Israel’s Divisions and the Challenges Ahead

Welcome to Shield of the Republic. A podcast sponsored by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Walter Lipman during World War two, that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the necessary shield of our Democratic Republic. Eric Edelman Councilert, the Center for Strategic and budgetary assessments, a Bulwark contributor and a non resident fellow at the Miller Center, and I’m joined today by my colleague and comrade in Arms, Elliott Cohen, the Robert EAS Good Professor of Strategy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair and Strategy at the Center for Strategic and international studies. Elliott, how are you today?

I’m doing just fine. I’m really I always look forward to the our conversations, but particularly this one. You know, it’s relatively rare that you, read a book about a country that you think you know really well and you find yourself learning new things and thinking new thoughts. And, that’s gonna be our conversation today. So Let’s, let’s get started.

It will indeed our guest today is Isabel Kushner, is the New York Times correspondent in Jerusalem. And the author of the land of hope and fear Israel’s battle for its inner soul. Isabel, welcome to shield of the Republic.

Thanks so much. Thank you for having me.

Let me kick us off if if I can. I mean, Elliot and I actually talked a few weeks ago on the show a little bit about Israel, and the, struggle over judicial reform and the, division and polarization that it occasional in in Israeli society, but your book really does a phenomenal job of articulating and illuminating the the many, what social scientists would call cross cutting cleavages of of Israeli society, you know, polarized politically, between, the right, I would say, and the center left since the left is more or less collapsed in Israel as it has in other parts of the developed world like Western Europe. But also, division between what you call the first and second Israel, is israel of the founding generation, the Ashkenazim who built the initial state and the Miss Rahim who they brought in from the Middle East, in the early years of of the founding of the state. The divisions between secular Israelis and the Ultra Orthodox the Haradim, divisions between extreme, ultra Jonathan Last, Israeli settling in the West Bank. Frequently illegally, and those who still hope, you know, hope for some kind of negotiated settlement with the Palestinian Arab the Russian wave of Russian immigrants who, in many ways, helped kick off the, high-tech boom in Israel that led it to win the Supercut of startup nation.

The airlift of Ethiopian Jews, which is now created all sorts of, traumas, about race in in Israel. And the impact of all this on the, on the one institution which, had been the sort of melting pot that, of Israel, which is the army. And you touch on all of that, I think, brilliantly in the book. Could you explain for our listeners what what you mean by the difference between the first and second Israel?

Sure. This is a phrase that has been increasingly used here in recent years. And as you noted, in the big picture, it refers to the old the first Israel being the old elites the Ashkenazi stock who came from central and eastern Europe and built the state and their descendants and then there’s the Miss Rahim from the Arab speaking countries who came in the nineteen fifties after the state had actually been established in nineteen forty eight. But it doesn’t only cut across those lines because when you speak about first and second Israel, it’s, there’s also a geographical element where you’re talking about the wealthy prosperous center of the country, the coastal plain, the metropolis of Tel Aviv, the centers of of high-tech commerce, culture, And then the, the periphery as it’s called, the margins, the more remote parts of the country which is in many cases where the MRahim were sent to when they came in the nineteen fifties, Israel needed population and very was very much welcoming the fact that these Miss Rahim were coming here in waves and and encouraged their immigration. But Israel also needed population in specific areas.

And the areas where it really needed to settle were the border areas, the the sparser populated areas in the Naggev Desert and in the far north, and this is often where people were sent when they came off the boats in the 1950s to tent camps, basically transit camps, where there was obviously no employment, little employment. Ben Gurion had to exhort some of the local kibbutzim to employ some of them. And these tent cities or or transit camps developed into rather depressing development towns, which still today, you know, there are huge gaps between these development towns in the more remote parts of the country and the standard of living in the center of the country. So we’re talking about geographical first and second Israel. We’re talking about socio economic first and second Israel you can obviously get second Israel living in a poor neighborhood in the middle of Tel Aviv as well.

And it’s not only Ashkenazi and Misrahi because as you had waves of other immigration coming in, whether from the former Soviet Union or from Ethiopia, often, those people, those new immigrants who were coming late Iran, we’re also, finding cheaper housing and being absorbed as it as as as as they’re as it were. In these more remote or poorer areas with less opportunities and often finding it quite difficult to get out. Now some people do object to this term, first and second Israel, and many Msiraphim will say to you, what are you talking about? I’m not second Israel. I am Israel.

