications seem to be that the Russians don’t have that. I may be wrong about that, but it doesn’t look as though they have it.

In part because their forces have been so depleted by — They’ve been so depreciated. — by Bakmoot and the attrition that the Ukrainians have inflicted on them in that fight for

And they’re also maintaining a very long line. And, in some ways, blowing the Novakahoke dam may help them lessen they thought, because, as that flooded area dries out in the summer heat, that now becomes an area that the Ukrainians may try to to drive through.

I believe it’s also destroyed a number of the defensive fortifications that they built.

Yes, it did. It did, and they didn’t tell their own people about it. Now, there’s another thought I think of the progression thing in all this, If people are uncertain about what’s going on in Moscow, that will affect the senior general officers on the ground in Ukraine. They’ll be, you know, wondering who’s in, who’s out, is Schohigu really gonna stick around? Is Grasama really gonna stick around?

You know, is there And then, you know, to the extent the progression landed a punch on the very rationale for the war, it’s gonna affect soldier morale. It’s gonna affect general officer.

Which is low to begin with. I mean, the morale of the Russian forces have been terrible.

And I am sure that Look, if the Ukrainian has been good at one thing, it’s information warfare. I am sure that the Ukrainian are kind of saturating telegram channels and stuff like that with this, including all you really need to do is just make sure everybody gets to listen to promotion. And so as a result, I think what the Ukrainians are doing is they’re kind of probing at a whole bunch of different points, they’re hoping to find a weak spot, and that they’re gonna try to fight a breakthrough battle, and who knows, you know, I mean, in all this, we’re swimming in such a fog of uncertainty, but I’m know, I continue to be optimistic that they will they’ll be able to do it. The the one thing that that annoys me is when people say, okay, it’s been two weeks. Yeah.

This thing has succeeded. Right.

It failed.

You know, people should learn some military history. It breaking through at Ellemagne took a while, breaking through the Gustav line, took a while, breaking through the Siegfried line, took a while. That’s the nature of modern combined arms warfare, in particular when the other side is dug in a lot.

Right. To that point, it does seem that the Ukrainians have taken some losses. Which, again, not unanticipated, but harder for them to bear personnel losses in particular than than the Russians who have a manpower advantage, although maybe a wasting asset given the attrition that been inflicted and the task that they have to fulfill along that long line with depleted forces as you we’re saying Elliott, did you get some sense of how the Ukrainians were thinking about about that? I mean, it’s clear they haven’t committed the bulk of brigades that have been trained?

So they haven’t committed the bulk of the brigades. I’m not sure that the Russians have as much of a manpower advantage as one might think. I mean, absolute numbers, yeah, but they they’ve not been willing to draft people in, you know, to to really draft people in places like Petersburg and Moscow.

He reiterated that by the way in the talk with military bloggers that they weren’t gonna do mobilization.

Looked at absolutely it it affected our morale during Vietnam. So, you know, I’m sure it affects Russian morale. Ukranians on the other hand get to have their best and brightest as part of this thing. And that makes a huge difference. If you were to ask me, why why is the Israeli military been as good as it is?

The answer is not necessarily because of the generals, in fact, I’d say usually not, it’s because they are tapping the best and the brightest of their society. And you pay a price when you do that in all out war, but you also get tremendous benefits and I think the Ukrainians — the Ukrainians have that. So, you know, I think the thing is everybody feels that everybody knows people who’ve fallen. Like I said, their memorials wherever you go, the war’s omnipresent. But I think, you know, the from a manpower point of view, Ukraineian qualities hard.

This is a citizen soldier army, so we should think about it as the way you think about the World War II Army. Which was also a citizen soldier army. I think their biggest challenge I’d say the biggest challenge in the breakthrough is, you know, they’ve obviously gotten tactical training from us and the British and others, You know, the open question is whether they can conduct operational level maneuver. That is to say when you’re talking about an operation which might have tens and tens of thousands of people engage, which is a complicated and difficult art. The advantage that they have though, and I think it’s important for our readers for our listeners to think about this, is, you know, in general, and clausewitz talks about this, Going on the offense is usually good for morale.

You know, it’s just sitting there and taking it as they did Ramahmoud, is extremely difficult. Feeling that you’re on the offense and that as you do, you’re not only liberating your homeland, but your paying back, you know, the people who’ve killed and kidnapped and tortured and raped, their way through your country, that’s a motivator, and I think that increasingly that advantage and motivation is gonna tell over the course of the summer.

