Imperial Russia, Past and Present (with John Herbst)

Welcome to Shield of the Republic. A podcast sponsored by The Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Waldor Littman during World War two that a strong and balanced foreign policy is the indispensable shield of our Democratic Republic. I’m Eric Edelman, counselor at the center for strategic and budgetary assessments. A Bulwark contributor and a nonresident fellow at the Miller Center. And I’m joined today after a prolonged absence by my cohost and partner in all things, Streitry, Elliot Cohen.

Elliot, welcome back from travels and illness.

Well, thank you, Eric. It’s good to be back. The travel levels were great. COVID, not so great, but I do know that if, you know, you get the vaccinations and stuff, it’s miserable, but it’s not lethal. So I’m just grateful for that.

Well, we’re grateful to have you back and at

least almost at full strength. So Glad to have you and our guest today is a former colleague, one of our most distinguished former colleagues, retired ambassador John Hertz, John has been notably ambassador to Ukraine, but before that ambassador to Uzbekistan, but has a very broad career, having served as political counselor in Tel Aviv and in our embassies in Riyadh and Moscow. In fact, I think John served in Moscow just before I arrived there at the period of high, what I like to call highpedistroika. He’s also been the director of the office of independent states and the principal deputy to the ambassador at large for the new independent states. And finished up his career as coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the Department of State.

He has a bachelor from Georgetown, a Masters from the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, and he even just to show how incestuous this all is, Elliot. He even studied at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna. So John welcome.

Thank you. My pleasure to be here.

So John, today as it happens as we’re recording is Ukrainian Independence Day, And you had the opportunity to be the US ambassador in Ukraine while I was sort of sitting across the black sea from you in Turkey? During one of the most important inflection points in modern Ukraine’s recent history, which is the orange revolution, Tell us a little bit about that experience, and how did it prepare you to understand what’s been happening in Ukraine since this past year and and certainly leading up to and after February twenty fourth. For the audience

benefit, the orange revolution was when the old style regime in Kiev tried to steal falsify the two thousand four presidential elections. And the opposition that will actually won the vote but under the first official tally had lost it, poured out to the streets in demonstrations. Which ultimately led to a changing to a third round of of of a vote, third round vote, which the opposition won. And this was a geopolitically important moment for two reasons. The first is The Kremlin was fully behind the efforts to steal the election.

And in fact, they felt they would would be able to get away with it. And so the fact that there was this popular outpouring against the falsified elections was

a defeat for the Kremlin.

And the Kremlin’s association with the efforts to falsify the elections. Led to a substantial drop in Kremlin support in the center of of Ukraine. Kiev and elsewhere. Not the east where, at that point, Russian support was still substantial and not in the west, in the Galicia area. Where by and large Russia was not popular.

But Russia began to lose the center of Ukraine. As a result of its manipulation efforts to help manipulate the two thousand and four presidential election. So that was one reason why it’s strategically important. The other reason was and, you know, maybe Eric Hewitt and Elliott since you served in the Bush administration at high levels might might not fully accept this. But I would argue that up until the orange revolution in Ukraine at senior levels of the administration or specifically in the White House.

There was a sense that we should be able to get along with Russia. And in the support for the opposition, following the false divide election, the Bush administration began to push back hard against criminal activities. To see Moscow’s policies in a clearer light. The policies which now we see is truly dreadful. We’re beginning to recognize, albeit only tentatively then.

And I

can provide support for what I’ve just said, but I’m going

to I

actually agree with that. Totally. Yeah. I I I wouldn’t I wouldn’t disagree with that at all. You know, I’ve in fact, in recent months, I’ve been reflecting on some of the conversations I had with secretary and others, you know, particularly about Medvedev and and so on.

It was just shown himself to be simply a slightly smoother thug. Yes. There were a lot of illusions. And the the late great John McCain knew that. And said as much.

And I

wish we had paid more attention to not to put too finer point on it. The losing candidate in that attempted stolen election, Viktor Yanukovych, would go on to be elected president subsequently, only to be overthrown by a popular rebellion in in twenty fourteen. Correct. I I was stunned and I wonder whether you were John reading the long account in the Washington Post that appeared over this past weekend, although it’s been online for a a week or more. About the intelligence failure by the FSB leading up to the election.

I was sort of astonished that one of the two options that the FSB apparently was presenting to Putin as a replacement for Zelensky after the military operation began, was Victor Yanukovic who, you know, slunk away even allegedly was disparaged by Putin when he showed up in Russia carrying his bags of cash that he’d looted from the country you know, totally, you know, disrespectfully and and, you know, contemptuously. And yet they were thinking they somehow put him back into power in Ukraine. Does that were you as shocked by that as I was? No, that was par for the course.