And, you know, there’s also this pushback now, by younger, more educated generations of Miss Rahim who are saying, you know, our parents and our grandparents were wronged and were badly treated but, you know, we are absolutely not second class citizens here, and there’s a lot of truth to that. So This isn’t a clean line, and it’s often used by people who are advocating for some agenda or other. Some people find it offensive, but yeah, there is very much a sense that you know, we were in a peculiar situation here because what we’ve seen is huge demographic and generational change. And I think that’s really what I tried to show and unpack, if you will, in the book. And we’re now in a situation where the so called second Israel has basically been in power for much of the last forty years and yet still carries this underdog, sentiment and mentality.

So we do have a kind of changing of the guard and a changing of elites here, but somehow the old resentments and the old grudges have not only lived on, but in some cases become even more acute, and now we have new ones added on top of those.

You know, one of the things that I think is interesting and and puzzling about this is By just about any metric, you know, the degree of progress in Israel on a whole range of these social issues is phenomenal. Look at the intermarriage rate between Ashkinazim and, misterrahim, it’s, very high. If you look at another group that you talk about are Israeli Arabs, where there’s there is still, obviously, a whole set of issues, but until, I think, nineteen sixty six, Arab Villages were under martial law, Now, you know, as I think you point out, if you go into a, pharmacy or a hospital, there’s a good chance you’re gonna be treated by Israeli Arab who are pharmacists or doctors or, nurses. I think with the with each of these things, you can say it’s obviously a much more prosperous country than it was. You Obviously, the absorption of the displaced persons from Europe, which was another issue that the state faced at the very beginning.

That’s resolved. So why why has it suddenly gotten so much worse? I mean, given given the amount of think un undeniable progress, in that society. Why does it seem more riven than ever? Or is that, an optical illusion of some sort?

It’s certainly not an optical illusion, and and again, it’s an extraordinary situation. Because on the one hand, if you trace the progress over the seventy five years that the status has existed, I think what you see in each of these different sectors is a very strong Israeli identity that has grown up. So the Israeli Haridim, are different to Haridim abroad. The Arab Israelis have very much created an identity of their own. You know, they’re not the same as the Palestinians in the West bank, even if they have family over the green line, they’re not the same as the Palestinians in Gaza, they’re not the same as Palestinians in the diaspora.

They very much, formed an identity that is very unique, to themselves. And you see this in every one of these different sectors. And yet, why are we so riven here? Because each of these sectors seem has completely contradictory world views, in terms of what this country should be and where they would like to see it go. So, you know, you have, the religious zionists, for example, who are settling in the West Bank, some of whom the most stream of whom are now in key positions in this, governing coalition, who are messianic, and many of them would like to see some of them are still what we call Ma’am Laqati very stately and, you know, ultimately believe in in the Israeli government and democracy, but you have growing numbers there who would like to see some kind of, biblical type judea or theocracy.

You have, you know, again, less of a left right division now than a big mushy center of Liberals, in Israel, mainstream Israelis who would like to see Israel’s liberal democracy continue, or be strengthened with a constitution maybe one day. Working against this growing tide of of ultra Jonathan Last, and, you know, we’re seeing totally competing, aspirations of of what the future of Israel should be. And this is all very dramatically coming into play right now since this new government came in at the end of last year. With the judicial overhaul plan, which we can get to. But, you know, I think that’s just a symptom of these very, very different world views.

And many communities in Israel, you grow up almost, you know, within your own education them. So if you’re a mainstream Israeli, you send your kid to a local regular state secular school. Which is totally secular and will not have any religious education at all other than, you know, bible classes for matriculation. If you are a, religious scientist, you will send your child to a totally different school system, the state religious school system, if you are a HarAD, you will send your children to a HarAD autonomous school system where you’re not even going to be taught secular subjects at all in many cases, no math, no science, no English, and this is in the startup nation. And this is a a sector of society that’s been growing exponentially in terms of, numbers because of the large families that, are traditional in that community If you’re an Arabic speaking Israeli, you’re going to go to the Arabic school system.

If you’re a sector, you’re living in a kind of bubble in a community in the West Bank where you’re growing up with very little interaction with other Israelis until you get to be eighteen and and join the army. And so people are kind of creating and perpetuating these very separate world views, from an early age, which, you know, in adult adult who just persist and and grow even stronger.

So what what I mean, help us understand, your view of how that happened. I mean, there are two large explanations that occurred to me. One, which I think you allude to in the book is that there were there are things in the in the founding of the state of Israel and in the early years, I mean, one of the most notorious is the decision to exempt young, students at, the Harady issue vote for military service, you know, when there was a tiny number of them, But you can argue other other sorts of decisions that were made in those early years, which are only bearing and they’re, fruit now. The other is that in some ways, this is more general western phenomenon of identity politics taking over. And in that respect, Israel is not exceptional.

