How Finland Escaped Stalin’s Grasp

Welcome to Shield of the Republic. A podcast sponsored by the Bulwark the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Walter Lipman during World War two. That a strong and balanced foreign policy is the necessary shield of our Democratic Republic. I’m Eric Edelman, counselor at the Center for strategic and budgetary assessments, a Bulwark contributor, and a non resident fellow at the Miller Center. My partner in this enterprise Elliot Cohen is away today, but I’m happy to have as our very special guest, professor Kimor Antela, a emeritus professor of political history at the University of Helsinki.

Professor Rentola has previously also been a professor of history at Toku University in Finland, and he is the author of a recently released book in English how Finland survived Stalin from winter war to cold war. It is a remarkable work of, scholarship. That is based on deep archival research, multi archival research, multinational archival research, and The archives of Russia of Finland of Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as deep reading in the secondary literature, and the published documentary evidence as well. So, Professor Rentalo, welcome to shield of the Republic.

Okay. Thank you.

I wanna start by telling our, our viewers a story about, my own time in Finland As the US ambassador, Max Yachobson, who you knew, late Mac yach Yachobson, a a distinguished finished diplomat and historian in his own right, who wrote one of the early histories, diplomatic histories of the winter war, would frequently recount a story of, as a young diplomat, as the Press As Shea in the Finnish Embassy here in Washington, preparing for the visit of then finished president, to Washington to meet with president Kennedy in nineteen sixty one. And, I won’t go into the entire story, but, improbably, Max found himself on, air force one flying to hyannis port on a Friday afternoon, with president John f Kennedy. And President Kennedy, asked him a question, and that question was, we Americans have always wondered why it was alone among all the nations that bordered the Soviet Union, the Soviets never actually occupied, and turned Finland into a a people’s democracy. And Max noted in some of the his writings where he recounted this story that it didn’t seem to have occurred to president Kennedy that it might have had something to do with the fin.

And I think it’s fair to say that your book really is, I think, the definitive answer to president Kennedy’s question about why it why it is exactly that Stalin proved either unwilling or unable or a little bit of both, to impose his will on Finland So could we start? I mean, you really focus in your book on three episodes, the winter war that, began, much much as the recent war against Ukraine, began in twenty twenty two with a false flag, accusation that Finland had started firing on, on, on Russia on the Soviet on Soviet Russia. Tell us how how did how did this all work out? You know, so splendidly for the for the Fins in the in the end of the day.

It turned out to I when I was writing this book, I noticed that I didn’t, had the idea in advance, but the notice that, the same pattern was repeated three times first, starting, put on a maximum program. He wanted to to submit the whole thing under the Soviet system. I think in his head, he had this idea that he had to get back the frontiers of nineteen fourteen before the first world war. And Finland was part of the Russian empire at that time and and he was successful in in all directions and and he He tried to get Finland incorporated in in thirty nine when he began to winter war and then in two, later occasions in forty four. Also, he demanded unconditional surrender And in in forty eight, he planned a military three to military alliance with the between Finland and and Soviet union.

In all these, he first tried, be getting full control. But then, when troubles arose, the international situation and the Finnish resistance, created situation when, he saw that this is not so easy. And he was able to to stop crack and, be contented with much less than the original plan was?

Let’s talk a little bit about, the different elements that you describe, that explain why Stalin was, willing to change course and, in the end, certainly the first was finish resistance. Can you can you talk a little bit about, how that played out in in the winter war. I mean, I think as you have, I know, said publicly, the number of of Soviet, killed in action, at the time was only really a number released you know, in the nineteen, I think, eighties or nineties. So talk talk a little bit about the finish resistance. Then perhaps talk a little bit about the quality of finished statesmanship.

I was struck in reading the book, about the role of, of, Marshall and then later president mannerheim, but also, president Pasa Kivi, both in in the nineteen forty four and nineteen forty eight episodes. And then you mentioned that changing international circumstances played a role here too. I think all three of these factors played a role, but perhaps you could talk a little bit about each one.

Yeah. The resistance, I think the basis was created by, by Stalin. Himself because before the winter war, the original Soviet demands were rather small, some islands in the Baltic Sea and and a transfer of border probably twenty five kilometers or or something like that. Of course he would have later on wanted more. But that that was the beginning.