It’s not Susiano Kovich who has been mentioned, as a possible Russian puppet in Keith. A variety of not even second rate, but fourth rate politicians from that part of the Ukraine political spectrum

were

rumored as potential new presidents of Ukraine. So that it’s all indicative of the complete miscomprehension by the authorities in Moscow. Of what was happening in Ukraine. Why

did they get it so wrong, John? I mean, if, you know, for goodness sakes, they’ve been part of the same country for I don’t know, you can say centuries, but, you know, certainly for a very, very long time. But, I mean, throughout this, this isn’t that one of the mystifying things. The The degree of Russian miscalculation throughout this is it’s just mind boggling. It it goes back to my time in Ukraine and probably will before

that. Let let me give you a meta historic or meta an analytical answer to that. I I like to read history, and there is what I call the Russian Imperial History. Which believes that there is a straight line connection between key maneuvers to the Byerst Voor Muscovy, the Dutch in Moscow, to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and now Russia. And in that history, Ukraine is a little Russia.

They are the junior partners of this. And certainly, Russian leaders have been schooled in this, but so has the Russian people and so have most Americans who become experts on Russia. This this imperial version of Russian history was brought to United States by very distinguished historians Vernostkin Yale in the fifties, and I’m forgetting the guy at Harvard. And we chances are, if you read Russian history in college, You read a book written by one of these guys. There’s also a u there’s also a Ukrainian interpretation of history.

Very, very different. It goes from Quiróse to the duchy of Galicia, Daniel of Galicia.

And then

to the Cossack government in the seventeenth century,

and then to

independent Ukraine and they post world war one.

And to

independent Ukraine today. So these guys have always looked at Ukraine through this prison.

Which

has made it hard for them to see things clearly. And there have always been Ukrainians who have accepted this history as well. And so the Russians were talk to these Ukrainians, they became their assets, and they were similarly blinded. If you look at Ukrainian history, it’s not at all like Russian history. I think Ukrainian history is summarized or is exemplified rather.

By that wonderful picture of the Zapreducian Cossacks riding to the Sultan of of the Ottoman Empire.

And they

were clearly telling him where to go. And that decentralization element of Ukraine in history something you Russians do not understand. And what we’re seeing is the fiercest of Ukrainian identity in opposing this Russian invasion. Of course, a Russian invasion, which clearly has a goal of destroying that Ukrainian identity.

Which

is why some people correctly talk about, this is genocide. So John, you

know, I

I mean, I I think I agree with you. And I think that that kind of Russian imperial history that you talk about is a big source of the planation for why so many people underestimated Ukrainian will to resist and the Ukrainian ability militarily. Craft to thwart Russian designs, but also to seriously overestimate the Russian military. I mean beforehand, a lot of, you know, so called Russian military experts analysts in our community here in in DC, were very correctly foresaw what the Russians might do in terms of the Axis axes of approach that they might take and that they would probably go for teeth and try and overthrow the government and have a regime change operation replace Zalenski with Yanacovitch or whatever other quizling that they were going to put in place and thoroughly overestimated the ability of the Russian military actually execute this very large combined arms operation? Do you think that’s because they also were focused on this Russian imperial history?

They focus on Russia and not the other independent states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Well,

you know, the the the this notion of Russian payroll history is sort of like the background to which everything develops. So it’s certainly an important part of the equation, but it it also comes back to the view they’ve acquired of Ukraine from reading something about it but not really knowing the country. And obviously, Ukraine has not had a sterling thirty year history. An independent state. We all familiar with the internal problems relating to corruption and such.

But we also know, at least those of us who really know the country, Understood that there is a separate Ukrainian identity, not restricted to just Western Ukraine, and that it includes the desire to control their own fate.

So that

what that meant to me as an analyst, you know, in twenty thirteen, twenty fourteen, as his crisis was brewing, was that an important element of the Ukrainian political scene, not necessarily a positive element, the oligarchs. We’re gonna come down four square on the side of Ukraine because they didn’t want to be part of the Russia world. They knew that in the Russian world, the oligarchs in Moscow with the connection to the Kremlin would eat their lunch. And that’s why they stood up. I mean, we we don’t like we don’t like Hallamoysky, but he did very important stuff in DeNeepro.

As the Russians started the war in twenty fourteen.

And I

don’t think that Ukraine would have survived and done boss, if Affimed have not thrown his weight into their fight in May of fourteen in Maruho, specifically.

And

this was all understandable if you paid attention to Ukraine. As opposed to having certain myths about the country. And then you read up on it, and those whatever you read would reconfirm your your myths. So you couldn’t see things playing.

And of

course, that also neglects the fact that as junior partners in the Soviet enterprise, the Ukraine is word important for us. I mean, the rocket industry, right, is a Ukraine’s east. And turning to the cultural side, Ukrainians make up certainly a large number, maybe even a majority of all Moscow patriarchate priests.