It’s, there’s a variant of this in the United States. There are variants of this in France, and in, in other countries. And so in that respect is Israel just subject to whatever every other advanced society is subject to.

I I agree with you that it’s not unique. And and if we look back in time as as you raised in in the early years of the state, you know, if we talk about toxic politics now, you go back to Bengal and and beg in in the early years of social socialist, zionism, and the Beirut Party, and you you had Bangorion calling Manahum begin, Hitlerite, and you had, Manakum begin calling Banguri on Bulshevik, and, you know, I mean, there there was certainly no less toxic in those days. And, of course, at the very early months of the state, you you had, the two main, bodies that had been the main underground’s pre state, almost coming to a civil war. Over the, Alta lena armship. So yeah, there’ve been dramatic, dramatic differences here in the past and rifts and arguments I think and, again, now we come to today, I think you’re right.

Yes. It’s not unique. Identity politics is unpopularism. We’re seeing this all over now, but I think Israel is more vulnerable than many other countries. If you take Israel compared to the United States, Israel is seventy five years old.

It’s in a rather hostile environment still despite the fact it has peace treaties with with some of its neighbors. It it operates as a kind of island and it has, you know, if we look at the system here, a a democracy that is vibrant dynamic, very much alive and kicking right now. But very vulnerable again because of the system, we have no constitution. Because of all these, divisions that we’re talking about, Israel has not ever been able to form any formal constitution We have one house of parliament. We have, the government which essentially controls that house of parliament by one seat the one seat majority.

And then we have a a figure head president who’s a ceremonial role. And the only check on on government power as a result here is the Supreme Court. So it’s a kind of vulnerable system and not many checks and balances and a very fractious population, which has been shifting tremendously in terms of demographics. So if we go back to the fact that, yes, Ben Gurion exempted four hundred Yashiva students from Army Service, and, you know, because studying Torah was their profession as such. He never imagined that that four hundred would turn into tens of thousands.

Bengal’s notion was that the Harryim would kind of see the light and modernize and become more secular, once they saw, you know, how beneficial it was for Israel to have, to be a sovereign Jewish state. And, you know, I don’t think he ever imagined it would would get to this situation that we’re in today where One in four Israeli children born today are born into Kharedi families, and the economists and statistic experts are telling us that by two thousand and fifty, if trends continue as they are now, that statistic will double so the implications are huge, but I I don’t think that at the beginning, anyone envision that that’s where it would lead to.

You know, what we’re seeing here is a revolution of rising expectations that are been thwarted in some cases. Driven by some of the demographic, but also some economic factors that you discuss in the book, which is to say you talked about the fact that, the so called second Israel has, in fact, sort of been in charge since the political revolution of nineteen seventy seven when Likud came to power under under Beg to Differ thirty years, essentially, of labor domination. Your book also describes quite vividly the sort of decline of the kibbutzim and of the the the sort of initial, social democratic, you know, labor, zionism that drove the the first thirty years of the state. Megan, you know, among other things, of course, liberalized the economy and opened it up to free enterprise, and enormous growth now demographically. I mean, when I first went to Israel in the late seventies, the population was just, you know, somewhat north of three million, I was astonished to discover reading your book that it’s now north of ten million, which puts it sort of right in the area of Greece So it’s no longer the sort of tiny country, you know, demographically that we think of in our in our minds.

It’s now a very you know, a a reasonable middle power, demographically. But with a lot of increased inequality because of the changes that were inaugurated in the seventies and and perhaps as you describe in the book exacerbated by the the tech boom, which has created a lot of very, very wealthy people, but left a lot of these other marginalized peripheral groups behind. I mean, is that sort of driving a lot of this sense that Elliot was talking about earlier of discontent and populism?

Look there there are very wide gaps here between rich and poor. But if you look at the statistics a bit more closely, every year the, you know, the the government comes out with, poverty statistics And when you look at the poorest areas of the country and the poorest sections of the population, in many, many cases, you’re looking for years and years, this has been the case. You’re looking at the Kharedi population and the Arab Israeli population. And part of or largely the reason for that is fifty percent of Kharedi men, of working age do not work because of a system of of social benefits that have allowed them to remain in tourist study in the Ashivas or the Colells for married men, forever. And you know, somehow they get by a majority of the haredi women work, but many of them work in very low paid jobs.

Within the community as, you know, whether it’s, as carers or kindergarten teachers or assistance, but you know, rarely in in more high paying careers. And then in the Arab sector, which is a fifth of the population, many of the women traditionally have not gone to work. So these are the areas of the country where you see most of the poverty figures, but that I don’t think is what is driving the the turmoil, the huge turmoil we’re seeing today. It’s not really economic. It it’s really about, lifestyle and the the vision for the future of this country.