So let me ask you about some military equipment issues. One thing that seems to have slowed Ukranian advance has been rotary wing aircraft on the part of the Russians, the so called alligator, helicopters, Ka52s. We just, you know, we just saw Progyny shoot down six of them, so it’s not like these things can’t be taken down. So is there something equipment wise that the Ukrainian are missing? I mean, I know they have a shortage of of shore ads, of short range air defense, but Is there an operational issue?

My understanding of that one is this is a result of having put a lot of effort into the air defense of Ukrainerainian cities.

Right.

And so, sort of mid range kinds of systems, like NASA and Iris T, patriot. You know, which you you would wanna have are you know, they’re are being held to defend cities. I mean, helicopters, you know, the other thing is the Russian helicopters do have these long range standoff munitions, and if they are tactically competent, you know, the they’ll be just kind of popping up briefly get, you know, get the advantage of height, fire a missile, and duck down again. You know, it’s like anything else. It’s For every measure, there is a counter measure.

What I think one misconception though is Well, the Ukrainians don’t have air superiority, so therefore, they can’t conduct an effective offensive. And this is this is, I think, one of the ways in which people invoke history in a misleading way. The way to think about that, I I would say, is not, you know, It’s anachronistic to think of it in terms of, are there fixed wing airplanes flying over the battlefield. The question is, are the functions of air power being exercised. And if you think the reconnaissance function of air power, well, a lot of that is done from space.

Now, which didn’t exist in World War two, or from drones of various kinds. Precision fires in the enemies rear areas, well, that’s not people dropping bombs anymore. That’s high Mars and long range artillery and those kinds of systems. And in between, everybody’s got drones, I mean, but everybody. And so nobody’s gonna have the kind of very superiority that you had a d day.

Now would it be better if the Iranian had more? Absolutely. Is it a crying shame that we didn’t begin the training programs and the equipment programs for F-16s

months earlier.

You know six months or a year ago, absolutely. Would it be helpful if you had to have sixteen’s up there with long range air to air missiles unquestionably. But it’s contested airspace. And that’s gonna be the norm. I mean, it’s if ISIS can attack arts of our bases in Syria, with swarms of drones, not onesies and twosies, but swarms of drones, well, you know, states are gonna have that capacity too.

So, yeah, so I think it’s it’s a bit it’s a bit up in the air.

I wanted to stay on the question of long range fires for a second. So the Brits have provided, you know, the storm shadow for the Ukrainians, which has given them a long range precision fires. We’re still here, and I just heard it recently in the Pentagon, you know. But we can’t give them attack and we don’t have enough ourselves, you know. We have we have to keep them for our own stocks, you know, you’ve heard you’ve heard me and you’ve seen me in print make the argument for the de Pickam, for the cluster ammunition.

Yeah. Which we have, you know, about three million rounds of in stock, which we’ll never use because some undersecretary back in two thousand eight changed policy to say we would move from a three percent dud rate to a one percent dud rate. I mean, Russians have already flooded the whole area with munitions with cluster munitions with thirty percent dud rate, so the place is littered with unexploded ordinance. It’s gonna be a massive cleanup effort after the war. Where do you think we stand on these things?

And what do you think the prospects are for So

I think, you know, we’ll eventually move on I mean, the argument about Atacam’s is fatuous, for several reasons. First, you can manufacture more of these things. We export them to other countries. Secondly, you know, some portion of our Atacam’s inventory and there are about fifteen hundred of these things all told is dedicated to Europe. Well, you know, wouldn’t it make sense to let the Ukrainian the Ukrainians have thirty of them, let’s say, in order to defeat the Russians.

Who we’re planning on using them against anyway? You have an opportunity to defeat the the Russian army. For God’s sake and to make these guys combat ineffective for quite some time to come. So why wouldn’t you expend it now instead of hoarding it for the future? I mean, again, just to be clear, what what would you do with the attackers?

Well, there are really two things that you could do. One is you could take out the Curchase Bridge, which is one of, you know, there are basically two causeways to Crimea from the North, into Ukraine, and then there’s this one from Russia proper. You can take down the Curchase Bridge and you can also probably shut down Russian air bases in Crimea, which would be a big deal. And as you say, I mean, dual purpose improved conventional munitions basically, these are cluster munitions, which will do a job on vehicles as well as on people. And entrenched fortifications.