So in

all these elements, if Ukraine was not, you know, if Ukraine was not solid,

you as

Russia have a problem. And that relates directly to your question about the failure of the Russian military effort. Besides the fact that it was simply stupidly conceived, I mean, as you know, Eric, on part of a network, which includes lots of retired three and four stars. And Ben Hodges was explaining to me, in December, there’s no way that with the disposition of Ukraine Russia had, you know, two hundred thousand troops on Ukraine’s boarders, they’d be able to seize Keith. And of course, he was

right. You know, at

some point, I’d I’d like us to talk a little bit about what the long term implications of this are. I’ve been reading Dominic Leavon’s excellent book on the run up to World War one from the Russian point of view. And of course, what’s striking about the opening paragraphs. Literally, the opening paragraphs is he says, well, you know, if Ukraine is not part of the Russian empire, then there really isn’t a Russian empire. Which I think really it’s the point that you’re making of the centrality of Ukraine to Russian Imperial Power into some ways rush in self conception.

You know, we’ve all been focused on the day by day to day and the blow by blow quite understandably, and of course, the future is murky. But if if there’s one conclusion that I think is pretty straightforward to draw, it’s Ukraine is not gonna be part of a new Russian empire. You know, the the Russians have consolidated Ukrainian national identity and quite astounding ways. There’s gonna be hatred that goes on for generation after generation after generation. You know, I can imagine a Ukraine that fits into the west because it’s a western kind of country in some respects.

What what does it mean for Russia if Ukraine is permanently and profoundly alienated? I

think, yes, as Bijinsky said, there’s no Russian empire without Ukraine.

But I

think more importantly, a Ukrainian victory in this war probably means, oh, let’s put this way. It substantially increases the odds that Russia could become a quote unquote normal country. And let let me let me turn to my favorite Kremlin approved analyst, Dmitry

Trenton.

Trenton wrote a book, I don’t know, it was two thousand and two, two thousand and three, cold something like the end of Eurasia that may have been

it. And

in that book, he laid out the Seloviki view of of history, which is very much that Russian imperial view of history. And how that was may have made sense for Russia in the past, but was not a good guide for future Russia. And that Russia understood that and was moving away from that past.

Now, of

course, trend was spectacularly

wrong. As

events which crystallized during the art revolution made clear. So he had to rewrite that book a few years later. But the the point is a guy, you know, a former intelligence officer, someone who’s now rabid because the hammer has come down in Russia. You have to be fully supportive of this Fools venture. But who understood that Russia can only prosper by distancing itself from its old

habits? And

I think that his analysis is absolute is was absolutely correct. That to succeed in today’s world, you have to empower your people because this all depends upon people talent to unlock technology.

And

this is all part

of it.

The same kind and, you know, Kuchevsky famously said, is that like like history? And what I would be giving you is a paraphrase, when Russia marches the Russian people suffer.

And we see

that it’s spectacularly reaffirmed right now. So I believe that Russia cannot remain a greatest country, a world power, unless it changes its political style. And again, the fact that a long time ago as Vid Sik, who always wants to be within the Kremlin approved Penumbra, understands that. To me, he says, there are lots of people in the official elite who understand this. I

agree totally. I mean, John, when you and I were serving in Moscow and as the Soviet Union was coming unraveled. I’m sure you had the same experience. I did of many many Soviet citizens saying, you know, in a post Soviet you know, Russia, we want to become a normal country. You know, we we want to be normal.

And for all of his flaws, I think Boris Yeltsin was trying to take Russia in a direction of a a normal country. And Putin, I think, took it in a completely different direction. And I think by intent from the beginning, wanted to take it in a different direction because

he while

he might not have had any nostalgia for Soviet communist ideology had clear nostalgia for empire from the beginning. And and now it’s seeing its full effluorescence in his seven thousand words screed last summer about how Ukraine’s not really a nation. It’s part of Russia and then his more recent comments about Peter the Great and, you know, restoring Russia to its its imperial greatness. And you see this as a light motif every night on on Russian Russian TV with all of the papagandas for the Putin regime, you know, Solovyov, Simeon Jan, and of course, you know, with the recent assassination of Dasha Dougana, and her father who who’s been an an ideologist of this kind of great Russian empire. You know, this is this has to be killed for Russia to be able to become a normal country.

Can I ask

the two of you since both of you have served there and know a lot more than I do? You know, what’s the mechanism that takes you from the kind of well organized dictatorship police state that you’ve got now to in which basically anybody who’s in the elite has to be kind of complicit in the regime’s doing and which has a pretty good lock on communications and opinion shaping. What’s the mechanism that then takes you to normalcy? I mean, is it Civil War? What is it?