And you see all sorts of Israelis out on the streets now. Protesting, but the people you don’t see out either for or against the judicial reform are the Arab Israelis to a large extent or the ferry dim, for their own reasons, which I can go into. So I don’t think it’s really that rich poor gap that is driving this. I really, really do believe it is ideal based, value based, It’s about the character of the country and that the future and the nature of Israeli democracy and freedoms.

I’d like to, pick up on that. You know, I think, not all of our listeners may know that, you know, the the The nominal dispute is about the Supreme Court, which I think is fair to say a lot of people on across the political spectrum think needs to be reformed somehow. I mean, the current Israeli system as I understand it is judges the judges pick other judges, which is a bit odd. And, the particularly the the Supreme Court’s really invention, and then use of a standard of reasonable reasonableness, quote, unquote, in striking down laws is something again, which kind of seem a bit odd to Americans with a with their constitutional system, but I think it’s also fair to say, that I think for a lot of Israelis, this is sort of a stalking horse for much larger issues. And, of course, there’s also a view that this is just the first step that there are other things coming down the pike in terms of packages of legislation that’ll be coming out and there are, that’ll come out of the dominant coalition.

So I wonder if you could just unpack the current crisis a bit because I think for for some for some Americans paying attention, they say, well, but now, we the idea that judges can strike down laws in the base of reasonableness, that sounds crazy to me. And the idea that politicians have no role in picking judges, that also seems crazy to me what why are so many people getting upset, and I I will just add, you know, I we have, I’ve lots of Israeli friends, including a very senior military and intelligence people. They are out on the street. And they are really, deeply emotionally engaged in this. So perhaps you could just help people understand all that.

I will try. I mean, every every Israeli, and I’m talking even about eight year old children at this point have become constitutional experts of sorts trying to figure out what the heck is going on here. And you hear children being interviewed at the protests who speak very fluently about checks and balances on power and it’s really quite phenomenal. But, just to begin to unpack it, first of all, judges here don’t select other judges. It’s it’s that’s something the government has been, putting out as a kind of propaganda point.

It simply not true. There is a judicial selection committee that has been in place in the same format since nineteen fifty three. And it includes members of the judiciary, through the president of the Supreme Court and three super and another two supreme court justices. On top of that, it has, two members of the Israel Barr Association who are elected for or chosen from among all the lawyers registered certified lawyers in Israel who vote in elections and the National Council that they choose in the Barr Association picks two representatives. On top of that, you have the justice minister who is actually the head of the judicial selection committee another minister from the governing coalition, and two members of the parliament, the knesset, who are customarily one from the government side and one from the opposition, but that’s not even anchored in law.

So actually you could end up with two coalition representatives, along with the two ministers. And in order to choose a Supreme Court justice. On that committee, you need a majority of seven out of nine. And what that means is that the judges and the judiciary, the legal professionals don’t have a veto power they have to come to agreements and deals. You know, not not neither side, neither the politicians nor the legal professionals have an automatic majority on that committee to select Supreme Court judges.

So what we’ve seen over the years is a kind of deal making and consensus system where they come to agreement Okay. You support my candidate. I’ll support your candidate. And what we’ve seen in the last few years, this is really since Gidonsar who in two thousand and eight, made that amendment that you had to have a super majority on the committee for Supreme Court justices what you’ve seen is a court that has become much more ideologically diverse and more balanced. And I yell at Shaquette, who was justice minister, for a right, you know, coming from the right wing, she she clearly says that, you know, I managed when I was justice minister and head of the judicial selections committee within the existing system, I managed to get four conservative justices elected to the bench.

Plus another a fifth one in the subsequent government when she was interior minister, but was still sitting on the judges selection committee. So, you know, there are people even on the right here who say you can work within the system. It’s been working. It’s worked for fifty three, since nineteen fifty three, in fact, Manafem begin thought there should be more legal professionals on the committee, and not less. And the question now is, you know, should this committee become more politicized?

Because what our justice minister currently has proposed of this government, first he proposed that the government would have an automatic majority on that committee which basically means you don’t really need a committee. You just need the government to choose the justices. He then proposed a softer version where the committee would be split half and half between the coalition, the government, and the opposition. But either way, what you are doing is politicizing, totally politicizing the process of selecting judges and by implication politicizing the Supreme Court which is the only check, as I said earlier, on political power here. When we come to the reasonability issue, Israel, you know, yes, there there are people who say that the grounds of reasonableness has been overused and the court has been, overactive or has there’s been overre in judicial review in certain cases.