But when he attacked, he put up poppet government, a false government for Finland and, and gave order to his troops that, they must sell you the Swedes on the border. Which may mean that to to conquer the the whole finland. And, I think that created the fin so that this is not about some small islands. This is about life and death, and so they fought very hard. And so it lost they they published the figures of their, soldiers lost in the winter war only, fifty years after the war.

And it turned out that, they lost a hundred thousand twenty six, a hundred twenty six thousand so it just dead in the winter war, which is quite a lot because it it only lasts the world lasted, one hundred and five days. A little more than three months. So it was a huge fierce, furious struggle that Fins were able to put up. The Fins, they didn’t believe in the beginning that that the service would attack at at least not in the the harsh winter conditions, but they did it, and and it was a big mistake. And biggest disasters were suffered by, soviet troops trying to realize plans added to their attack plan by studying himself.

So he got quite a harsh lesson there. He, of course, he underestimated the Finnish capacity to resistance as put in a sedan in the uranium board recently.

Yes. And one of the things that struck me, when I was reading, the book was the degree to which the outnumbered Fins were extremely adaptive and creative, much the way, you saw the Ukrainians in the early days of, twenty twenty two. And one of the inventions, that the Fins had. They didn’t have the benefit, obviously, of precision guided anti tank munitions that the Ukrainians had, but they adopted their own version of that, which was that they were the ones who invented the molotov cocktail, the the, improvised explosive that disabled many, many, Russian tanks.

Yeah. That’s right.

And how did Molotov feel about that? Did you find any evidence in the in the Russian?

I’m sure that he wasn’t techie though. This was called molotov cocktail, but he couldn’t change it. It was distributed all over the world. The nominations.

Think many of our viewers and listeners may not know that, the winter war, as you said, lasted, for only a hundred and five days into the spring of nineteen forty. But once the, once the Germans invaded, the Soviet Union in in, nineteen forty one, Finland sought to get back the territory that it had lost in the treaty negotiations. First, can you explain, you know, why it was that you know, what what in the world situation in nineteen forty led Stalin to settle for less than he might have originally, in the face of all this finish opposition. But but then, you know, what, what led to the outbreak of the so called continuation war from nineteen forty one to forty four, and how that ended and what what what kept Stalin from, demanding even more of Finland in nineteen forty four than he had in in nineteen, you know, forty at the end of the winter war.

In nine in nineteen forty in the winter war, I think the main thing that changed starting mine in the main international, factor was, the Western aid plans Britain and and France, which we’re already at war with with German, Germany, but they were not waging the war yet. They plan to give help to Finland, and Stalin was not afraid of them coming to to North Norway and and Northern Finland, which was part of the plan, but he was very much afraid when he, through espionage, got the information that the western powers planned to bomb, other oil cities on the Caspian Sea, because that was the only oil available for the Soviet Union at that time. And it would have been very distracting for them in the during the war if you lose lose your oil during the war. At that time, and and then he also decided that it is great hurry now to make peace before the Western Post. Can do the pumping because the the bridges were in Iraq and and the the French were in Syria.

So, under reach, they they could they could permit quite easily. And in the second war, I think Finland would not have taken part so easily in the German attack, against the Soviet unit of the winter war, but went on occasion to get back what was lost arose with the German attack. It was quite easy to to get Finland to join. But in in nineteen forty four, it was clear that, Finland was on the losing side. Again and, and starling, was on two minds there in in nineteen forty four.

He so that it it would be possible to to go on the same same basis as as after the winter war, but then he became greedy. And when the Soviet big attack general attack in June nineteen forty four was in the beginning, it was successful he demanded surrender, unconditional surrender, which would have lead lead it into occupation. But then the finish put up more resistance and stiffer resistance. And then also the international situation changed so that the western powers made the invasion in Normandy in France. And, the Soviet commanders in the Finnish Front they asked more troops to to submit Finland, but Stalin denied because after the Western invasion and its success It was great hurry to Berlin who would be the first one there and that helped Finland quite a lot because stunning couldn’t add forces in these directions and the forces which were there were exhausted and and couldn’t produce any more results.

So Finland was helped by this. And then also in forty four, Poland was a factor in the sense that, there was the same direction of warsaw. When the red army became closer became closer and Stalin was not, willing to help the poles to success in this. And this, made his relations, with Western allies much worse than it used to be. And he needed something to show the western allies that he is able to be moderate and Finland was used for that purpose also by him.