Well,

if you’ve been reading Levin’s book Elliott, you know that a, he talks about the hollowness of Russian institutions before nineteen seventeen check. They’re still, you know, been hollowed out by putin except for the instruments of repression. There are no other real institutions outside of the military and the security services. And the other historic means for, you know, for doing this has been military defeat, which is what broke apart the empire in in nineteen seventeen. And as leaving describes in the book, the collapse ultimately of the of the Russian army.

And we might you know, see that again, I think. Watching the Ukrainians, you know, sort of pick apart in turn to cease of Russian logistics around hair son,

you know, bridge

after bridge, one bridge at a time, one road at a time.

It’s gonna be

very difficult to sustain the rather large force that’s down there now, which they suckred the Russians, I think, into sending down from the Dunbar because they kept talking about this big counter offensive that they were gonna launch, and the Russians walked into this, and how are they gonna sustain that force over time? I I you know, after a while, if you don’t have food, you don’t have gas for your trucks and what you can’t operate. And people start to, you know, walk away. I mean, that’s, you know, a real possibility. John, would you agree with that?

Yes. And I would add it. It’s it wasn’t just what

happened after the Russian defeat in world war one. It happened in Russo Japanese war. Where you had some significant reforms because you had you had the revolution of nineteen o five, you got significant reforms as a result. After the Crimean War, you had major reforms when the Russian defeat there. And of course, at the end of the Cold War, at the end of the Afghan war, the fall of the Soviet Union, So and it’s also worth recalling that it took two years, but two years after the Cuban missile crisis, who shot was was gone.

And related to this, it’s I mean, we don’t we don’t have the best information on on Russia. What’s going on at elite levels in Russia. But any analysis of the two videos, the video a few days before the invasion, where he had put in with all of his siloetry and everyone was appalled as he was talking about things. And then the one right after the invasion where it was Putin was showing good and got awesome of. Well, they were clearly appalled as he was talking about raising the nuclear alert.

So this is Putin’s baby.

And I

I think that ultimately this will lead to a change in leadership, although ultimately could mean years down the road.

So can I ask the two

of you one other question? This is it’s not gossipy, but it’s fascinating detail. So there was, we

think,

this attempt to blow up, what’s the name Dugan? That got his daughter, although some people say, well, actually, they were targeting the daughter not Dugan. What is this all about? And more importantly, what do we think it means? I’m not

certain what it’s all about. I do know that this very peculiar version that the FSP put out within like thirty six or forty eight hours of her death. Would suggest, you know, all these details

is

not plausible, and it’s not plausible to the point a quality to Anzey Pankowski, but I’ve not verified this. This version has not actually been put into the major Russian media. It’s just like, you know, on the big TV programs, the big political programs, maybe because it is so preposterous that they could have all this detail so quickly. But there’s also the peculiarity If it weren’t true, it was just the FSB, so brilliant in analysis after the fact, was so incompetent to let this all happen. Yes.

That’s Right? I mean, this arched enemy of Ukraine, of of Russia, somehow gone to the country, rented apartments, next to her. So obviously, in a lead apartment, and was able to blow oh, go to this nationalist gathering and blow her up,

where the

CCV cameras had been turned off for the previous two weeks. Who did that?

Well, that that suggests, in fact, this was this may have represented some still wavy effort — Yeah. — who trying to diminish we can do good. Who knows?

Yeah. I mean, it it could be anything. I I think it’s hard to stress how much we don’t know about this. Correct. But Yeah.

I mean, the the cover story after, you know, how many years has it been since Boris and yipsoft was killed? They haven’t solved that murder. Right. You know, Anna Palatzka, Palatzka, you know, they haven’t solved her murder. But it’s been thirty six hours, somehow they miraculously managed to solve this thing with a story that makes no sense whatsoever.

Also, I was looking today, maybe John, you can shed light on this. They had an open casket funeral for her

after her

car was blown up and shown burning, which sort of Yes. Is a little bit mystifying to say the leaf. So there there there’s a lot we don’t know about this, but it could easily be Elliott before we started in the green room saying, do you have any good theories? And I go, no. But I got a whole bunch of bad ones, you know.

So, I mean, could be I mean, he’s reputedly close to the GRU, so this could be some kind of FS Bank GRU. You know, a feud that we don’t understand?

I I have to say it doesn’t make it stands to

reason. That whatever the

reason for this is and I it again, I on on the face of it, the whole thing just doesn’t make any sense. This has

to be

unnerving for a lot of the Russian elite. I would think. Particularly, the people like Sislavio and Simeon — Yeah. — and Simeon and others because no matter what the explanation is, it can’t be good for them. I mean, even if it’s, you know, some really ticked off veteran of Ukraine who lost you know, friends there and, you know, decide on this as a way of taking revenge.