You have the conservative supreme Court Justice, Noam Solberg, who publicly, has spoken and written about you know, a need to perhaps restrict or limit the use of reasonability as a grounds, but he certainly wasn’t suggesting it should be done away with altogether. And he also recently said he never expected it to be banned by legislation. He expected that the court itself through its rulings would evolve, a more restrained system of of of of the use. But really without that, you know, some people say, oh, there are plenty of other tools that the court has, for judicial review. It can use conflict of interest.

It can use proportionality. There are many other legal grounds, that for use, which are less vague and subject than this standard of reasonableness of the judge’s opinion of whether something is reasonable or not But the fact is that without the the grounds of reasonableness, which is used in the western world, it’s in used in Britain and several other western countries of Europe, without it, we are told by experts there’s a kind of black hole where appointments by the government of people who are known to be corrupt. You know, there is no way of stopping them. There will be no judicial tool for stopping them, and we have a very real case now of a very a dairy. The, leader of the Shass ultra orthodox sephardic party.

In the nineteen nineties, he was indicted. He was charged with with taking bribes. And at that point, the Supreme Court made a presidential ruling based on reasonability that it was unreasonable extremely unreasonable to have a minister serving in the government who has been charged with bribery. And therefore, the, prime minister has to fire any minister who has been charged It doesn’t apply to the prime minister, as we know. But but, that was in the nineteen nineties.

Ariader was convicted He served time in prison. He came out of prison. He served his chill period time where, you know, you have to have a cooling off period after serving prison time before you can go back into the the knesset, and then he made a comeback Now a couple of just last year, in fact, he was convicted yet again of tax fraud but despite that, he came to a plea deal with the authorities as part of the plea deal he, agreed that he would quit public life and he resigned from the knesset. Come the next elections he stands again. He gets, you know, his party gets, nine or however many number of seats.

He’s the head of the party, and Netanyahu and the government appoint him to two, not one, but two senior ministerial positions. And the guy has a suspended sentence right now as part of the plea deal. He there was an argument the government that the law says, you know, if you served an actual prison term, then you need to have a cooling off period and you can’t be in public life immediately, but this is just a suspended sentence, and the law doesn’t say anything about a suspended sentence. So, of course, you get more petitions to the Supreme Court, and it goes back to the court, and the court rules a majority of the panel ruled that it was unreasonable, for Ariader to be appointed to two senior ministries given his recent conviction and his recidivism having been convicted the first time of bribery, and the fact he’d then you know, being convicted again of financial crime. And and, you know, part of the coalition deal was that he would then become finance minister in a couple of years’ time after the government was founded.

So, you know, the only grounds the court had was this reasonableness clause. So, you know, this is a live example of how it’s been used.

So I mean, that’s first, that’s fascinating. And I I stand, corrected and educated. But but I’d I I guess the the question that I’d put you is is okay. This seems fairly technical, but but clearly there’s this explosion of existential angst on the part of that big mushy center that you described. And and I was wondering if you could just describe for us.

Okay. What what is the kind of the the deep underlying motivation, I mean, you know, when I, again, just talking to friends, it’s that, you know, the state that they knew could be lost, that the kind of liberal democracy that they’ve lived under could be lost. Is that would you characterize it that way?

We’re talking about the the center and the protests. Yeah. Look, the center that As was noted earlier, the left in Israel has dwindled to almost non existence, and that’s because the The peace camp as it were was was decimated during the second anti father when you had suicide bombings in Israeli cities, across the green line, and and the the the peace camp was just wiped out. So many of the Israeli left and center left moved to the center because there was no longer really a realistic agenda, or any imminent prospect of a solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict also given the divisions on the Palestinian side and the weak and divided leadership there. So you had a center that really didn’t have an agenda for a long time other than kind of being decent.

You know, there was this notion that, you know, we just want a decent Israel, a stately kind of government and and, you know, every and let’s not try to take sharp positions on anything in order to not frighten off any voters. So it was it was a large center without much of an agenda. But what we’ve seen now in the last few months, since this judicial overhaul was announced, and and it came as a big surprise, by the way. To most of the voters in Israel. The the center now has a that totally has an agenda.

Which is defending liberal democracy, defending the independence and prestige of the Supreme Court. And fighting against religious coercion, fighting against any kind of, limitation of of rights for minorities in Israel. And and this is what we’re seeing really playing out now between the government and the opposition and and the protesters who are out on the streets.