And, you know, the dud rate is like just a bit over one percent, it’s not, this is not ten percent. And you would think it’s the Ukrainian country for goodness sakes, if they’re willing to tolerate it, why are we squeamish? And it’s just part of the only word I can use is shameful, timidity of the administration. It’s like they don’t under they’re not taken seriously yet. There’s were going on.

And if you decide not to give this to people, you know, lots of Ukrainian young men and women are gonna die, who don’t have to die. It’s as if that doesn’t get through.

Part of the argument is, you know, even though the United States is not party to the Cluster Unician’s Convention, our British, French, and German allies are, and that this would presumably not go down very well with European Publix. I mean, interestingly, the bureaucratic of this inside the Biden administration, as I understand it, are a little bit unusual in the sense that It’s the state department that is raising the biggest objections here as I understand it. You know, there was a recent story that there’s now a relook going on And apparently, Jake Sullivan has privately told some people that he is not necessarily opposed to this So I mean my suspicion is we will get there probably later this summer and and provide them. But again, you know, the administration just seems to be constantly kind of a day late and a dollar short.

A lot of this I think is just bureaucratic stupidity. You know, we have a policy we cling to it, and then we conjure up, you know, there’s there’s a great old piece of military wisdom, do not take counsel of your fears. And, that’s what they tend to do. You know, the idea that, oh, you know, Really British support for Ukraine is gonna snap, if you use cluster munitions, and presumably a long way to say, this is why these are very value. These are why these are necessary.

I mean, at this point, I I really don’t think European Do we really think that European public opinion will kind of spin around after everything that’s gone on and said, oh, well, if they’re using cluster munitions, then we might as well let the Russians take most of Ukraine. Right. I mean, it’s just ridiculous.

I couldn’t agree. It’s just — Couldn’t agree more. —

there’s a level of absurdity to it that’s and I and, you know, if I sound touchy, it’s because, you know, you and I have both heard these arguments so many times, and I’ve really come to the conclusion. It’s just a cover for cowardice. I really am. And and it and it comes And maybe I do feel this particularly keenly after seeing these memorials. And they were everywhere.

I mean, I walk into lecture hall where I’m going to speak, and there’s the name of all the recent graduates and faculty. Who’ve fallen in this war. I mean, it’s ubiquitous, and when we decide to be super scrupulous and super cautious. It means there’ll be more more names on that wall — Of course.

— and

there’ll be more beautiful graves. Yep. In places like LaViv. And I just have a feeling that the people making those decisions aren’t thinking concretely about what that all means.

Well, Elliott, I’m gonna give you the last word. Anything else you wanna add after after that preparation?

So I yeah. I mean, one of the most interesting things about all this is for me has been learning about the history of Polish Ukrainian relations, which are have not always been easy at all, you know, course, parts of Ukraine have been blown to Poland, but the recent history, particularly during world war two, is pretty pretty hard. So, in next year twenty twenty four is gonna be the the anniversary of the Volnia massacres. This is a set of massacres that happened in nineteen forty three, forty four, forty four, which members of the Ukrainian National movement, basically, you know, seeing that the war was gonna — how the war was gonna end, wanted to drive out Polish populations in what’s now Western, Ukraine. And it was accompanied with massacres on both sides.

I mean, brutal and horrible. I mean, and we’re talking about not just with guns, but with shovels and sides and all that. And there’s history there. What I am very struck that the polls, as much as one can, have moved past that. And that, you know, two peoples who had quite bitterly opposed each other, at different points, you know, have really reconciled.

I think the the polls in a very statesmanlike Way actually right around the end of communism recognized their Eastern border, which you know, I could have understood if they would have said, well, hey, look, a lot of this was stolen by the Russians and given to Ukraine, which would be true. And they didn’t, they just said, okay, that’s it. And they moved on. So I think that’s First, it’s a reminder that, well, I’ll I’ll tie it to the lecture I gave it. I I quoted Foxter’s famous line that the past isn’t dead, it isn’t even past.

And and, you know, what that teaches me is the past the past is never past. That’s true. But sometimes it’s dead. And sometimes people can move on beyond it, and that doesn’t mean you forget things and, you know, that you don’t commemorate them and you don’t contemplate their meaning, but that it is possible to move forward, and that one has to move forward. And I think that’s that’s actually kind of a hopeful thing in the middle of this terrible time.

Well, the idea that we don’t have to be prisoners of our history is a great note to end on, and great to have you back. And look forward to more episodes of shield of the republic with you.

As ever.