No matter what the explanation is, it it has to be at least disconcerting to put it mildly. Yeah. I

mean, there’s a

level of incompetence being exposed as John was saying. That either they were incompetent in letting this assassin, you know, run around or they’ve incompetent at least, you know, put this whole thing together. Because it’s all, you know, the story is is, you know, unraveling anyway. I mean, it could be, you know, a message from Putin to the ultra conservatives who’ve been getting a little loud about, you know, we have to have total war when he’s a clearly not waging total war in Ukraine. He’s limited.

Limited the mobilization of the country, which is partially not solely, but partially responsible for some of the poor military performance. There’s a lot of other things that go into it corruption, lack of experience with large combined arms operations, and just the scale of what they were trying to do, which is vastly larger than anything they’ve done before in Chechnya or Georgia. I mean, the scale of this thing is just, you know, thousand mile front is much bigger than anything they’ve attempted before.

Can we talk

a little bit more about how this ends? We were discussing this a little bit before we came on. You know, the the mainstream Washington predictions seems to be stale mate, which I therefore, automatically assume is wrong. And, you know, there’s a policy recommendation that flows from that, which I think is worse than wrong, which is Well, we have to begin now figuring out some sort of diplomatic line to the Russians, which I think would be a catastrophe because you just begin negotiating with yourself. Because it’s, you know, as soon as you put forward an unreasonable proposal, everybody will say, well, that’s unreasonable.

And The

eternal search for the diplomatic off

ramp. Right. But I guess my inclination is to think that there is at least a reasonable prospect that as this goes on and as the Russians as the Ukrainians pursue what Mick Rhine is called the strategy of corrosion, the Russians crack. And that there’s a dramatic change in this, that it doesn’t simply string itself out month after month throughout the winter and even beyond. I’m curious, what what do the two of you think?

I I agree that time actually favors Ukraine. As long as Western support does not

diminish. That’s

that’s that

is a critical condition. But I could actually see this war going on for for years. I’m not predicting it will go on for years, but I could see it.

I see

this war ending when Russia realizes that its its goal is unreachable. And right now, that means Putin needs to recognize it. But it could be some other constellation of leaders that recognize it. It could also be Putin himself. I don’t rule out that possibility though.

I don’t think it’s likely. You know, I was

concerned a little bit, not so much in the most recent time period, but a couple of weeks ago, that the administration was maybe content to, as I’ve said publicly a couple times, play for a tie. And John, you authored a open letter that I signed on to. I think there were about nineteen of us who ultimately signed people who’d served and former Soviet Union have some experience with all of this, calling for much more robust support for Ukraine and and arguing that Ukraine has a chance to win And I also co wrote with David Kramer, Steve Began, and Dan Fader, a piece in the Bulwark that argued the same thing, which came out. I mean, they they were roughly contemporaneous. And since that time, I’m not sure whether we can take credit for it or not.

But since that time, there have been two rather large packages of weapon support announced for Ukraine by the Biden administration that clearly seemed to suggest that they’re not playing for a tie, that they they they want Ukraine to win. And it’s got counter battery radar, which has been a very important shortfall for the Ukrainians. It’s got a lot of ammunition in it. I think two hundred and forty thousand some rounds of one one five five ammunition, but also more ammunition from the high Mars, which have had a a huge fact the long range fires that have really done enormous damage to, again, to the Russian logistical system. So do you agree, John, that you know, arguably what we’ve written has had some impact, but also that the administration really now does seem to be understanding that that Ukraine has to win and that they’re crucial in making it happen?

I am not certain about the ultimate intent of the administration.

And I

even hold a suspicion they have not thought this through thoroughly. They’ve obviously spent a great deal of time thinking about it, but they have not thought this through thoroughly. They’re more in a crisis management mode then a clear definition of our interests and if the factors have played to protect our interests. Because I think if they did the latter, they wind up where we are, where we were in that in that joint statement. And there’s also a a very clear caution I actually call it timidity on the part of the administration.

When it comes to taking measures that would bolster Ukraine’s efforts, not just defend itself, but actually to take back territory. They have foolishly, in my opinion, discuss the nuclear threat completely illiterate in nuclear doctrine or nuclear deterrence, doctrine and practice. As done successfully by countless US administrations during the Cold War.

So this

is this is all our listeners

can’t see this, but I’m nodding vigorously in agreement. Well,

so so that leads me to another question since I mean, you’re you’re a career diplomat, John. Eric and I were reckless, political appointees, and the wicked and foolish George W. Bush administration. These guys are obviously twice as smart as we were and well intentioned, and they all get along with each other. Actually, the the question is a serious one.