In the case of the, you know, the nineteen forty and the allied, plans to help, finland. This is a case where, your book is fascinating, on this subject because This is a case where intelligence information may have led to conclusions that were in fact you know, more than what the reality would have led one to believe, which is to say Yes. The British and French were talking about sending forces, to Finland. But there were, you know, it’s not clear how serious that planning was. And as far as bombing back who, it it it seems that that was never really, a serious plan by by the allies.

So in some sense, Stalin and as you point out, Stalin privileged information that was clandestinely, obtained by soviet intelligence as opposed to what governments were saying and formal diplomatic communications. And it may, in this instance, have been the case that he was misled by the intelligence to take an action that spared Finland that you know, wasn’t really gonna be in the cards anyway.

Yeah. It’s a it’s it was I think it seems so that when the winter war began and and Stalin, so that this is different what what he thought, in advance. I think he believed that the British probably had misled him by feeding him with false information. That, reported the the east past the Cambridge five and and others have reported about, defy this mood in the the Finnish leadership and and uh-uh the idea that the west would not do anything came came from the intelligence sources also. And I’m starting believed that the British had tried to lead him into a trap.

And, and he cut all relations with the Cambridge five during the winter war, and that made him dependent on on intermittent from France. The French sources, more or less. And, and the French sources exaggerated the western plans. Much more than the the British. And, and the French sources were mainly immigrants, Russian immigrants who hope pretty much to collapse of both servicemen and all such things and and reported that now the huge plans are developed in in Western countries.

So starting got probably a wrong impression of the western plans and saw them through through his intelligence sources as, more dangerous than they actually were. And I think the the British didn’t try to mislead him. The situation changed. It was, the information was correct. The finish finish we are afraid afraid of this of defeat in the war if if the Soviet attack and, and the British at that time, we are not willing to help.

But when Finn’s, Finnish’s resistance gave the western powers time to develop plants, and and give assistance. The popular opinion in these countries in France and and Britain, made also the effort to to help this small nation under attack and So there also the information about, given before the war, was correct more or less to Stalin, but then the situation changed. And also the western attitudes and and the Finnish attitudes they changed from what they had been before the Soviet attack.

Yeah. I do wanna talk about a bit about the, finished diplomacy and and statesmanship here because, as a small country, with a very big neighbor. It it does seem as you read, your book, to that, finished leaders were extremely attuned to the shifting currents of international affairs and had a, a real sense of timing of what the right timing was when it, you know, was necessary to actually make a deal. And and in many of these instances, you find, Finnish leaders employing delaying tactics to try and buy time, play for time until circumstances changed. Is that a fair a fair assessment?

I think yes. Of course, there were not many in the Finnish leadership who were aware of the whole international situation, but those who were, and social democratic leader right on there. They were rather cool headed in this sense. David, they were able to calculate the situation and and so the opportunity. You see it clearly in in nineteen forty four when, the Only occasion when a peace, deal was possible was then when when Germany had vacant enough, so that it couldn’t Hitler couldn’t stop the fence to, go away from his aliens.

And, but it it must be done after that, after the chairman became weak. But before that red army arriving to Helsinki. There were only three capitals in Europe, of the country’s participating in the second World War, the capitals were not occupied by for emphasis Moscow London and Helsinki. And that was a remarkable success of timing also.

Yeah. That’s no. That’s a really incredible diplomatic achievement. Let let’s turn to the episode in in nineteen, forty eight. So Finland had had survived.

It had lost territory in in the two peace agreements, and in the peace treaty, that was reached after the war in nineteen forty seven. In nineteen forty eight, the situation’s a little bit different The United States has announced the Marshall Plan, aid, and Finland, in order not to raise soviet hackles, declines to participate, in the Marshall plan. Other countries are also in in, central Europe that are occupied, by the Red Army also end up not participating. But in in February of nineteen forty eight in, in Czechoslovakia, the communists are basically in the government. It’s a coalition government, but they’re basically instructed by Moscow to seize power and they do.

And they exclude the bourgeois parties from from government and, Czechoslovakia becomes a a a so called People’s democracy. That didn’t happen in Finland, but as you may clear in your book, it could have happened. There certainly were plans afoot to make it happen. Why didn’t it happen?

I think that the main, goal of Stalin and and the Soviet leadership in in nineteen forty eight was to get a military treaty with Finland about aliens in in case of war. If the Western powers attack the Soviets through Finnish territory. They wanted to to finish the fighter on the Soviet side. And but they knew that this is very difficult for Finland to accept And so they had plan b if the Finnish leadership of president Parsigu wouldn’t accept this. It would be forced to to become the country would be forced to become a people’s democracy.