Isabel, how much of this is being driven at least in part by the prime minister’s own legal entanglements. I mean, he’s been it seems almost perpetually under investigation for more than a decade. And is under investigation now. Clearly, some of this effort at restructuring the judiciary would have some impact on his own situation, but it’s a little hard from from here to parse how much of it is driven by that and how much of it is by this wider struggle that you’ve described.

Yeah. It is very hard to pass from here too. I mean, nobody can really get inside Netanyahu’s head. And and it’s become more and more of an enigma because for for many, many, many years, Netanyahu was a staunch defender of the Supreme Court and the supremacy of the rule of law as Manakim begin was. And and he was absolutely counted as a democrat and a liberal democrat.

An a pragmatist. And something I mean, many, many people here including heads of this security agencies, the former heads who worked very, very closely with him, in previous governments, will say something has changed. Netanyahu has changed, and most people will trace that change to twenty nineteen. Like as you said, he was investigated for years. In twenty nineteen, he was actually charged three counts in three separate but interlocking cases, of graft.

And he’s charged and now on trial charged with, fraud breach of trust and in one case bribery. Ron DeSantis then, he he he his reaction to that was to begin to attack the pillars of Israeli law enforcement. So it began with attacks on the police when it was the police doing the investigating. And the state attorney’s office and the prosecution and then the attorney general and the attorney general who was his appointment and a conservative keeper wearing god fearing man. Mandelblit, he he started as attacking the attorney general, after the attorney general, approved his indictment.

Now he’s actually on trial. It’s spread to the judges and the courts. And then you ask yourself, well, how does any of this actually help him? And that is a puzzling question because in the past we’ve heard about initiatives to legislate laws in the knesset that might help, like, introducing laws that would not, you know, bar a prime minister from being charged while in office, for example, although that couldn’t now apply to him retroactively because he’s already on trial. So you ask how could it help him?

Well, first of all, it’s been clear after Netanyahu really dragged the country through five elections within the space of under four years. It was clear that he was determined to fight this prime this case, this corruption case from the prime minister’s office. And despite the fact that there was one inconclusive election after the next, he just insisted on remaining at the head of the likud party and running again and again and again until finally he managed this time to put together a coalition that gave him a majority, together with these far ranked parties and the ultraorthodox hierarchy parties. How can it help him? It was not really very clear, other than a general notion that if the judges are more sympathetic, you know, over time you get some more sympathetic judges in in the the Supreme Court, then should he be convicted and it comes to an appeal then maybe he’ll get more of an ear there.

But now we’re seeing other possibilities because once and if you look at the pattern of the priorities of this judicial reform. What’s the first law that was actually passed and enacted. It was to do away with the grounds of reasonability as a grounds force the court striking down government decisions or appointments, or for the government firing officials. So now we’re in a situation after the reasonability grounds has been canceled by the legislature by by the knesset we’re in a situation where if the government wanted to fire the attorney general, it could and the Supreme Court would not be able to do anything about it, and then potentially the government could bring in a more sympathetic attorney general who would say, you know what? We’re looking at this case.

It’s not going anywhere. Seems to be flimsy, we we’re gonna put it all on hold and re examine all the materials Ron DeSantis. And basically shut down the trial. That that’s just one scenario I’m giving you of how this judicial overhaul or reform could actually practically be used to extricate the prime minister from his legal troubles. He absolutely denies that he has any such intention.

He denies all wrongdoing. But we’re we’re seeing block being put in place that potentially could be used in that way.

I mean, this is obviously a very particular kind of crisis. One way or another, it will, pass one host. But I guess I have two questions. One is, do you think this really is an exit moment for Israeli liberal democracy, or is it, you know, a crisis? But that this is a country that lurches from crisis to crisis, and somehow things come around.

And then I had a follow-up question, which it takes slightly different answers, but maybe, direction, but maybe if you could speak to that first.

I think it really is an existential crisis, and I’ll explain why. If this overhaul goes ahead. And if we’re looking at the future of rather extreme governments here. First of all, you’re going to see, a lot of the backbone of of the Israeli economy, the health system, the the tax paying middle class is looking for somewhere else to go. There there are scenarios where, you know, if you have, I don’t know, a hundred and fifty specialists of of the certain medical area in the country and and fifty of them decide to go abroad we’re in big trouble.

We’re looking at a military that is facing incredible challenges in a way it never has done before. With all this lit political, discourse having seek now into the ranks, and and we’re seeing reservists saying, you know, declaring that that our contract with with the country has been broken. This is not the kind of country we are willing to continue to volunteer to sacrifice ourselves for, this is not what we signed up for. We’re seeing money, high-tech, you know, investments going down and money going out we’re seeing a general breakdown or unraveling of of many of the bases of the ethos of of being Israeli. And I think now we’re looking at a potential constitutional crisis.