I’ve been to Paul, frankly, by the way, they’ve they’ve talked about it. I think they handled the initial diplomacy very well. I give Bill Burns, our former colleague. A lot of credit for how the initial sharing of intelligence and so on went. But I have that same very strong sense that there isn’t a clear strategy here that there’s been way, way, way too much self deterring talk about escalation in nuclear weapons and so on.

And real fear of having the Ukrainians actually, you know, achieve some sort of decisive victory. So I’m curious how to explain all that? Explain this caution

or explain the arms package in light of this? No. Well, the the caution. I

mean,

the arm actually, I’m curious. You may be talking about both the arm’s pack. I think my sense is, what’s happened is they’ve gradually, you know,

they’re gradually

easing their foot off the brake. A, and b, I think Biden is somewhat tougher and more hawkish than his advisers that may be mistaken. Although, I think I actually I think Austin may be the most hawkish one of the bunch. So I I guess I do tend to think that they’re taking this foot off the brake a bit. But the other stuff I I find baffling too.

The

pattern is very

clear. They say

no to the requested. They should say yes to. And over time, they that no turns into a yes, but it takes time. And even when it turns into a yes, they do it in droplets. As opposed to substantial supply.

Yeah. This is

Elliot’s point that they’re titrating this out, you know, with a you know, eye dropper.

But the but there’s also another element. I think they are overly cautious or even intimidated by Putin’s nuclear threat, so that’s a factor, but they also don’t like public

criticism. So

they react to that. In ways that encourage more such criticism. And to me, that’s why we do

these letters.

Incentivizing our pet behavior. Yes.

Let’s get

into the escalation dynamic here because I think it’s an interesting question. I I agree totally with what you’ve said about their their illiteracy in fundamental nuclear returns. I think I think Frank Miller and I actually wrote something about that last week. One of the things that they’ve held up on is, of course, the attachums rounds for the

high bars.

The high bars are a high mobility rocket system that’s wheeled, that can use different kinds of munitions. They’ve been giving them the so called gimblers rounds, which have effective radius of I think about sixty, seventy, eighty kilometers, something like that. Attachments have a three hundred kilometer range. And so

the

idea here is we we don’t wanna give them the attack items because that would allow them to strike into Russia, and that would be escalatory. We only wanna and the argument would be we only wanna give them defensive means. We don’t wanna give them the, you know, means to offensively attack Russia. And provoke escalation. And I guess my question is, why shouldn’t the Ukrainians be able to go after

missiles

in Bilgarod, which is just some small number of kilometers over the Ukrainian border. Or in Belarus where they’ve also been taking fire. Why shouldn’t they be able to hit those legitimate military

targets? I

mean, somehow that’s escalatory, but the Russians doing this to Ukraine is not escalatory. I just don’t understand the logic.

And it gives the Russians an advantage. But it’s also true. It’s not the full American position. I mean, there have been peculate your incidents in Belgrade going back months, which

did exactly

what you said, which took the war two points in Russia, which we essential for the Russian military operation. And

as best I can

tell, we didn’t say boo about that. And also, and this is interesting, the Russians have not claimed that the Ukrainians did this. Because they didn’t want the implications for themselves of the blaming keep. So that’s interesting too. But I I believe we should affirm Ukraine’s right to legitimate self defense, which would include the right to strike back at targets in Russia which are used for military operations.

But the administration is not quite willing to go there. But I’m pleased the administration has not been fussing about the Ukrainian strikes on very successful strikes on Crimea. I mean

legally, we have never recognized the invasion and seizure of Crimea just as we never recognized a forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into Russia or Soviet Union after world war two. So that’s clearly by their own parameters, a legitimate set of targets. Now if they drop the Church Bridge, Right. I don’t know how. How do you think the administration would react to that?

I I mean, look, this is speculative. But given what I’ve seen, I would not be surprised to learn that they have counseled against it.

It would be

a from my standpoint, it would be a natural thing for Ukraine to do. Yeah. Maybe because it’s logistically important, but, b, because it would be perhaps even more dramatic than sinking the Moskva, right, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Yeah. To be clear

to our listeners. This is a bridge built by the Russians after the seizure of Crimea to link Russia physically to Crimea. And so it’s a perfect symbolic target, right, to disconnect Crimea from from physically from

Russia. Strategic and symbolic. Yes. Do the

two of you think it’s realistic to expect that this war whenever it does end, whether it’s weeks, months, years, will end with the Ukraine whose borders are those of pre twenty fourteen? I think the right answer, at least for me, is I don’t know. When

when when I’ve

been pressed to define victory for Ukraine,

My

answer

is a Ukraine which has secure, which is secure, fully sovereign, and economically viable. You can have

those things without

having all the Ukrainian territory that was under Keith’s control in twenty fourteen. It does

mean, however, you have to

have Odessa. It does

mean you have

to have either security guarantees or what some people call the Israeli Security Solution, which means you arm them in ways that make them a very very nasty target even for Russia. And as for

the actual territory,

well, that may wind up being decided that the conference table. But also, obviously, Ukraine has to have a decisive say on that. But also, given some of the

things that

Eric and I were both saying about how things may play out in Russia in light of their failure to date. I could easily see the whole Russian objective falling apart as a result of continued failure.