And then, signature for such an agreement would be easy to to obtain. And and here, I think, the main thing was probably from the finish side. It was president possibly playing time here and, because the international situation was becoming for the Soviets worse and worse. There were new complications. The break with yugoslavia was advancing the Berlin crisis was, in preparation on both sides and, other things which, would take so many resources.

So it was rather difficult. And then also, I think stunning sure that it would be taking getting communists into power in Finland would be much more difficult than in in Czechoslovakia because in Czechoslovakia, the communists were dominant power in in the government and and they also had a strong position in tech tech military forces and police, but not in finance not quite the contrary in the military.

Although there’s one very interesting part of of the story, I think. Which I think might be different, which is there were some Finnish communists, and I’m thinking here particularly of the interior minister, oriolino, who had some ambivalence about Stalin and some, nationalist They might have been communist, but they were also had some nationalist feeling, as well. And some of that seems to, be at least partly a result of what happened to, many of the Finnish communists who left Finland after the finished civil war in nineteen eighteen, the reds who went to to the Soviet Union, many of whom were killed by by Stalin in the in the great terror of the nineteen thirties. Is that fair to say too that the interior minister kind of decided not to really play along with some of this?

I think, the Finnish communist leadership was afraid of taking power. Because they were, they no knew what had happened to their friends and Congress in late nineteen thirties who were in the Soviet Union, and they sense that this might be again repeated. And and then also during the war time in in particular winter war the communist, the local communist in Finland had taken part fighting the Soviet Union. Also at that time, it is said that I there is not a certain source for this, but it is said that Stalin said that, it might be better to make a deal with, bourgeois Finman led by president Pasekebi then make it by force a people’s democracy and get a left wing government, which hates us the Soviets. And, that might be a factor.

And I think, certainly, it was a factor for the Finnish Communist. And starting new that Finnish communists were not so eager to take power because of these reasons. There are some of course who where, but most of them Not very much. Everybody had lost somebody in Salins terror.

Yes. It’s a fascinating part of the story that you tell extremely extremely well. And I wanna come back to, you know, some of the source material that that you used, for this. But There’s a very interesting, episode, that you recount in, in your book, of a conversation between Stalin and, sir Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. And, the the story that you recount is that, Stalin tells Eden that Hitler is a a genius of sorts but that his problem is he doesn’t know when to stop.

And and sir Anthony Eden responds by saying Well, who who who knows when to stop? Who, you know, what leader knows when to stop? And Stalin says, I do. And you you you make the point that Stalin was capable of making very, you know, assessing the international situation, whatever, however, you know, good or bad is sources of information may have been, but assessing this the balance of forces and, making u turns, on policy. If it served served his purposes.

And and, essentially, you recount that these in these three episodes, Stalin assesses the balance and and and makes a a u-turn. I mean, one of the things that seems very striking about president Putin is it’s not clear at all that however much he may admire Stalin and in some ways you know, emulate Stalin. It’s not clear whether he has that same sense of knowing when to stop. Is that a fair judgment, do you think?

I think it’s, as fair as can be, it’s, evident that, that put in has not has had this sense of or ability to to make a a sudden turn, but he may still be forced to develop that ability. I I don’t believe he’s we we haven’t seen all his, tricks yet but Stalin was clearly Stalin’s position as a leader of the Soviet Union at that time was stronger than Temputin’s position in present day, Russia. So that Stalin was freer to make decisions so that anybody couldn’t do anything against him.

I mean, yes, critics, you know, did not fare well in Stalin’s Russia. Although today, and Putin’s Russia critics don’t seem to be faring very well either. But, as you say, it’s not his power, is not as absolute as as Stalin’s was, you know, for for sure. Can you talk a little bit about, how you got all this amazing material I mean, a a lot of the material that you cite are reports, from, Soviet intelligence agencies the NKveda, the, the, the, essentially the predecessor of the current FSB. You have, you know, western documents that had been acquired by Soviet agents that show up in, in, in, in Soviet intelligence, materials.

How did you get access to all of this material and, how likely is it that historians are gonna be able to continue to access some of this material?