And I say that in a country that has no constitution because what we do have, basic laws, which the Supreme Court imbued with a sort of quasi constitutional, status And one of those, you know, is is the new government’s law to abolish the grounds of reasonability. We now have, case. We have petitions to the Supreme Court to overturn that basic law. And the Supreme Court says, you know, yes, we do have the authority to to overturned basic laws, although it has never been done before, and the government is saying, no, you don’t. And we’re looking at an imminent serious clash between the government and the courts where if the court does strike down that law, then the government has to decide whether it’s going to obey the court or not.

If the government decides not to, you have the opposition saying it will be an illegal government. You’re going to have an army and a mossad, and, internal Schimbeth security agency, etcetera that has to decide who it’s going to listen to or take orders from? Is it who has the the final say? Is it the government or the court? And and we’re looking at what many Israelis are fearing will turn into a civil war.

This was unimaginable a year ago. We just weren’t anywhere near there. But I think if you look at the the the book, for example, you see the seeds of this growing up, and you see that this has been building up. For years. And, you know, I think what we’re seeing now is an accelerated outburst of of a crisis.

The the likes of which You know, I’ve been here more than thirty years. I mean, nobody really remembers anything like this before.

So, but one, you know, kind of follow on question. I think one of the most disturbing aspects of this to me, at least. And I’m, I don’t think I’m a particularly devilish guy, but, you know, you see on the Israeli right represented by people like, Idemar Bendfir or Bizal Smotrich. Attitudes and views which frankly have a bit of a fascist feel to them. They’re violent, they’re racist, and sanctioning, you know, awful breaches of law and stuff like that.

And and that’s I mean, there are a number of parts of of this crisis that I find very disturbing, but that’s one of the most disturbing of all. And I was wondering if you could just speak to that. Do you think that that You know, you mentioned, you know, some of these some of the people in the West Bank are just, you know, you can get a cheaper apartment. And, you know, also sometimes when people say the West Bank, I mean, there it’s just another suburb of Jerusalem that you’re talking about. In other cases, you really are talking about people who are further out there and who are kind of isolated and sometimes very extreme.

But I was just wondering if you can speak to that segment of Israeli society because that That’s the part that seems really potentially violent to me in ways that are you know, really could do a number on Israeli liberal democracy.

Let me add to Elliot’s question, Isabel, if I could. Because the meta the meta question that I think your book presented to me was whether the challenges that Israel faces now And, you know, we talked earlier. You talked earlier about how Israel is located in a relatively hostile environment, although some of that’s been ameliorated by peace treaties with with Egypt and Jordan and, and now the Abraham accords with Morocco and Bahrain and the UAE and prospectively if the by demonstration is successful in brokering it, a peace treaty with the kingdom of of and normalization with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That’s not to say Israel’s security environment isn’t, difficult and challenged in particular by Iran and a series of Iranian proxies, near Israel’s borders. But but as I read your book, I really began to wonder whether the internal challenges, the prospect of annihilation from within.

Was this not not as great or even greater existential threat to Israel than what it faces. Externally. And if you could maybe address that, I would appreciate it.

Well, if I just could start with your point, Eric, that, you know, as as Israel’s outside enemies seem iran aside to be less existential a threat internally Israel seems to have lost its compass. And, you know, it’s very much the case that that it’s almost like Israel turning in on its self. And that is why, you know, we’re seeing, I think, because we’re not united against an outside enemy, we’re not fighting those wars of seventy three of, you know, possible annihilation you know, maybe ironically it’s kind of the luxury of not doing that that has allowed this situation to grow up. But I think it’s it’s more about the demographics and the generational change. So What’s interesting to me is that for many years, even in the last decade, I would say, Israeli sociologist and economists have been very, very focused on the exponential growth of the Harady community looking at the demographic growth and the fact that so many of the men in the workforce age are Bulwark and are not in the labor force and what are the implications and and are not serving in the military and what are the implications for all of that down the road, which obviously are very worrying, for the economy, for national security, for national social cohesion.

In a country where, you know, purport purportedly, there’s meant to be universal draft and sort of equality in terms of rights and obligations. But below the surface, what we’ve actually maybe not had our eye on enough is the the growing power of the religious scientist movement and the the nationalist forces in Israel. Who have been slowly, but very methodically, moving into the main power centers of society. So we’re talking about the media and the military, you know, making a very concerted effort to have more of a role in Israel mainstream society. And unlike the Harry Dean who are more focused on their own interests, you know, as long as they get the budgets for their own communal needs, and for their own school system, and and, you know, they’re they’re kind of more or less happy.