In

other words, Ukraine was getting all of its territory back, including Crimea, Oh, that will require some fancy footwork, which is hard to predict at the present time. Since we’ve

been

talking about what we’ve

been reading Elliott, I I’ve been reading the first volume of Stephen Kotkin’s really phenomenal biography of Stalin. And I’ve actually been reading just in the last week that chapter about the debates that Bolsheviks had about the treaty of Brestlutovsk, which was negotiated at at least initially by Trotsky with the Germans. Who who essentially already occupied almost all of Ukraine, but it created an independent Ukraine, albeit kind of under German protected for a brief period of time. So initially, Trotsky’s position was I mean, Lenin wanted to sign it. And he didn’t care.

He just wanted to sign it, be done with it, end the war for political reasons. Trotsky came up with this idea that was pretty idiotic of, you know, neither peace nor war. And he he sort of gave these, you know, kind of, huge orations to his German counterparts at the negotiating table and then came back with this slogan. And then the Germans launched another offensive and and the Bolsheviks said, you know, Boston and, you know, signed signed the deal and Ukraine became independent. So I I just bring that up just to say, you know, diplomacy can go through all sorts of permutations and and combinations before you get get a result.

And I like John, I’m hesitant to say how I think this will end, but I’m curious, I mean, it could easily end,

as John

says, with the Russians, the Russian army collapsing, and the Russians just giving up this objective of destroying Ukraine. I mean, it would this would require a change in leadership clearly that we were speculating about earlier but the Russians pulled out of Kief and pulled away from Kief. So kind of giving up some of these objectives, it’s obviously not something they’re not capable of doing. They they could could easily do it. You could see them maybe pulling out of the south because they can’t at least back to Crimea because they can’t really supply that whole area from and run and occupy it against the hostile population, all the way from, you know, muddy opal, all the way down to hair sun.

That that they may have trouble maintaining that, particularly as the Ukrainians go after the logistics. And then, you know, who knows what happens at the negotiating day label with Lugans, which they more or less totally control now. And donuts, which they control about a half of. So you

know, it could

come out in a variety of different ways. But I’m curious about the question of, like, how you get there? I mean, you know, John said, you know, it’s gonna be it could be at the negotiating table. I’m just curious about how you even get to the negotiating table. I mean, there

we

had these kind of in different negotiations that went on between the Ukrainians and the Russians for a while in

Istanbul. You

did get and I must confess this surprised me. I never thought you would get this, but you did get the grain agreement that the Turks and the UN worked out with the Russians and Ukrainians that you know, let Ukrainian grain exit the Black Sea, which is very important for Ukraine’s economy obviously to keep it functioning. My suspicion is that that was driven by Putin’s desire to keep Turkey available as a a place from which he can escape NATO sanctions in which the oligarchs who support him can, you know, basically park their yachts and their money. And and that seems to be going on. We just had the deputy secretary of treasury calling his counterpart after having visited Turkey saying stop being a place where, you know, sanctions could be violated.

Unfortunately, Turkey’s

got a long history of that.

You know,

I just wonder, I mean, John, if you’ve got thoughts, how do you get to the negotiating table? Putin seems to have no interest in negotiating. Zelensky, if you read the polls, has very little room to maneuver and to to make you know, we were talking about potential territorial concessions you might make in the Dunbaras or maybe in the south somewhere. But I don’t see right now that he’s got the ability to do any of that. So how how even as two former diplomats, how do you even get there?

I don’t even see the path. I I

agree roughly with your analysis, Eric. I think the the predicate for a realistic negotiation is clear Russian defeat or at a minimum clear Russian failure to achieve its objectives. At that point, at that point, maybe the Kremlin decides it does not need to have effective political control of Ukraine. Because that remains Putin’s objective. They have to give that up.

Once they give that up, I can see a real negotiation taking place.

The problem,

of course, which is part of the political game or the diplomatic game, is you’ve got a lot of weak sisters, especially in

Europe, who

simply want this war to go away, and they don’t understand or they’re better yet, they refused to see. That any ceasefire they tried to cobble together now, even if they were able to do it, would simply be a prelude to the next Russian offensive. Which has been the Russian pattern going back to Georgia in two thousand eight, and then, of course, with the Minsk agreements. Yeah. I sadly,

I agree. Elliott, do you

I’ve got one final question for our guest, but do you have No. I I

mean, I guess, the main thing is I agree with John. This is one of those cases where there has to be some dramatic battlefield events. And, you know, I just hope that we can there there is an instinct, which is sometimes strong in the state department. But I think it’s pervasive in the US government and then among certain elements of chattering classes to think, war is absolutely terrible, which of course it is. Therefore, we need to have a negotiation.