Or Russian archival situation changed quite a lot after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In nineteen nineties, it was possible to get very interesting materials, by going yourself to the archives and asking, but then in put in time, it was changed so that, individual researchers were not treated so well as in the nineteen nineties. But the Soviets had this target of getting international cooperation between the scholars and and we had the Finnish, historians we had an agreement with the Russian academy of sciences to to get, some materials around the winter war and out of out of conflicts and, through that, it was possible to to get the matter as the russians during the first period of put in put in time, they were, keen to favor such projects where There was a official Soviet participant, official Russian participant, taking part in that and and get the foreigners. And also I think at that time, the Russians had the idea that by giving materials on sensitive issues to various foreign scholars. It would help to, bet get a better image for Russia in these nations for the polls, the service, the Russians gave materials on the cutting mass aircraft police officers in the last week of the winter war.

And, or decided in the last week of the winter world. They were killed a little bit later. And, the hungarians to nineteen fifty six, hunger and the revolution, suppression of that, and things like that. And with the fins, it was evident in the winter war. They saw that that was the most short point in our relations and and they thought that it would give a better image for them if they would be more honest honest about that as they used to be because earlier they had to lie many things.

And I think it was a good, target. But, they later abandoned it. And nowadays, it’s, as I have to present, I think it’s not possible to to get anything comparable from the sovieta rationale?

I think we’re lucky that you were able to get the material you did and to write this fascinating fascinating book, you know, there’s an old joke, that goes something like how, you know, how do you explain the Nordic country’s security policies. And the answer is Norway has NATO, Sweden has Finland Finland has a very long border with the Soviet Union. Talk a little bit if you would about the role that Sweden played because, you know, you you not only mined the archives in in Russia and and Finland president Posakivi’s diary and other, sources like that. But also, Swedish records as well. And the Russian, Ambassador, Soviet, woman, ambassador to Sweden for long, long time, revolutionary colleague of Lennon’s plays a very important role in this story that you tell.

So can you tell us a little bit about how Sweden, came to play a role here?

I think in in many many things have a negative attitude to to Sweden and Sweden’s role in the war. Many things that the Sweden didn’t help enough. But I think, Sweden helped quite a lot. Already, with its mere existence because it was very important for the fate of Finland that seen from Moscow on the other side of Finland was a Sweden and not Germany, like the Poles, Poles had the Germany there or the Baltics. At the Germany there, even Czech and Hennari has had the Germany.

So, it was much easier for the Soviets to to deal with the country who didn’t have such an aggressive big power on the other side decided to help it. They were They respected Sweden quite a lot astonishing a lot, but, they didn’t have to be afraid of it. It was too too small for them to be afraid of unlike Germany. So it was easier for them and also technically Sweden was neutral. It was, possible to use Sweden as a channel between Finland and the soviets when a channel was needed.

So it it was very good, for the I I think without Sweden, Finland wouldn’t have got such a piece. It got. So to help us trade it was a day. It’s true that they sent in the middle or they sent some volunteers and troops into the north of Finland. It was of course symbolically and even operationally important, but the military help was not not this issue, the political help and financial help.

Where the the most decisive part of the finish of the series helped the finland. And,

for Finland and Sweden both now, their membership in NATO is going to be, relatively a different experience, for them. I mean, there’s a strategic culture that, developed, I think, in both countries different in both countries, but in Finland, the culture of, historic neutrality, in in Finland, a, a culture of, strategic culture of being alone, and having to make one’s own way. And therefore, having to be you know, very careful, very, precise, but always a very strong sense of being alone. Do you think that it that it’s gonna take a while for Fins and Swedes to, become acculturated to, you know, planning for a a a military alliance of thirty two nations?

It may take its time. It’s, but, I think now, in particular, Finland, the the atmosphere is now so that, the situation has changed rather fast in Finland so that the opinions about NATO and and cooperation with NATO have changed changed by putting attack to Ukraine. And and I think Finland probably is more adaptive. Than Sweden, but on the other hand, Sweden has a long tradition of secret cooperation with NATO already during the cold war, which, is not so strong tradition in Finland. Finland must have been.

Much more careful because of the Soviet fear of Soviet reactions to any cooperation with with the Western power. So Sweden can be can build on that basis. Their cooperation during the cold war. It remains to be seen how how fast it will go.