But the religious sinus movement wants to change Israel. And they want to annex the West Bank. And they want, you know, a different kind of Israel with a different future. And I think what we’ve seen is is this slowly growing up very methodically over the years, whether it’s within the, the Yashivas in the West Bank, that’s where there are pre army, academies or, you shivers where soldiers, religious soldiers combine army service with Taurus study, and we’ve seen absolute extremism, coming out of there. I’m from the rabbis in, in that camp.

I mean, we only have to look back to the assassination of Yitzvak Rabine to understand you know, and now we’re, you know, that was the nineteen nineties. We’re now twenty twenty three. So we’re decades on, and that has only been growing in a way. And now what we’re seeing is people who were really considered on the fringes ITmar Benvere was considered, you know, a thuggish provocateur until a year ago. You know, he was he was a target of the the police.

Now he’s the minister supervising the police. So, you know, we’ve seen because of this desperation of of Netanyahu to put together a government and to maximize every right wing vote, you know, he brought together the religious signers and party to run on a slate joint slate with Itamar Benkvia’s Jewish power, just to make sure that they were gonna optimize their chances electorally as soon as they got into the government, they split back into their own parties, but we now have these these political fringes in the center of power?

Let me ask one last question, and we’ve gone over a little bit, but that’s because this is just so so interesting. Are you an optimist or a pessimist?

I I think I’m neither. I think I I’m a very sober, person who who still has some hope. I I’m not sure what I would be up mystic about at this point, but I I’m I’m still kind of hopeful, that this country certainly does have a future, and I’ll tell you why. Just anecdotally, I I begin my book in a small Mosav in the Arab desert, which was founded by the sort of hardy salt of the earth, pioneers, in the nineteen fifties, when even the government at the time said there’s no chance for agriculture or viable settlement down there. These people did go down there.

They they did eventually get things Maria to sign off on on settlement there. They they, not only did manage to teas and vegetables out of the sand, but, you know, the the Arab became an absolute bread basket for the Israeli agricultural sport over the years. Those people from the old Labour’s ironist left are feeling alienated when I went, was down there for for my book. They were feeling very, very alienated from the rest of the country, which had shifted rightward and they did not see much future for themselves. Now I went back there to take my book to the family in chapter one because, they had been so generous in in tolerating my repeated visits and as I drove down to Aynia have in the Arava, as you as you approach this little tiny Mosav, which is a speck on the map, You see the road lined with Israeli flags.

And when I went to sit with the family, the the the protagonist of the younger generation asam, asaf Shafam, his his partner, Renette said to me, you know, I’m now feeling more hopeful than I have ever felt before because you know, they’ve been joining the protests. And she said the vibrancy and the vitality of the pushback against this this the extremism of this government has encouraged even her and even this family. Now you you just have to be out on the streets to to feel, yeah, whichever side you’re on here, It doesn’t, you know, I’m not I’m not taking a side here. I’m not saying, you know, which whichever side of this this huge argument you’re on. You have engaged Israelis who care so much.

They’re so passionate. About the future of this country. They’re both holding the Israeli flag. Okay. Whether it’s a pro reform or anti reform, it there a sea of Israeli flags.

This has become the symbol of of both camps I was speaking to a Polish journalist not long ago who told me when they had the pro democracy protests in Poland, the protesters were embarrassed to carry the Polish flag, and they carried the European Union flag instead. Here we have, a population that cares, and I I have to believe, you know, I think you have to create the hope And I have to believe that that is the recipe for the fact that this country absolutely has a future that eventually these these fundamental issues will will be sorted out in some way or other this many people are seeing this as a potentially constitutional moment where, you know, at some point, perhaps not with this government, but at some point, finally, the outcome will be a stronger democracy where there is, some kind of attempt to reach consensus on some of the fundamentals of life and politics here. And and I think, you know, I I I like to put myself on that side of hope.

Jonathan Last atypically optimistic note. I have to bring this episode of shield of the Republic to a close. Our guest has been Isabel Kushner. The author of Land of Hop and Fear Israel’s Battle for its inner soul. If you wanna understand the context of in which Israel’s constitutional crisis is playing out.

It’s absolutely essential reading. Isabel, thank you so much for joining us today.

Thank you.

That was terrific. Thank you.

Thank you.

We’ll be back next week with friend of shield of the Republic Peter Fever to discuss his book thanks for your service about American civil military relations and attitudes, towards the military and American society. So please join us then. If you enjoyed this episode of Shilda Republic, please leave us a review on Spotify or Apple Podcasts or wherever you get your podcasts.