And this is something Eric, you and I have have talked a lot about and even talked together and and talked a lot worse about

it. There there are

times when you don’t negotiate You know, Churchill did not wanna negotiate with Hitler in nineteen forty. Lincoln was not gonna negotiate with Jefferson Davis. There there may be a time for negotiation, and of course, you never simply rule it out. But it is a question of of timing. And I think if I may if I may say so, you know, it’s a good thing to

have some

very distinguished diplomats like the two of your good selves out there saying, you know what? This is time for negotiations, and this ain’t it. On

this specific point, Putin is giving us lots of material to drive this home. All the war crimes,

the rhetoric

coming from, not just the Russian media, but a former president of Russia, which has serious scholars talking about genocide. And

of course,

any territorial concessions mean that you’re leaving those Ukrainians to the ten Diversies of

these people,

a

truly

gruesome prospect. And that’s something we need to make sure people understand.

Yeah. So, I mean, the filtration camps, the separation of, you know, Ukrainian children from their families. I mean, it’s it’s really quite horrific. And I I agree that we probably as a, you know, a nation haven’t talked about it enough. I mean, I I don’t know, but the two of you, but I am still somewhat stunned that the president of the United States has presided over thirteen billion dollars in military aid over six months to Ukraine, which is great.

Amazing. Yes.

But he has

yet to speak to the nation from the Oval Office to explain the stakes and why it’s so important as as John was saying at the outset of his comments on this podcast today. Why this is so important? And and he has yet I mean, he’s made comments along the way, including, you know, about, you know, Putin. But he has not really spoken in a coherent way to the public laying out the case for why we have to continue doing what we’re doing and I worry a little bit that even though public opinion, according to polling is pretty robust in support of Ukraine, John, you emailed me just the other day a a pull from the Chicago Council. There’s a there’s another I think a Reuters poll out today that’s very similar in terms of kind of robust support for this.

But that forty

billion dollars that Congress appropriated is gonna is gonna expire at some point We’re gonna need to go back to the well, and I really worry that there hasn’t been the political groundwork laid by by president Biden to to do that. Just imagine, what would happen? If Biden were to do that? And before

he did

that, he reached agreement with McConnell. And so you have Biden give it a speech from the Oval Office, then get some time for the Republicans to say something similar right after, how that could shape the political environment here, including going into the midterms where we’re all concerned about the possible increase of quote unquote, populist republican representation.

So,

John, just you’ve been great

with your time. I just wanted to ask you one final question. I mean, we’ve sort of circled around it, but just I wanna kind of press you a little

bit. How would you

grade the Biden administration? We’ve talked about the that they’ve been slow, they haven’t been as as quick as all of us would like with assistance. So we, you know, on this podcast, we’ve certainly been pushing that since since February. In our various writings. All three of us have written about this, public letters we’ve done.

Then they have done

a, you know, a decent job of maintaining alliance cohesion and keeping the alliance together. I give them high about how do you grade the administration overall? My adjective

of choice is adequate. And so if we’re turning that into a grade, maybe that’s a c plus.

Clearly, they’ve

laid out the right framework for pushing back, you know, the the three pillars of sanctions, arming Ukraine and plussing up NATO and East. Great. But their implementation has been cautious, timid, slow. You know,

I

I try not to get overwhelmed by the passions of the day. I try to take a an approach over time when I look at issues. And again, I think if we continue the way we are, Ukraine probably wins. It just takes longer and it’s ifier. And so if if that’s correct, then twenty years back, twenty years from now, we’ll say, well, I guess they did okay.

They did well because they won. It came out the right way. But since we don’t know, we don’t have that we don’t have that in the bag yet. Concerns about the the weaknesses in their policy, which could lead to the wrong approach. So right now, I give them a c or c plus.

I mean, I, you know,

I’m a little

more generous, great. I give them an incomplete

Well, that’s that’s

actually way to dodge the question.

Well, I think no

matter

what, it means all three of us have to keep the pressure on. Absolutely agree with that. Well, John

Thanks,

John. It’s been great having you. We we wanna have you back on shield of the Republic, but Okay. Thank you for joining us

and helping us welcome

Elliott back from his sick bed. Elliott, thank you for

for struggling to get through the the podcast. We appreciate your effort. And and well, thanks for the welcome back. I’m glad you didn’t, you know, rotate someone else in here when I dropped out for a couple of weeks. I think we did have Bill Crystal in one week, but never mind.

Okay. Fine. Once

it’s okay. And that’s all for Shield of the Republic

for this week.