We’re, we’re running, you know, short of time, but I I do wanna ask you, You know, I I don’t wanna corrupt the history that you’ve done with presentism, but, it it is inevitable, I think, that when one looks at, the work that you’ve done on on Finland survival, that people think about about what’s happening today between Russia and, Ukraine. The late big neff Przezinski, for instance, frequently would talk about the solution for Ukraine is Finlandization as he as he put it. Finlandization, I know from my time living in in Finland is is a a term that, you know, many Fins, I correctly, in my view, take offense at, in the sense that it is, frequently in the west seen as a sign of diminished independence and nationhood. And from the finish point of view, and as your book certainly shows, the ability of Finland to survive in the circumstances that it had faced, in the nineteen forties and and beyond, is really the true story of, of, of, of what happened. But What lessons, if any, do you think there are from Finland’s experience with Soviet Russia in the nineteen, forties and into the nineteen fifties and what Ukraine faces today.

Are there any lessons to be learned?

For the Finnish, there are, of course, several lessons. And the main lesson, I think, is that fulfillment the combination of, ability to resistance. And and military ability connected with ability to compromise this when needed and and made sacrifices. Also, the fin the Finnish idea, president Coi used to wrote, a book of of the Russian idea. What’s the idea of Russia after he he was retired, and it was translated into Russian.

And a Russian reporter asked, mister president, what then is the idea of Finland and he answered to survive. And and that’s a very at the description of, of the finish. So the finish were able to to do both sides. They had this strong, willingness to defend the country even by military means, but then also, ability to make compromises when needed. Turn at the the social democratic leader during the war.

He said that we must be able to to cut one limb to save the body and that was what they did during the war. And of course, I think for the finish, success in in this, it was, there was a great effect also for the fact that, when the arrears proceeded to the Soviets, after the war, the population was not left. They all came. All most all came to Finland. Which was left.

And, so nobody was remained there and it, it would have been very destructive for post war relations if there would have been a Finnish minority, which for would have been strongly oppressive by the Soviet authorities. It would have wouldn’t have been possible. In Ukraine, probably I think this compromise feeling with with the things clearly had, it’s not so strong problem in Ukraine. And also I think this, suffering of the population, civilian population has been much greater in Ukraine than it was in Finland during the war. So it creates some different factors into situation.

You make the point, you know, I think that the number of civilian casualties in the, finish winter war was only, about two thousand, and, the, the, casualties, for I mean, the disproportion between military casualties suffered on the finish side and this villain casualties is you know, absolutely astonishing. And as you say, it it created this, potential political openness to to compromise You know, I think for the benefit of, our our listeners here at at Shilda Republic, when you say that the Fins, in the territory that the Soviets took in Karelia, were evacuated to Finland. It was four hundred thousand people, which was more than ten percent. Of the population of Finland. I mean, I think the overall finished population was something on the order of three million plus or something in in in nineteen forty.

So four hundred thousand people being relocated, from the Corellian, you know, territories that were, ultimately taken over by the Soviets into Finland to what’s today’s Finland it was an extraordinary, event. I know when I was ambassador, lots of people, whom I met and and came to know. I believe president Atasari, in fact, who was president when I was there. His family was, evacuated from Corellia. So this was a very, very big deal, and a huge undertaking, by by Finland and and you, you know, you don’t hear Finn’s complain about it and say, oh, you know, woe is us, you know, this terrible thing happened.

And Finn’s just it was part of doing business with a big ugly neighbor next door.

Yeah. And I think also the the small number of civilian losses was very important for the post war relations in in both wars. The winter war and and the continuation war after that, we lost about ninety ninety thousand soldiers dead which is a great number for a small country. But in a perverse sense, you can called natural, the fact that the young men are killed in the war. But the civilian losses were only two thousands.

And you don’t find that proportion in any European country. Even the English, lost more civilians because of the heavy bombings, but, but the fins did not and and It created the atmosphere after the war that we were able to protect the civilian population and we were able to, stand the war period why don’t we would be able to stand also the period of peace?

Yes. Well, our guest today has been Professor Kemo Rantola, the author of How Finland survived Stalin published by Yale University Press. It’s a terrific work of history, and I learned a lot. I I thought I knew a lot about the winter war and, the continuation war, but I learned a lot from reading this book, and I’m very grateful to you. For, writing it, I’m grateful to, Finland’s ambassador to the United States, Mico Haltela, for arranging for it to be translated into English.

I think, there’s a lot, a lot to be learned here. And, thank you very much for joining us on shield of the Republic. Okay. Thank you.